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Bihar Muslims' Response to Two Nation Theory 
1940-47: 
The Lahore session (1940) of the Muslim League adopted 
a resolution in which Muslim majority areas were sought to be 
grouped as "autonomous and sovereign" , 'independent 
states". 
This vaguely worded resolution came to be known as 
Pakistan resolution. The Muslim League, from its days of 
foundation (in 1906) to the provincial elections of 1937, 
underwent many changes. However, after the elections of 1937 
its desperation had increased manifold. During the period of 
the Congress ministry (1937-39), the League succeeded in 
winning over a sizeable section of the Muslims, more 
particularly the landed elites and educated middle class 
Muslims of Muslim minority provinces like U.P. and Bihar. 
From 1937 onwards, the divide between the two communities 
went on widening. Through a massive propaganda and tactful 
mobilizations, the League expanded its base, adopted a 
divisive resolution at Lahore (1940) and then on kept pushing 
its agenda which culminated into the partition of India. 
Nevertheless, the role of imperialism, the role of Hindu 
majoritarian organizations like the Hindu Mahasabha and 
tactical failure on the part of the Congress combined with 
communalization of the lower units of the Congress 
(notwithstanding the unifying ideals of the Congress working 
Committee) can not be denied in the partition of the country. 
Such analysis on the 'making of Pakistan' has either 
concentrated on the negotiative politics at the level of top 
leadership, known as 'High Politics' of partition or else the 
works on partition remain confined to the provinces of the 
Punjab, the Bengal and the United Provinces (now Uttar 
Pradesh). 
The present study therefore concentrates on Bihar. As 
suggested by the title itself, this s tudy has not gone into the 
'High Politics' of Partition. Nor does this study go into the 
theoretical debates on the concept of the Two-Nation theory. 
(Anil Chandra Banerji in his Two Nations: The 
Philosophy of Muslim Nationalism and Shafique Ali Khan in 
his Two Nation Theory as a Concept Strategy and Ideology 
have dealt with this aspect in detail). 
This study only concentrates on the response of the 
organizations and individuals of the Muslims of Bihar towards 
the separatist politics of the League. 
This work consists of six chapters including the Prelude 
and the Conclusion. The first chapter, i.e. the Prelude, gives a 
survey of the works on the political behaviour of the Muslims 
of Bihar. For a broader and comparative perspective, it also 
makes use of some of the works on other provinces. Moreover, 
to understand the reasons of the alienation of other 
marginalized linguistic and social groups of the colonial 
Indian society, it also refers to the non Brahmin Tamils, and 
their relationship with the Congress led Indian National 
Movement. 
The second chapter, Community Consensus: Muslims in 
Bihar Politics - An Overview uptill 1940 traces the history of 
the cordial relationship between Hindus and Muslims in 
colonial Bihar. This chapter also comes out with the finding 
that Bihar being the nerve centre of the fiercely and colonial 
'Wahabi' movement negates the common perception that in the 
late 19 '^' century the Muslims became loyal to the British. 
In Bihar, both traditionally educated Ulema and the 
modern educated Muslims maintained a cordial relationship 
with the Hindus, jointly opened up educational institutions and 
political associations and fought against imperialism shoulder 
to shoulder. Having taken a lead in modern education, the 
Bengalis had dominated the public employment in Bihar. 
Therefore resenting against this, both Hindus and Muslims 
gave a priority to make Bihar a province - separate from 
Bengal. The political mobilization along these lines, probably 
united both the Hindus and Muslims. In fact the voice of 
separate provincial status for Bihar was first raised by the 
Muslims in a Monghyr based Urdu newspaper Murgh /-
Sulaiman (1877). From the different annual sessions of the 
Congress to the Non Co operation and Khilafat movements and 
the Civil Disobedience movements, the participation of 
Muslims remained very high. 
The Bihar Provincial Muslim League (BPML) 
collaborated with the Congress and the former organization 
was dominated by the staunch nationalists like Hasan Imam 
and Mazharul Haq. Pertinently, the League and the Congress 
in Bihar did not have an adversarial relationship for 
considerable period of time. In fact in the wake of the Khilafat 
movement the League almost lost its organizational existence. 
The third chapter. The Polarizing Texture of Bihar 
Politics: A Survery uptill 1940 gives an account of the rift 
between the two communities. The organizations like 
Gauraksini Sabhas (1880s onwards), and Shudhi and 
Sangathan programmes, tableegh and tanzeem movements 
estranged the relationship between the two communities. 
Frequent riots took place. The elections of 1920s and the 
perceived and real grievances of the Muslims against the 
Congress ministry (1937-39) contributed to the alienation of 
the Muslims against the Congress. The League played upon it 
very shrewdly. Thus, the League carved out a space for itself. 
From 1938 onwards, it established several district units. 
Denying premiership to Syed Mahmud, also contributed to 
Congress-Muslim rift. 
However, it was 1946 riots that substantially increased 
the distrust between the two communities. The involvement of 
the functionaries of the Congress in the riots was a major blow 
to the Muslim-Congress relation. And regardless of their 
attitude towards the League, the Muslims, to their surprise, 
came to perceive that the Congress also believed in dividing 
the country along Hindu and Muslim lines. The colonial police 
displayed its inefficiency in handling the communal riots and 
the S. K. Sinha led ministry failed to win the trust of the 
Muslims on this issue. Despite Gandhiji's insistence, Syed 
Mahmud was not given enough roles to play in such a 
situation. All such things have been dealt with in the fourth 
chapter, Bihar Muslims : From Alienation to Exodus 1940-47. 
The fifth chapter, Muslims' Resistance to the Two-Nation 
Theory: Bihar 1940-47, provides the details of the Muslim 
organizations and the individuals who confronted the League's 
separatist politics very strongly and effectively. These 
organizations were Imarat-e-Shariah, Momim Conference, 
Shia Conference and, of course, a huge mass of the Muslim 
leadership associated with the Congress. Besides them, a large 
number of Muslims in Bihar were associated with the Socialist 
organizations. All of them not only confronted the League's 
communal separatism but also ensured a large participation of 
Muslims in the Quit India Movement. 
This chapter also makes a detailed analysis of the 
reasons why and how did the Muslim League succeed in 
winning the most of the Muslim seats of Bihar in the 1946 
elections. 
This exploration reveals that the League's separatism 
could not strike deeper roots among the Muslims of Bihar, and 
the organizational presence and penetration of the League was 
always weaker . But the communal violence in retaliation of 
the pogroms in Noakhali (Bengal) was very fatal as the Bihar 
Congress resembled with the Bengal League. 
Neverthless, the present study in its Conclusion does 
underline that 'Despite the communalization of the lower 
rungs of the Congress, it was largely due to the ideals set by 
the Congress led national movement that the all-inclusive 
ideals like religious pluralism and secular democracy remains 
the guiding principle of independent India' and that 'India 
could be partitioned only in the presence of British'. 
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India's struggle for freedom was unique in the sense tliat it was not only for 
national liberation but also for a national reconstruction. The dialectics of 
the Indian National Movement as conducted by the Indian National 
Congress froml885 had undergone several changes during its journey. From 
constitutionalism to agitational politics characterized by the ever expanding 
and penetrating mass movements like the Non Cooperation movement, the 
Civil Disobedience movement, the Quit India movement and the ultimate 
partition of India and the Independence in 1947. These aspects of the Indian 
National Congress and the response of the retreating imperialism have been 
widely researched, discussed and interpreted through different approaches. 
Still the interest in the theme remains and several questions have yet to be 
answered rather explained in depth. 
The partition of India however was an anti-climax of the national movement 
in some ways. This theme also has been widely researched, discussed and 
debated and it still continues to interest the scholars everywhere. There are 
various versions of British scholars both academic and retired English civil 
servants. There are also versions of Indian scholars and civil servants like 
V.P. Menon's Transfer of Power. There are other works in which there is an 
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attempt to put the blame and guilt on individuals who were on the centre 
stage of the final phase of the Indian National Movement. There are other 
works written from ideological point of views, inspired by personal political 
jealousies, personality clashes etc. These are more inspired by the post 
independence electoral politics. 
However, this is significant to be noted that the Indian National Congress 
was at the helm of affairs all through and there were no other challenging 
models for India's freedom struggle unlike the Italian or German Unification 
to take as an example to illustrate our point of view. The proponents of the 
Italian unification had three contending and competing models: 
(a) For the creation of a Papal State 
(b) For unification under Austrian hegemony 
(c) Sardinia-Piedmont led unification 
Of these three models the third one succeeded. 
In the German unification also there were three models exemplified by: 
(a) Austria led Holy Roman Empire 
(b) Federal model 
(c) Prussia led movement who waged wars and effected consolidation under 
its leadership. It was the third model, which gave a final shape to the 
German unification and the birth of the German Empire. 
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Whereas in the case of the Indian National Movement, we have no such 
plans and models for national liberation, above all the nature of the state. 
We have to take note of certain emotional and idealistic sectional appeals. 
The Hindu Mahasabha's slogan of 'Akhand Bharat' could not challenge the 
Congress, nor could it throw any all-inclusive concrete blue print of secular 
Independent India. It could not emerge as a legitimate, acceptable force as it 
was never openly opposed to the British Imperialism nor was it ever in the 
mainstream. 
The Indian Marxists also did not put forward any well thought out plan and 
make efforts to win the support of Indian people. So far as Socialism is 
concerned, the Congress itself had adopted it in the Faizpur session of 1936. 
Thus the Marxists were not left with anything distinctive on the 
programmatic plane. 
Similarly the Muslim groups also did not come out with a concrete all-
inclusive alternative, cutting across caste or communal lines. Maulana Md. 
Ali Jauhar did talk about India being a " Federation of Religions". He could 
not give his ideas a concrete shape. This idea therefore did not have many 
takers. Sir Syed Ahmad Khan had come to realize that British rule has come 
to stay in India. Because, in order to understand the British rule in India, he 
derived an historical analogy from the Mughals to explain his point of view. 
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Therefore he employed his energy to come to terms with the British rule in 
India. Compared to this the Muslim leaders in the metropolitan cities had a 
different experience and found themselves competent to confront with the 
emerging educated middle class. 
We have situations where the Indian National Congress sought to 
accommodate Muslim demands in the Lucknow Pact (1916) and its different 
version was the C.R. Das Formula (1923) for Bengal. The intervening 
developments in India and abroad made the British to offer new proposals to 
the Indian National Congress and others. The developments of the period 
after the First World War have been widely researched in various works'. 
However the significant work of Ayesha Jalal has raised questions. While 
blaming the Congress, she says that, "It was Congress that insisted on 
partition. It was Jirmah who was against partition" and that the "absolute 
partition was Congress order of the day"^ at the same, her research has 
breathed a fresh air to question even the attitude and policies of M. A. 
Mushirul Hasan, Nationalism and Communal Politics in India 1885-1930 Delhi, 1991. 
David Page, Prelude to Partition The Indian Muslims and the Imperial System of Control 1920-32. Delhi 
1982. 
Uma Kaura, Muslims and Indian Nationalism 1928-40. Delhi, 1977. 
^ The Sole Spokesman: Jimah, the Muslim League and the Demand for Pakistan. 
Cambridge, 1985. p. 262. 
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Jinnah; even though marginally if not substantially. A recent study of Salil 
3 
Mishra has observed: 
" It was no great discovery made by Jalal that Jinnah was against 
the partition of the two Muslim majority provinces (namely 
Punjab and Bengal). He wanted to include the two undivided 
provinces in His Pakistan. Congress on the other hand insisted 
that, in the eventuality of "India" being partitioned, Punjab and 
Bengal too would have to be partitioned...." 
Much remains to be researched about Jinnah in order to understand him and 
his times. He took up a definite position only in 1940s. He did not talk of 
transfer of population. 
The Congress may be blamed for many things but this was the only 
organization, which had not undertaken any sectional/ sectoral demands 
unlike the Muslim League and the Hindu Mahasabha to name a few. 
Indians may blame each other but the fact remains that India could be 
divided only in the presence of the British Empire. 
^ A Narrative of Communal Politics: Uttar The 1946 Riot and the Exodus of Bihari 
Muslims to Dhaka. In Sharifudin Ahmad (ed.) Dhaka: Past, Present and Future, Dhaka, 
1991. For details of the riots, see Sir Francis Tucker, ''^India's Partition and Human 
Debasement" Delhi, 1988.pp.l80-194. 
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The present work attempts to investigate the response of the Muslims of 
Bihar for and against the Two Nation theory of the Muslim League as put 
forward by M. A. Jirmah. 
Moreover, cutting across the historiographical trends and the regions chosen, 
the discourse on the Muslims of British India is usually reduced to the idea 
of separatism. 
This has much to do with the (mis) perception that Partition was largely a 
Muslim affair rather than a Muslim League affair. Whereas, historically, the 
policies and programmes of the Muslim League alone have not solely 
influenced the political behaviour of all the colonial Indian Muslims. The 
failings of the Congress in shaping the responses of the Muslims have 
largely been ignored. 
Mushirul Hasan, in his paper on the Muslim Mass Contact Programme of the 
Congress ministry (1937-1939), clearly says: 
"within two years of its launching, the Mass Contacts Campaign 
ran into serious trouble not so much due to the Muslim Leagues 
opposition or the lack of Muslim support, but because of 
Congress' own reluctance to pursue it with any vigour or sense of 
purpose".'^ 
' Mushirul Hasan (ed.) India's Partition: Process, Strategy and Mobilization. OUP, 
Delhi, 1993. pp. 153-59. 
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In the early 1939 the Mass Contact Programme was scrapped, as it was 
considered only a brainchild of Nehru. In general most of the prominent and 
influential Congress leaders had remained either opposed to or 
unenthusiastic about it. The Congress right wing came out with the bitter 
criticism against it. So much so that Abul Kalam Azad's pamphlet, 
"Congress and Musalmans" could not be distributed on the lame excuse of 
lack of funds. B.S, Moonje proposed to Bhai Parmanand and Raja Narendra 
Nath that all the "Hindu Mahasabhites" should join Congress to counteract 
the effect of Muslim influx into the organizational structure of the 
Congress^. 
Mushirul Hasan comes out with serious indictment of the Congress proving 
the Mahasabhite hold on the district units of the Congress and concludes: 
"Congress' own position regarding Communal activities of its 
members remained dangerously vague" 




Salil Mishra's work^ is definitely a serious attempt at filling this gap 
although it is confined to U.P. alone, and it studied only a brief period from 
1937-1939. 
An all-inclusive study of Partition will, therefore, have to undertake the 
explorations at two levels. First, the role of majoritarian communalism 
articulated not only through the organizations like the Hindu Mahasabha but 
also manifested by the Congress (notwithstanding its ideological 
commitments). Secondly, regarding the political behaviour of the Muslims, a 
clear distinction has to be made between the politics of territorial 
separatism and demanding adequate representation in the power 
structure. 
Joya Chatterji's work^ points out the Congress' failure in Bengal. She says 
that in 1905 the bhadralok Bengalis stood against the partition of Bengal 
along religious lines but in 1947, when the definitive partition of Bengal 
took place, this was preceded by as an organized agitation (which demanded 
the partition of the province along religious lines.) again by the very same 
social class of bhadralok. 
She looks at the role of the Congress in Bengal on a broader canvas of 
economic, cultural and political perspective. She says that the bhadralok 
' A Narrative of Communal Politics: Uttar Pradesh 1937-39. Delhi. 2001 
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nationalism was strongly committed to zamindari and rent receiving 
interests. 'This avowedly 'modem' progressive and anglicized bhadralok 
nationalism drew inspiration from Hindu revivalist ideologies. This 
reactionary shift emanated from the threat that was presented to the elites by 
the economic depression of 1930s, and by the McDonald's Award and 
Poona Pact of 1932. This drove the Bengali Hindu elites from anti British to 
Anti Muslim Posture. She observes that sudden collapse of agrarian prices 
and of rural credit in 1930s, placed tremendous strain on rent and debt 
collection. This decline in power of rent and debt extraction went in favour 
of prosperous tenants constituted by Muslims. They could now flout the 
landlords and could consolidate their own position in rural Bengal. 
Secondly, the Act of 1935 gave the voting rights to the upper stratum of 
peasantry, hence a voice in the legislative arena, besides being support d by 
a restless Muslim intelligentsia. This assertion of rising mofussil Muslims 
greatly threatened the position of the bhadralok in the power structure. 
Thirdly, the McDonald's Award and Poona Pact dramatically altered the 
balance of power in the province. In the legislative assembly bhadralok 
strength came down. This impending fear of Muslim dominance in politics 
led the bhadralok to look upon the British favourably. Not only this, the role 
^ Bengal Divided: Hindu Communalism and Partition 1932-47, Cambridge, 1995. 
10 
of the Bengal Congress started declining on the all India plane, hostility 
against the central Congress leadership increased and the factionalism within 
the Congress along the left and the right eventually led to capture of the 
Congress by the right wing who created a new Hindu political identity and 
the Bengal Congress deployed the Hindu Mahasabha to organize a campaign 
for partition of Bengal in 1947. 
Having said this, Chatterji concludes that the partition of 1947, in Bengal, 
was the considered choice of large and powerful sections of the Hindu 
population. When push came to shove, bhadralok Hindus preferred to carve 
up Bengal rather than to accept the indignity of being ruled by Muslims. She 
fiirther says that in the case of Bengal Hindus evolved a parallel separatism 
of their own. The Bengal Congress campaigned successfully for the 
vivisection of its province on communal lines. The Congress high command 
was ready to pay the price of partition in order to strengthen its hold over a 
Unitary India. 
So far as the united Bengal Plan of Sarat Chandra Bose is concerned, 
Chatterji argues that this plan had no takers on its home ground, culture was 
, ! 
deployed as a mark of difference rather than evidence of traditional unity in 
the region, and the bhadralok Bengalis far from launching agitation against it 
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actually fought for the partition which gave them a separate homeland of 
their own. 
Besides Joya Chatterji, some of the recent studies have sought to challenge 
the discourses with regard to religious or linguistic minorities. Such studies 
have contested the hegemonistic, assimilative, dominant, intolerant, 
exclusivist nationalism represented by the Indian National Congress, which 
remained dismissive about sub-national nationalism of different religious 
and linguistic minorities, whose legitimate power aspirations were rejected 
by dubbing them as 'separatist' or 'anti-national'. 
Q 
Thus M.S.S.Pandian protests against the framework of nationalist narrative 
within which the 'linguistic insubordination' of Tamil Nadu gets written as 
'chauvinistic' 'fissiparous' and 'divisive' He argues to "free the language 
question in Tamil Nadu from the stigma of being dubbed 'anti national' in 
the nationalist narrative, and make available alternative ways of imagining 
politics based on the national-popular will...the anti-Hindi agitation 
I 
launched by the Self-Respect Movement in 1937(when the Congress 
ministry was formed) was a movement where national-popular found its 
articulation in mobilizing a spectrum of subaltemities in support of Tamil." 
^ MSS Pandian, "Towards National-Popular: Notes on Self-Respecters' Tamil". 
Economic and Political Weekly (EPW), December 21, 1996. pp.3323-3329. 
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Charu Gupta^, argues that the very metaphors of nationalism viz. {Bharat 
Mata, Matri Bhasha, Gau Matd) were exclusionary and divisive. It can, 
therefore, be safely said that these kinds of narratives of majoritarian 
nationalism were not less responsible for stoking separatism. 
Tanika Sarkar'° advocates against 'viewing the colonial past as an 
unproblematic retrospect where all power was on one side and all protest on 
the other' and she further suggests that 'partisanship has to take into account 
a multi-faceted nationaiism, all aspects of which were complicit with 
power and domination even when they critiqued western knowledge and 
challenged colonial power' 
In this context, there is a need to explore the political behaviour of colonial 
Indian Muslims of different regions. 
As we have stated above that most of the studies on Partition have remained 
confined generally to UP, Punjab and Bengal. The present work attempts to 
study the question of the partition of India and the response of the Muslims 
of Bihar leaving aside the 'high politics' of partition. 
^ Charu Gupta, "The Icon of Mother in Late Colonial North India: 'Bharat Mata', 'Matri 
Bhasha' and 'Gau Mata' in Economic and Political Weekly, pp. 4291-99. November 10, 
2001. 
Tanika Sarkar, "Rhetoric Against Age of Consent: Resisting Colonial Reason and 
Death of a Child-Wife" EPW, September 4,1993. 
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There are a number of studies on Bihar politics with reference to Muslims. 
The studies of Md. Muzaffar Imam" , Kamta Chaubey'^ and the latest 
study of Taqi Rahim'^.as well as several extremely well researched articles 
published by Papiya Ghosh give refreshingly new and imaginative ideas on 
the Muslim Politics in Bihar. 
Taqi Rahim's work is an important intervention. A freedom fighter, writer, 
and a political activist of radical conviction, died only recently. His book, 
therefore, is valuable as his memoir, especially with regard to the 
developments of the period from 1937 to 1947. Taqi Rahim writes that he 
has avoided many references lest the book may not become cumbersome. 
But nothing (including those based on his memories) has been written 
without corroborating them with reliable sources and archival documents. 
Nevertheless, all these works have contested the "primordialist" as well as 
the "instrumentalist" theories of Muslim separatism.*'* The foremost 
" Role of Muslims in the National Movement, 1912-1930: A Study of Bihar. Delhi, 1987. 
^^ Muslims and Freedom Movement in India, 1905-1928, ('A study of Bihar), Allahabad, 
1990. This work, for communal polarization, puts much emphasis on the elections of 
1924-28 when Shafi Daudi, Mazharul Haq, Hadi Husain and some other prominent 
Congressmen were defeated. Rajendra Prasad also confirms it in his Autobiography. 
" Tehreek-e-Azadi mein Bihar ke Musalmanon ka Hissa (In Urdu) i.e. Contribution of 
Muslims of Bihar in the Freedom Movement, Patna, 1998. 
Francis Robinson," Islam and Muslim Separatism: A Historiographical Debate" in 
Mushirul Hasan (ed.) Communal and Pan Islamic Trends in Colonial India. New Delhi, 
1985 (revised). 
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Primordialist is Francis Robinson, whose ideas have been supported by 
Farzana Sheikh/^ 
Robinson says that the Muslims have certain primordial contents which 
direct them towards separatism, that the Muslims are an innately separate 
political entity, that there are always some symbols in their cultural 
storehouse which are used for political mobilization, which according to 
him, was the reason why even western educated politicians like Maulana 
Mohammad Ali Jauhar and M.A.Jinnah slipped away to religious 
nationalism, demanding a homeland for the ummah. Hence, according to 
Robinson, even prior to the formation of middle class, and even before the 
beginning of competition for jobs etc. elements of separatism can be traced 
among Muslims. Robinson's thesis therefore ignores the different kinds of 
stratifications of the South Asian Islam based on class, region, 
language/dialect, sect, caste/biradri, sect/doctrine etc. The anti colonial and 
collaborative positions (with the Congress) taken by Deoband, Jamiat-ul-
ulama-I- Hind, Imarat-e-Shariah (Patna), Momin Conference, Shia Political 
Paul R. Brass, ''Muslim Separatism in United Provinces: Social Context and Political 
Strategy Before Partition" Economic and Political Weekly, Annual Number, January, 
1970,also, 
Reply to Francis Robinson" in Robin Jeffrey, Lance Brennan, Jim Masselos, Peter 
Mayor and Peter Reeves (eds.) India: Rebellion to Republic, Selected Writings, 1857-
1990. New Delhi, 1990. 
'' Community and Consensus in Islam, Cambridge, 1989. 
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Conference, Rayeen Conference, Mansoori Conference etc have not been 
explained by Robinson. 
Not only this, even if we don't take into account the above mentioned 
stratifications, and study the later half of century Bihar to scrutinize 
Robinson's thesis, we find that Robinson's thesis fails to hold ground. 
About the Ulema, Paul Brass'^ says: 
"their religious orientation tended towards traditionalism and 
revivalism rather than rationalism and modernism...Culturally 
they were oriented towards traditional education through the 
medium of Urdu, rather than toward modem education through 
the medium of English." 
Contrary to such formulations, in Bihar, as early as 1836, Shah Kabiruddin 
of Sasaram khanqah had applied to the Governor General of India for 
providing modem education in English in madrasa associated with the 
khanqah where Hindus and Muslims both received their primary 
education.'^ The first literary society called Anjuman-e-Islamia was 
established at Arrah in August 1866. The chief patrons included non-
Muslims like Babu Surajmal besides Muslims like Waris Ali Khan, Khuda 
Language, Religion and Politics in North India, Cambridge, 1974, p. 163. 
" Muzaffar Imam, op cit pp. 19-20. 
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Bakhsh Khan etc. The society was open for both the communities. Syed 
Imdad Ali's Bihar Scientific Society, Muzaffarpur, founded in May 1868, 
had 500 members including an overwhelming number of Hindus also. Its 
journal in Urdu; Akhbarul-Akhyar was edited by a Hindu, Babu 
Ajodhyanath. The Society had many branches and a chain of schools even in 
the villages of Muzaffarpur and elsewhere. The network was funded by a 
number of Hindu zamindars. It later developed into Collegiate school and 
subsequently, in 1899; it was handed over to Langat Singh to make it the 
premier college of modem education in North Bihar/ ' 
Similarly, in Patna, Zubdatul Madaris, Bihar Literary Society (1873), Bihar 
Association (1871), Bihar Up/car Sabha (1876), were all opened for every 
community. In March 1884 Shamsul Ulema Mohammad Hasan founded 
Mohammadan Anglo Arabic School. It brought out gazetteers in Urdu and 
English; it had many Hindu students on its roll. Syed Sharfliddin (1856-
1921) opened a Darul Ulum at Bankipur (Patna) on Deoband pattern. 
All these illustrations prove that, in Bihar, the movement for modern 
education never attained a particularist /separatist dimension. 
" J.SJha, "Origin and Development of Cultural Institutions in Bihar", Journal of Historical Research, 
Ranchi, 1965, vol. viii. 
" B.K.Sinha, "Syed Imdad AH Khan-An Eminent Educationist of Nineteenth Century Bihar", Journal of 
Historical Research, Ranchi, vol.xiii, 1970. 
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That is why when Hindi with Nagri script was introduced as court language 
in Bihar in January 1881, both Hindus (particularly Kayasthas) and Muslims 
together opposed it. Whereas in the Patna College as well as in other schools 
not less than 23% of the total students were Muslims while their total 
population was only 13%.^" No wonder then, that when Sir Syed Ahmad 
Khan advised the Muslims to stay away from the Congress to avoid another 
conflict with the colonial masters after 1857 and to concentrate on modern 
education instead, the educated Muslim elites of Bihar explicitly declared to 
go along with the Congress. The foremost voice representing this idea came 
from Syed Sharfliddin. At Allahabad session of the Indian National 
Congress in 1888, he led the Bihar delegates. Wazir Ali Khan of Gaya also 
accompanied him, Sharfuddin spoke at the Allahabad session: 
"I am proud to say we have here amongst us more than 200 
Muslims. I hope that at least in my province of Bihar the Muslims 
have the fullest sympathy with the objects of the National 
Congress"^' 
20 Taqi Rahim, op cit p.99. 
Report of the Indian National Congress, 1888, cited by J.S.Jha, Early Revolutionary 
Movements in Bihar, Patna, 1978. p. 21. 
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Similarly, a large section of the Ulama was associated with the Congress 
from the very beginning. ^ ^ 
In 1899, Afaq Khan set up "Boys' Association" at Darbhanga to popularize 
the Congress' programmes in the region. At the Sonepur fair, first meeting 
of the Bihar Provincial Congress Committee was held, chaired by Sarfaraz 
Hussain Khan, and of the 6 delegates, 2 were Muslims Hasan Imam 
and Najmul Hoda. Ali Imam was elected the president of the Bihar 
Provincial Congress at Patna in 1908. At Madras session of the Congress, 
Ali Imam spoke on the civil liberties. He demanded repeal of Deportation 
Regulation. Maulana Shibli Nomani vehemently criticized the Muslim 
League while Mazharul Haq, Sarfaraz Hussain Khan, Ali Imam, Hasan 
Imam, etc. brought it near the Congress. Due to the overwhelming presence 
of nationalist Muslims in the Bihar Provincial Muslim League, it was kept 
out of the agitation for the separate electorate.^^ In fact, the Bihar Congress, 
during its early phase, was dominated by the Muslims rather than the 
Hindus. Most prominent of them were Nawab Sohrab Jung, Syed Wilayat 
Ali Khan, Syed Fazal Imam, and Wazir during its initial phase. Syed Imdad 
Imam, Syed Amir Husain (1864-1910), Syed Sulaiman Nadvi (1884-1953), 
Khuda Bakhsh Khan (1842-1908), Syed Sharfuddin (1856-1921), 
" Muzaffar Imam, op cit p.27. 
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Salahuddin Khuda Bakhsh (1875-1931), Mazharul Haq (1866-1931), S.M. 
Fakhruddin (1868-1931), Khwaja Md. Noor (1878-1936), S. Ali Imam 
(1869-1932), S. Hasan Imam (1871-1933), Sir Sultan Ahmad (1880-1963), 
S. M. Zubair (1884-1930), S. M. Umair (1894-1978), Shafi Daudi (1879-
1949), Abdul Qaiyum Ansari (1905-1974), Manzoor Ajazi (1913-1969), 
Maghfoor Ajazi etc. 
Here it should be mentioned that "Instrumentalist" thesis of Paul R. Brass 
or Anil Seal's explanation regarding the "Muslim Breakaway"^'^ fail to 
explain the case of Bihar, where also, like UP, the Muslims were far ahead 
of Hindus in education and jobs. However, unlike the Muslims of U.P., 
neither in establishing educational institutions nor in taking position against 
the colonial rule, the Muslims of Bihar charted a different/antagonistic 
course. 
Another significant thing about late 19th and early 20^^ century Bihar is that 
here, even the champions of modem education like Noorul Hoda and 
Khudabakhsh Khan remained concerned about religio-cultural traditions. 
Hence they revived the old madrasas and opened up new ones. In fact, 
" The Hindustan Review, 1907,vol.viii.p.l 10. 
See Paul Brass "Muslim Separatism in United Provinces" EPW, 1970 and Anil Seal, 
Emergence of Indian Nationalism: Competition and Collaboration in Nineteenth Century, 
Cambridge, 1977 for an explanation of the instrumentalist idea which argues that rather than 
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regarding education, there was no conflict whatsoever between the 
traditionalists and modernists. Each was committed to both systems of 
education. This happy blend of tradition and modernity might have 
helped check the growth of separatism. These institutions produced many 
leaders, Shri Krishna Sahay Indian member of the Governor's Executive 
Council of Bihar), Dr. Sachidanand Sinha, Dr. Rajendra Prasad, Alakh 
Kumar Sinha, Narayan Babu Inspector General of Police, Bihar) and 
many other luminaries got their primary education from such Anglo-
Urdu/Persian madarsas. 
This is the reason why next to Bengalis, Muslims dominated in government 
jobs, medical and legal professions.^^ Therefore, in the movement for 
separation of Bihar from Bengal, Muslims were in the forefront. 
In 1905 when Swadeshi movement was launched against Curzon's partition 
of Bengal, the leadership of the movement had adopted certain 
mobilisational symbols and methods, which alienated the Muslims giving 
social cleavages being the determining factor in political mobilization, it is the activity of elites 
who use these cleavages as an instrument for such mobilization which suits their political ends. 
" T a q i R a h i m , p. 100. 
This has been explained with data by V.C.P.Chaudhry, Creation of Modern Bihar, 
Patna, 1964), Ali Ashraf, The Muslim Elite, Delhi, 1982), Kamta Chaubey, Sri Krishna 
Singh {UnpublishedPh.D. Thesis, Patna University, cited by Taqi Rahim op cit.) 
This has been explained with data by V.C.P.Chaudhry, Creation of Modern Bihar, Patna, 
1964. Ali Ashraf, The Muslim Elite, Delhi, 1982., Kamta Chaubey, op cit. Sri Krishna 
Singh (Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, Patna University, cited by Taqi Rahim.) 
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way to the rise and growth of communalism. But Bihar presented a different 
picture of Hindu-Muslim co-operation. It is often said that since clash of 
interests (like jobs, education etc.) took place between the educationally 
advanced Bengalis (who dominated the govt, jobs in Bihar also) and the 
Muslims in Bihar, so in their self- interest the latter moved forward. But an 
important point should not be missed here that the educated elites in Bihar 
consisted mainly of Muslims and those of Bengalis consisted of Hindus, 
even then this clash was not expressed in religio-communitarian, 
particularist/separatist overtones. Whereas in Bengal the situation had got 
communalized. The bhadraloks (high caste Hindus of Bengal), afraid of 
losing hegemony on the Muslims and the low caste Hindus (who were 
concentrated more in east Bengal), neglected their educational, material and 
moral development and ensured as much delay as possible in the 
establishment of the University of Dhaka. Because, says A.K.Biswas, 
"Given education to the Muslims and the low caste Hindus, the 
crippling monopoly of bhadralok would have eroded leading to 
the most healthy development that would have nipped in the bud 
the future danger of demand for Muslim homeland. But even after 
annulment of partition (of Bengal) in 1911, the high caste Hindus 
ensured as much delay as possible in the establishment of the 
University at Dhaka, which was one of the essential conditions for 
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undoing the partition of Bengal... But the high priests of 
nationalism, or swadeshi were frenzied over the prospect of the 
loss of their hegemony over the Muslims and the lower castes in 
Eastern Bengal. By mixing religion with politics, the upper castes 
made swadeshi an exclusively Hindu, that too a religious affair 
and precluded the participation of the Muslims and the low castes 
in the agitation which in any case lacked mass support and base. If 
the bhadralok were less fanatic and more humane, the partition in 
1947 could have been a distant dream." ^ ^ 
Contrast the situation with Bihar where the Hindu-Muslim cordiality had 
reached such a high watermark that at the third session of the Bihar 
Provincial Congress, (Muzaffarpur, 1910), Deep Narayan Singh, in his 
presidential address, proposedsome significant developments, which are 
worth mentioning in the context of Bihar. The extending of the principle of 
separate electorate to the Hindus also where they were in minority and the 
noteworthy feature of the conference was that the Muslim delegates, who 
were as much as half of the total delegates, supported this proposal most 
enthusiastically. For this, The Beharee {May, 20, 1910) observed that it was 
difficult to find any other province where such an exemplary collaboration 
between the political life of Hindus and Muslims existed and that it was an 
example worthy of being emulated by the rest of the country. 
^^  Paradox of Anti Partition Agitation and Swadeshi Movement of Bengal 1905, Social Scientist, 263-
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Simultaneously, it was none other than Mazharul Haq and Hasan Imam 
who opposed the extension of the system of separate electorate to the 
Muslims in the local bodies. 
Mazharul Haq said, 
"I shall sacrifice ten thousand principles and ten thousand separate 
electorates simply with one object, namely, to bring the two communities 
^ A 
together in order that they may work hand in hand". 
Taqi Rahim is much more emphatic about the role played by Mazharul Haq 
in the Lucknow pact of 1916. He says that Haq was most instrumental in 
bringing the League out of loyalist politics and close to the Congress. Haq 
had already presided over the League session of 1915 in Bombay. Here his 
presidential address was much more daringly patriotic and anti colonial than 
those of any other address of Congress session thus far. In this session of 
League, the Congress had sent a delegation on a goodwill mission, 
consisting of Lord Sinha, S.N.Banerji, Malviya, Besant, and above all of 
them Gandhiji. Here in order to develop a better understanding between the 
League and the Congress and also to work out the constitutional reforms, the 
League appointed a committee in which as many as 9 people were from 
65,vol.23, No.4-6, April-June, 1995. 
^ Qeyamuddin Ahmad and J.S.Jha, Mazharul Haq, Delhi, 1976, p.l2. 
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Bihar. They were Ali Imam, Mazharul Haq, Maulvi Fakhruddin 
advocate, Nawab Sarfaraz Hussain Khan, Maulvi Ahmad Hussain advocate 
of Muzaffarpur, Maulvi Akhtar Hussain advocate of Muzaffarpur, Syed 
Mahmud, and Barrister Syed Md. Naim of Bhagalpur. He says that though 
Md.Ali, Maulana Azad, and Jinnah 's roles were very important but Ali and 
Azad were in jail and Jinnah had joined the League just in 1914 at Agra. 
Hence, Taqi Rahim says that, for the Lucknow pact the greatest credit goes 
to Haq.^^ 
It is intriguing that while the leadership so much successfully arrived at a 
better political understanding between the communities in 1916, in the 
following year Bihar suffered from one of the most consequential communal 
riots. This was Shahabad riots of 1917. 
To Papiya G h o s h , t h i s riot very decisively polarized the texture of 
Bihar politics. This riot was mainly on the issue of cow. Since 1880s, the 
organizations like Gaurakshini Sabha, Sanatan Dharma Sabha, Hindu sabhas 
and Arya Samajis had started profilerating in Bihar. After 1908 Gwala 
movement also emerged. Since 1893 riots became quite frequent. But the 
Shahabad riots surpassed all previous riots. In October, enquiry into the riots 
29 ibid, pp.132-35. 
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started. Mazharul Haq put the report of the Congress and the League 
together, which dismissed the details of the mosques defiled, women raped 
and in particular of the women throwing themselves into the wells. 
(Obviously to avert the crisis of communal tension). In the session of 
the All India Muslim League (1917), Hindu leaders were condemned and at 
its special session, it condemned the Bihar Muslim League for grossly 
neglecting the aftermath of the riots. In fact, in order to avoid any communal 
polarization, Hasan Imam (Chairman of the joint meeting of Bihar 
Provincial Congress Committee and Bihar Provincial Association) preferred 
not to mention the riots and confined himself on the follow-up details of the 
Lucknow pact and its application to Bihar. 
"This not surprisingly alienated the Muslims. Gandhi, then deep 
into the Champaran Satyagraha, explained his inability to moye to 
Shahabad... His message to the Hindus was that they were to try 
stop the daily wholesale slaughter of cows.. 
^ Papiya Ghosh, "Community Questions and Bihar Politics 1917-23". Indian Historical 
Review (IHR), vol.xvi, no. 1-2, July1989-January1990. 
Papiya Ghosh, IHR, p. 199. 
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Consequently, the Muslim League leaders came under increasing pressure to 
break with the Congress. In a series of hugely attended meetings organized 
by the Muslims from all classes, the leadership was thoroughly rejected by 
the community. They strongly denounced the politics of Hasan Imam, 
Mazharul Haq, Safaraz H. Khan, and Jirmah etc. Simultaneously, the 
Gaurakshini movements went on gaining momentum. Where as Mazharul 
Haq kept insisting on giving up the cow sacrifice in the All-India Cow 
Conference, at Patna, in 1920. The communal tension further increased due 
to Shudhi movement in the 1920s and 1930s, particularly after 1923, when 
their focus was converting the Malkana Muslim Rajputs back to 
Hinduism.They were concentrated more in Shahabad area. The issue of 
conversion of Hindus in Malabar and Multan riots became recurrent issues 
even in the speeches of Rajendra Prasad and Shri Krishna Sinha. This 
included several Congressmen and Sinha himself was associated with the 
Hindu Mahasabha for several years. Due to this, later on retrospectively, 
Syed Mahmud had to say that after 1923 the Muslims turned increasingly 
towards intransigent leaders in the face of the shudhi movement and the 
egress could not be accepted as a secular body as it had a tendency to 
"communalism in culture with nationalism in politics."^^ By 
jz Syed Mahmua, Hindu-Muslim Cultural Accord, Bombay, 1949. 
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contrast, the Khilafat committee's inaction over the shudhi issue added to 
the resentment among the Muslims.^^ 
After the Lucknow Pact, the most important political development was the 
Champaran Satyagrah. As early as 1914, Khan Bahadur Fakhruddin, from 
the platform of the Bihar Provincial Conference, moved a resolution 
pressing the govt, to institute an enquiry into the conflictual relation between 
the European planters and the ryots of Tirhut, whose grievances, he said, 
were genuine.^ "^ This is a lesser-knovm fact of history that Peer Md. Moonis 
was foremost one of the leaders who organized and mobilized the peasantry 
of Champaran. He was an extremely well read and talented person. He was a 
teacher in the Bettiah Guru Training School from where he was terminated 
from the services due to his anti colonial political activities. He was a 
regular columnist in Pratap, Kanpur. He was counted amongst the leading 
Hindi journalists. The S.D.O.of Bettiah W.H.Louis called him " a 
connecting link between the educated class and the ryots". It was none other 
than Peer Md. Moonis who led the delegation that met Gandhiji in Lucknow 
in 1916. It is ironical that even the most progressive of modem historians 
have omitted his name and highlighted the name of Raj Kumar Shukla, (who 
" Papiya Ghosh.op cit. {IHR), p.207. 
" Bihar Herald, April 25, 1914. 
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was only one of the delegates). The govt, framed some fake charges against 
Moonis; the police thrashed him badly and put him behind the bars in 
1918.^^ 
Other important Muslim leader, who organized the peasants were Shaikh 
Gulab and Adalat Hussain.^^ Hasan Imam gave financial assistance to 
Gandhiji when he came to Champaran. 
The enthusiastic participation of the Muslims in the Non-co-operation and 
Khilafat movements is too well known to be repeated here. However, there 
are some significant developments, which are worth mentioning in the 
context of Bihar, 
Bihar Provincial Congress Committee ratified the Nagpur resolution of 1920 
and appointed several District committees. Shafi Daudi for Muzaffarpur, 
Maulvi Zakaria Hashmi for Saran and Shah Md.Zubair for Monghyr, were 
appointed to popularize the Non-co-operation programme in the respective 
districts. In Arrah the task was assigned to Mahfliz Alam. 
Government educational institutions were boycotted and Bihar Vidyapeeth 
was set up with Mazharul Haq as the Chancellor. Abdul Bari also joined it as 
^^  Acharya Shivapujan Sahay, Peer Md. Moonis: Vyakti aur Kriti; Vaani (7-9) cited by 
Prasanna Kumar Chaudhry and Srikant, "'Bihar Mein Samajik Parivartan Ke Kuch 
Aayam"(in Hindi). Delhi 2001. p. 38. 
^ Taqi Rahim, op cit p. 158. 
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a teacher, Shafi Daudi made the arrangement for the examination of the 
students. In the National Council of Education for Bihar Mazharul Haq, 
Shafi Daudi, Nazir Ahmad, Qazi Abdul Wadood, Qazi Ahmad Hussain, 
S.M.Zubair and Maulvi Wirasat Rasul were included. 
Shafi Daudi and Ajazi brothers of Muzaffarpur were extremely successful in 
forming panchayats to adjudicate the cases of villagers as the courts were 
boycotted. Daudi himself left a very lucrative practice in the Muzaffarpur 
court. Due to the remarkable organizing capacity of Daudi and the Ajazis, 
the Tirhut Division had become a 'danger zone' in official circles. Here the 
Congress machinery was at its highest efficiency. 
The volunteer corps organized by Daudi and the Ajazis became 'headache' 
for the Government. On October 30,1921, Daudi's house at Muzaffarpur 
was raided by the police, because it was the headquarters of the Central 
Board of Control for the National Volunteer Corps/Sewa Samitis.^^ 
But the period of 1925-28 witnessed widening divide between the two 
communities. The Municipal and the District Board elections of 1924-25, 
says Kamta Chaubey, left behind a legacy of bad blood between Hindus and 
Muslims in Bihar. 
^^ Non co-operation and Khilafat Movements in Bihar and Orissa, p.66 cited by Kamta 
Chaubey, p. 151. Also see "Shafi Daudi papers " and "M.A.Ajazi papers ", NMML, 
New Delhi. 
I am thankful to Daudi and Ajazi Memorial Committees of Muzaffarpur for the papers. 
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Several prominent Muslim leaders of the Congress like Hadi Husain, Shafi 
Daudi and others lost their elections. The former was a candidate for vice 
presidentship of the Gaya District Board and the latter was a candidate for 
chairmanship of Muzaffarpur District Board. They were prominent 
Congressites, yet they did not get the votes of the Hindu Congressmen. It 
was all the more distressing because Shafi Daudi was defeated by a 
European planter Danby, who obviously successful in securing a good 
number of votes from the Congressmen. This defeat made him deeply 
suspicious of the Muslim position in the Congress. This was the decade 
when Arya Samaj's shudhi movement was also very active in Bihar. Even 
more telling was the defeat of no less a person than Mazharul Haq himself 
in the elections of the Bihar Legislative Council. He, in disgust, retired from 
politics. His retirement was most inopportune as he was needed most to stem 
the rising tide of communalism. Maulana Azad wrote a letter (dated 20 
August 1926), persuading him to accept the presidentship of the Congress 
(Guwahati, 1926) but he did not relent. Nevertheless, he and Shafi Daudi 
together undertook a tour of the entire Bihar to work for communal harmony 
in the midst of recurrent riots.^^ The Bihar Provincial Conference of 1925 
was however, presided by S.M. Zubair and the District conference of Banka 
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was presided by Daudi to popularize khadi.^' In many villages like Kapasi, 
Muslim women were seen engaged in weaving and spinning/® Here it 
should be noted that despite all these, no important Congress Muslim leader 
took recourse to separatism. Rather, in a special meeting in the Anjuman 
Islamia Hall, Patna, on May 8, 1927 they decided for joint electorates rather 
than separate electorates. The Hall was packed to its capacity with Ali 
Imam, Fakhruddin, Sarfaraz Husain Khan, Shafi Daudi, Khan Bahadur M. 
Ismail, Syed Abdul Aziz etc.being the notable participants. 
Thus, in spite of so much of provocations, Muslim politics in Bihar, uptill at 
least 1928, says Kamta Chaubey, was liberal, non-communal, and 
nationalist to the core and opposed to the separate electorates. It, therefore, 
can be said that the Muslim leadership of Bihar presented an ideal picture 
before the nation to be imitated by the other provinces. It was due to the 
domination of these committed leaders from Bihar that even the Bihar 
Muslim League remained ideologically close to the Congress and it could 
not become ''the citadel of communalists and reactionaries'''' so much so that 
the presidential addresses of Mazharul Haq for the League and that of Lord 
Taqi Rahim, op cit pp.258-259. 
Mahadev Desai, Gandhiji in Indian Villages, pp.232-83. 
40 Young India, 1927-28 pp.74-76. 
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S. p. Sinha for the Congress were in exact ideological conformity at Bombay 
in 1915.'^ 
Shashi Shekhar Jha says, 
"Notable feature of the Bihar Muslim League was the absence of 
communal character...perhaps the leadership of Mazliarul Haq 
and other eminent Muslims as also the nature of political activities 
were responsible for it."^^ 
On 20 March 1927, Muslims had a meeting in Delhi where Daudi, S. M. 
Zubair etc. were present. They had experienced the limitations of joint and 
separate electorates. Hence they were pressing against the separate 
electorates but simultaneously they demanded reservation of seats for the 
minorities in the legislature. S.M.Zubair had already emphasized this point 
in the Provincial conference of Congress at Purulia in 1926. The Muslims 
gave up the demand of separate electorates for which Jinnah and Iyengar 
also played an instrumental role. This gesture of Muslims impressed even 
the Hindu Mahasabha leaders like Moonje, Kelkar, Jayakar, and Aney. And 
this was ratified by the AICC at Bombay in May 1927. 
This is testified by the laurels showered upon M. Haq, by the several issues of The 
Leader and The Behar Herald of January 1916. 
^^  Shashi Shekhar Jha, Political Elite in Bihar, Bombay, 1972, pp. 112-131. 
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Thus the fissures created in the Hindu-Muslim relationship during the 
elections of 1924-26, had been redeemed, thanks to Daudi and Zubair. This 
went a long way in presenting a formidable united opposition against the all-
white Simon commission. 
On January 1928, under Daudi's presidentship, in the Anjuman Islamia 
Hall, Patna, a conference was held where it was resolved to put a stiff 
resistance against the Simon commission. In Muzaffarpur Jama Masjid, 
Daudi delivered a stirring speech to mobilize the people against the 
commission. He himself led a demonstration of students in Patna. 
Nevertheless, the M.L. Nehru Report was seen as dissatisfactory by a section 
of the Muslim leadership. Shafi Daudi and Maulana Sajjad were highly 
critical of the report. It resulted into Daudi's retirement from politics soon, 
which was indeed a big loss of Congress as he was one of the greatest mass 
leaders of Bihar. Mazharul Haq had already retired from politics in disgust 
(and subsequently died in 1930), which was another big loss. This came at a 
time when the Mahasabhite leaders were increasing their influence in the 
Congress, and share of Muslims in the politics of Bihar Congress had started 
visibly declining. 
However, despite their grudges against the Congress, Syed Mahmud, 
S.M.Zubair Abdul Bari etc. remained with it. Abdul Bari continued to gain 
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popularity among the workers in Jamshedpur. Syed Mahmud filled up the 
gap created by Shafi Daudi and Mazharul Haq. In 1930, at Lahore, Syed 
Malimud was elected General Secretary of the AJCC. Maulanas Sajjad, 
Nooruddin Bihari, Usman Ghani, Abdul Wahab Darbhangwi, Abdul Wadud, 
remained active in Congress and its Civil Disobedience movement. Due to 
their popularity and mobilizational capacity, they were put behind bars. 
Their anti- League position remained consistent and in March 1929, they 
set up All India Muslim Nationalist Party. By July 1930, its provincial 
branch was opened in Bihar with Maulana Sajjad as its President. 
Overwhelming participation of the Muslims (in the civil disobediance 
movement) in Saran, Champaran, and Muzaffarpur was due mainly to Syed 
Mahmud's organizational ability and in Jamshedpur, Shahabad and Patna it 
was due to Abdul Bari. All these districts had a number of Muslim leaders.''^ 
Taqi Rahim says that since the Muslims, in the face of fighting colonialism 
unitedly, had given up the demand of separate electorate, their demand for 
reservation of seats under joint electorate should have been conceded as it 
was done in the case of Harijans in the Poona Pact of 1932. But the 
Congress, under the pressure of Hindu Mahasabha, failed to accommodate 
this demand, which further added to the Muslim woes against the Congress. 
Taqi Rahim, p.288. 
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Unfortunately this was the time when two great leaders Hasan hnam and Ali 
Imam had passed away. 
This situation put a great burden on the nationahst leaders like Syed 
Mahmud, Abdul Bari, and S.M.Umair etc to keep Muslims with the 
Congress. 
It was against this backdrop that the elections of 1937 were held. Muslims, 
though having grievances against the Congress, did not switch over to the 
League, and instead formed a nationalist party — Muslim Independent Party 
(MIP), which was ideologically akin to the Congress. It was led by Maulana 
Sajjad of Imarat-e-Shariah, and had a fonnidable mass base reaching down 
even to the remotest villages.The Congress and the MIP contested 
elections with seat adjustments. The League could not get even a single seat. 
The MIP won 15 out of 40 reserved seats and the Congress won five seats. 
This sort of ideological affinity and electoral adjustment created an 
impression among the people that the Congress and MIP will jointly form 
the government. But the Congress rebuffed moves to have any power-
sharing arrangement with the MIP. This snub was a rude shock to the 
Muslims of Bihar. Yet another cause of disaffection was preferring 
"" See Urdu works of Abdus Samad Rahmani, 'Taareekh-e-Imarat' and Zafeeruddin 
Miftahi, 'Imarat-e-Shariah: Deeni Jiddo Johad Ka Raushan Baab (Urdu) Patna, 1974. 
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S.K.Sinha over S.Malimud for the Prime Ministership of B i h a r A d d i n g 
insult to injury, the Advocate General of Bihar, Sir Sultan was replaced with 
Baldev Sahay. He was the only Muslim advocate general in India. This 
further added to the disenchantment of Muslims against the Congress.Since 
the share of the Muslims in organizing and building up of the Bihar 
Congress was fairly high as compared to the Muslims of other states, so they 
expected proportionate share in power. Remaining on the margin was quite 
unacceptable for them.'^ '^  The reluctance of Congress to give proportionate 
power to the Muslims was the major reason for the growth of the Bihar 
branch of Muslim League, which until 1937 was almost non-existent. And 
so long as it existed in its initial phase (i.e. 1908-1919), it by and large 
remained ideologically consistent with the Congress. 
In his recent study, Jawaid Ahmad"*^  has catalogued the increased shudhi 
campaign of Arya Samaj creating communal tensions. He finally concludes 
that, 
"There was a good prospect of Hindu-Muslim rapproachment in 
Bihar. The Bihar Congress was in a position to curb separatist 
euphoria and communal instinct by projecting the Congress 
Maulana Azad, India Wins Freedom, Delhi, 1988, pp. 16-17. 
Taqi Rahim, p.334. 
British Experiment of Responsible Government: A Case Study of Bihar under Dyarchy, 
1921-27, unpublished Ph.D thesis, JMI, New Delhi, 1996. P.237 
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Muslims to the forefront of the movement but the Bihar Congress 
intoxicated with electoral politics and unwilling to share power 
with the Muslims, failed to bring the prospect of Hindu-Muslim 
amity to a reality". 
The Congress' denial of power sharing proved fatal. The League could 
exaggerate and magnify the grievances of the Muslims. However, contrary 
to the claims of the apologists of the Congress, the grievances were not 
completely unfounded and hence cannot be ruled out summarily. There may 
be reasons to look at the Pirpur and Shareef Reports with some doubts as 
these reports were used by the League as an instmment to alienate the 
Muslims away from Congress but the one written by the consistently anti-
League Imarat-e-Shariah's Maulana Sajjad cannot be dismissed as baseless. 
The Jamiat ul Ulema-e-Hind/ Imarat-e-Shariah/MlP had started with 
supporting the Congress, opposed the League and had expected to have 
share in governance. But in 1939, Sajjad had to reach the "inevitable 
conclusion" that the Congress was "communalist to the core". He wrote a 22 
page long letter to the Congress High Command cataloguing the grievances 
of the Muslims against the Congress government. This letter was written 
after the Congress resigned from the govt, in 1939. This letter was meant for 
Congress to do a "self examination of its failings and errors" rather than to 
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make it public, which could have further embittered the Muslim feelings 
against the Congress. 
Despite all these well-articulated grievances, the dominant section of the 
leadership remained committed to the idea of composite nationalism and 
opposed to the League. Syed Malunud, Abdul Bari, Jameel Mazhari (famous 
Urdu poet) and a host of popular mass leaders continued to be in the 
Congress. Jameel Mazhari was the Publicity Officer of the Congress 
government of Bihar. Wlien it resigned in 1939, Mazhari also resigned 
whereas another Publicity officer, Ramdhari Singh Dinkar (famous Hindi 
poet) did not resign/^ 
In November 1940, Maulana Sajjad, the great nationalist leader who 
exercised political and religious influence on the Muslims, passed away. 
This was a blow to the Muslim Politics of composite nationalism at a time 
when the League's separatist politics was becoming rapidly strident. The 
emergence of Abdul Qaiyum Ansari as a popular leader of the Momin 
Conference around this time did somewhat shore up the Muslim 
participation in the national movement. Like other organizations of the 
oppressed social groups viz. Kisan Sabha, Yadav Mahasabha, Triveni Sangh 
^^  AICC papers No. G-42/1939. 
Taqi Rahim, op citp3%S. 
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etc. the Momin Conference also gained ground mainly in Bihar (though 
founded in Calcutta by the people of Bihar). 
Apart from him, Syed Mahmud, Abdul Bari, Comrade Ali Ashraf, Manzar 
Rizwi (leader of the working class in Dalmianagar), Maghfoor Ahmad Ajazi 
and his elder brother Manzoor Ajazi (Muzaffarpur) etc were also there. A 
large number of Muslims actively participated in anti colonial struggles 
during the World War II under the influence of these leaders. Ali Asliraf, 
Peerzada Syed Shah Sulaiman, Chaudhry Abul Hasnat of Arrah etc. went to 
jails for their fierce anti colonial activities. 
Majlis-e-Ahrar, Momin Conference, Rayeen Conference, Shia Political 
Conference, Mansoori Conference etc were some of the Muslim 
organizations, which remained vehemently opposed to the League. On 14 
April 1940, Maulana Sajjad refuted the 'Pakistan' resolution of the Muslim 
League.^ ^ Earlier in December 1938, he had initiated a debate through a 
pamphlet, which was distributed among common people also.^^ On 19 April 
1940, they observed Hindustan Day against League's observances of 
Pakistan Day at several places. In July 1940, at a village of Bhagalpur, a 
^^  See Hasan Nishat Ansari, Congress-Momin Relation: A Socio Historical Analysis, Patna, 1989. 
' ' This refutation appeared in 'Naqeehan organ of the Imarat-e-Shariah with the title, 
"Muslim India aur Hindu India ki Scheme par ekaham Tabserah" on April 14, 1940. 
" See Zamanullali Nadeem (ed) Makateeb-e-Sajjad, Patna, 1999. p.20. 
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famous journalist .Syed Abdullah Pumeavi of Muslim Azad Conference 
convened a meeting of Muslims opposed to the League where League and 
Jinnah were severely criticism. The issues of the Searchlight {January 3 to 
April 30,1940) carried reports about frequent meetings of Momin 
conference, Rayeen Conference, Shia Conference in several districts where 
they had vehemently opposed Jinnah and his League besides pressing for the 
demands of their empowerment. 
In the Individual Civil disobedience movement of 1941, S.M. Umair, 
Manzoor Ajazi (Muzaffarpur), Abdul Bari, Ulfat Hussain (Godda), S.M. 
Imam (Gaya), Husain Mazhar (son of Mazharul Haq) etc. went to the jails. 
Yusuf Meer Ali was another popular leader. He was President of the Bihar 
Socialist Conference. He insisted on expanding the Individual civil 
disobedience movement on national plane. 
However, despite all these instances of participation, Hindu-Muslim 
relationship kept deteriorating due to a variety of reasons. 
The lower units of Congress and Hindu Mahasabha were all along almost 
synonymous. This character of the lower Congress alienated the Muslims, 
created communal tension and riots became an ever present threat. 
Consequently, a massive riot broke out in Biharshareef. Biharshareef has 
since long been educational, cultural, religious and spiritual centre of the 
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Muslims. Maulana Sajjad, Syed Sulaiman Nadvi, Dr. A. Rahman etc. 
belonged to this place. The Biharshareef riots, therefore, greatly affected the 
psyche of Muslims of Bihar. "This riot had convinced them that if power is 
transferred to the Congress then the Muslims wouldn't have even the right to 
assemble and protest for their legitimate democratic rights."^^ 
From now onwards Jamiatul Ulema, Imarat-e-Shariah, Congress-Muslims 
all suffered definite and steady erosion in their mass base. In this way, the 
riots proved very damaging to the cause of national movement. 
Among students and youths, however, the leaders like Comrade Ali Ashraf 
had an abiding influence and the Communists in general gained popularity 
among the Muslims. It was this section, which helped in containing the 
Muslim alienation to a considerable extent after 1942. Thus, during the Quit 
India Movement fairly large sections of the Muslims fought against the Raj. 
Many of the participants are still alive in various villages.K.K.Datta gives 
a long list of such Muslim freedom fighters who were in the forefront of the 
movement. Reyasat Kareem (in Dalmianagar) mobilized the workers; 
Ahmad A. Khan and Md. A. Sagheer resigned from the Khagaul 
I 
Development Board. Many more were killed and wounded in various 
villages and towns. In fact, as compared to other provinces, the number of 
" Taqi Rahim.o/? cit. pp.402-3. 
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Muslims killed in Bihar was the largest. Significantly, in spite of such 
popular disillusioned with the Congress and with very few Muslims among 
the frontrunners of the Congress, the participation of the Muslims remained 
very large.^^ Thus, Taqi Rahim, expresses his grievance, " almost all Hindu 
historians and intellectuals, in order to cover up the faults of their leaders, 
keep saying that it was the Muslims of Bihar and UP who divided the 
country and created Pakistan.". He further says, " fact of the matter is that 
during Syed Ahmad Shaheed's Wahabi Movement the Ulema of Sadiqpur 
like Wilayat AH and Inayat Ali had injected anti imperialism into the 
Muslims of Bihar so effectively that it never disappeared."^ 
But, even more serious damages occurred during and after the elections 
of 1946. In Bihar, in order to win over the Muslims, Congress had to depend 
upon Syed Mahmud, Prof Abdul Bari, S.M. Umair and A. Qaiyum Ansari 
etc. The Congress resorted to every fair and unfair tactics to defeat League 
including extending support to pro-British candidates, creating caste and 
sectarian divides among Muslims. (At this time, we must remember, even 
Maulana Maududi, founder of Jamaat-e-Islami in 1941, opposed the 
League's demand of Pakistan, though for his own narrow reasons). In other 
I have interviewed more than a dozen of such people in the villages of MuzafFarpur and the surrounding 
districts. 
55 See K.K. Datta, Freedom Movement in Bihar, vol. Ill p.36, p.58, pp.64-137. 
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words the League went to the elections all-alone. Even then it could win 34 
out of 40 Muslim seats in Bihar. However in a number of seats the Congress 
was defeated by a very narrow margin. Congress had contested this election 
with the support of Jamiatul Ulema/Imarat-e-Shariah and the Momin 
Conference. The Khanqah-e- Mujibia served as the central office of the 
election campaign. 
The nationalist Muslim organizations lost most of the seats in the elections 
of 1946, more because of resource crunch and less because of the League's 
popularity. Here too, the Congress made a mistake. For mounting an 
extensive propaganda during the election campaign, some expenses had to 
be met. "The nationalist Muslim bodies had scarce resources; the Momins 
and the Jamiatul Ulama were poor" communities."^^ Already the Muslim 
leaders of the District Congress Committees had started demanding that at 
least Rs. 10,000 had to be allocated for every Muslim seat to win.^ ® The 
nationalist Muslim organizations demanded assurances from the Congress, 
which included appointment of Muslim teachers in primary schools but 
" Taqi Rahim, op cit p. 4i2. 
" Rajendra Prasad to Sardar Patel. 7 November. 1945. Rajendra Prasad Papers No. 7-
5/45-6 
" Abul Nasr Abdul Baes to Rajendra Prasad. Ibid cited by Sucheta Mahajan, 
Independence and Partition: The Erosion of Colonial Power in India, New Delhi, 2000, 
p. 215. 
44 
Rajendra Prasad refused to assure anything except religious freedom. Tiiis 
attitude of tiie Congress leadership created differences amongst the 
nationalist Muslims affecting the prospects of the Congress in the elections 
of 1946. The Congress also refused to come out with a joint manifesto, 
although it did form Nationalist Muslim Board. Thus the campaign for the 
election remained 'confused and uncoordinated' as confessed by Rajendra 
Prasad himself.^' 
Jaya Prakash Narayan had also insisted on ensuring a share for Muslims in 
licenses, contracts, jobs etc.^" 
It however needs to be added here that mere electoral victory of the League 
did not make the Partition inevitable. The Muslims of Bihar kept contesting 
the League and its Two Nation theory regardless of their disenchantment 
with the Congress. 
In Muzaffarpur, the Ajazi brothers alongwith others campaigned from house 
to house on bicycles in 1946-47. Maghfoor Ajazi had set up All India 
Jamhoor Muslim League, in 1940, to oppose Jinnah's scheme of Pakistan. 
He was active since 1940 to oppose Jinnah's Pakistan (notwithstanding his 
disillusionment with Congress, which he had joined in 1920 and built it up 
" Sucheta Mahajan, op cit, p. 217. 
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so assiduously. He was among a few of the great mass leaders of the 
District).^' Maulvi Ahmad Ghafoor and Sayeedul Haq of Darbhanga, Fazlur 
Rahman of Patna, Qazi Md. Husain of Gaya, Hafiz Md. Sani of Bettiah, 
Qazi Md. Ilyas of Begusarai, Md. Noor of Pumea, and Isa Rizwi of 
Sheikhpura etc were very active leaders of the Congress during this period. 
In Siwan, Abdul Ghafoor (future chief minister) and Zawar Husain of AISF 
(future Vice Chancellor of Bihar University, Muzaffarpur) were active and 
popular mass leaders working for the Congress candidates. Maulana Shah 
Mohiuddin, the sajjada nashin of Khanqah-e-Mujibiya, Phulwari Shareef, 
had great spiritual influence on the Muslims of Bihar. He had many people 
like Abdus Samad Rahmani, Usman Ghani, and Ahmad Husain etc who 
! 
campaigned for the Congress. But the greatest iielp came from Qaiyum 
Ansari's Momin Conference. Of the 6 Muslim seats of Congress 5 were of 
the Momin conference and the 6th one (Syed Mahmud) could win largely 
because of the Momin Conference's support. 
The Progressive Writers were also there in the movement. Among them, 
important names are of Akhtar Husain Raipuri, Ali Athar, Sohail Azimabadi, 
Akhtar Urainvi, Jameel Mazhari, Ijtaba Rizwi, Razi Azimabadi, Tamannai, 
AlCC Papers No. G-36/1946. 
Interview with Asghar Ajazi, son of Maghfoor Ajazi, Muzaffarpur, in December 2000. 
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Perwez Shahidi etc. Their writings did influence the political behaviour of 
the Muslims. Whereas, League's only leaders of some influence were 
Nawab Ismail (Hajjan sb.) and Latiftir Rahman Ansari. Rest of the 
leadership came from the Bihar Muslim Students' Federation. S.M. Jaleel of 
BMSF had brought out an English weekly, which propagated the League's 
politics. Besides, the League forged unity with the adibasis of Jharkhand and 
supported their demand of a separate state of Jharkhand. This increased the 
League's support base. This was a unique achievement of the Muslim 
League, where they could go beyond the Muslims. The adibasis participated 
in their meetings and shouted the slogans of Pakistan zindabad." 
Still a large number of Muslim leaders with considerable mass base were 
present in the Congress. Among the Socialists, Abul Hayat Chand Kazmi, 
Ahad Fatmi, Razi Azimabadi etc were there to give effective resistance to 
the League. The Muslims like Manzar Rizwi, Ali Ashraf, S. Habeeb, and Ali 
Amjad dominated the Communist Party, in Bihar. Habeebur Rahman etc. 
influenced the people significantly. 
" This has been recorded by Rajendra Prasad in his Autobiography, Also, see M.A. Warsi 
to Jinnah inZ.H.Zaidi [&d)Jinnah Papers, Karachi, vol.1 part 1, p. 803. 
47 
However, in the face of the 1946 riots, ail these efforts went in vain. It was 
the unprecedented scale of the riots that became the "turning point".^^ The 
riot broke out after a strike (hartal) in Patna against Noaidiali riots. On 
October Noakhali Day was observed. The leading Congressman of the 
district—Jagat Narayan Lai, with provocative banners and slogans, 
organized this meeting. (It should be noted here that J.N.Lai was one of the 
leaders who took the initiative for the shudhi campaign in 1920s, he was a 
member of both Hindu Mahasabha and Congress.). On 26^^ October, various 
Muslim villages were attacked. Soon it spread to many more districts. The 
Raj, the Congress and the League give different estimates of total casualties 
differing from 6 to 50 thousands. Many women jumped into the wells to 
save themselves from being raped. The sheer size of the violent mob created 
panic. The Congress workers while visiting the affected areas in Chapra 
came across mobs consisting of even 50 thousand people. 
Ever since the formation of the Congress ministry in 1937, says Papiya 
Ghosh, 
"there was an increasing feeling among Hindus that the Muslim 
League was 'unpatriotic'. This feeling of'exasperation', based on 
" Papiya Ghosh, "The 1946 Riot and the Exodus of Bihari Muslims to Dhaka". In 
Sharifiidin Ahmad (ed.) Dhaka: Past, Present and Future, Dhaka, 1991. For details of the 
riots, see Sir Francis Tucker, ''India's Partition and Human Debasement'' Delhi, 
1988.pp.l80-194. 
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the discourse of the League regarding the Congress, Hindus and 
Pakistan, had percolated to some extent to the masses and was 
worlced on by the Hindu Mahasabha. It was in this context that the 
experience of the migrant Bihari milkmen, cart men, rickshaw 
pullers, and the watchmen in the Calcutta killing of August 1946 
crystallized into the resolve for revenge."^"* 
What is more disturbing is the reaction of otherwise well meaning people 
like the editors of the two leading provincial newspapers- The Searchliiihf 
and The Indian Nation, which 'published particularly scurrilous write-ups' 
after Noakhali. The editor of the Searchlight, Murli Manohar Prasad, on 23 
October 1946, wrote that the 'East Bengal was a challenge to India's 
manhood and if there be a civil war let there be a civil war'. To add fuel to 
the fire, accounts of the East Bengal happenings from the Calcutta press 
were republished in the local press with additional inflammatory comments. 
A Hindu procession consisting of important Congress leaders paraded 
through the streets of Gaya holding the portraits of Gandhi and Nehru and 
shouting slogans such as Noakhali ka badla le kar rahenge and Hindustan 
Hinduon ka nahin kisi ke haap ka^^ Taqi Rahim also recalls that in the 
meeting Congress leaders including K.B.Sahay, Murli Manohar Prasad (the 
^ Papiya Ghosh, op cit. 
^^  CID SB 40/1946 cf Papiya Gho.sh, The 1946 Riots and the Exodus... 
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editor of the Searchlight) etc. delivered extremely inflammatory speeches 
and provoked the crowd/'^' 
Wavell also testifies to the complicity of the Congress in the riots. He 
noted that like UP, in Bihar also, the lower strata of the Congress did the 
I 
planning of the outbreaks of the riots and 'they were undoubtedly organized 
and organized very thoroughly by supporters of the Congress'/'^ This is also 
corroborated by the fact thai some Congressmen confessed before Gandhi 
for having taken part in the riols/''^ Jawahar Lai Nehru also admitted that 
some Congressmen with inclinations towards the Hindu Mahasabha were 
involved in the r io ts .Such developments gave much space to the League, 
which obstructed the relief works. I he migration continued even alter the 
leader of the Bihar Muslim League, Abdul Aziz advised against it. 
"It is the implications of the disillusionment among Muslim 
supporters of Congress that provide an insight into the visible 
resolve to migrate from Bihar... 1-or example, when the Secretary 
of the Telmar Congress Committee, refused to take shelter in the 
house of the Khusraupur zamindar household of the Hussains, he 
was confident that 'no one would touch a Congress Muslim'. Not 
'^TaqiRahim, pp.521-22. 
Mansergh, Transfer of Power, vol. ix, pp. 139-140. 
" Pyare Lai, Mahatma Gandhi-The Last Phase, Ahmedabad, 1956, vol. I p.627. 
' 'Nehru to Patel, November 5, 1946 in S. Gopal (ed.), SWJN, vol.1 p. 64 
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long after, he was killed along with 16 members of his family. The 
Momins were among the 'worst sufferers, despite the fact that 
they had been supporters of the Congress. They alleged that many 
people high up in the Congress had taken part in the riot."^" 
Papiya Ghosh in her yet another significant study comes out with shocking 
revelations regarding the Congress. She says that leading Bihar 
Congressmen, since 1920s, while mobilizing for swaraj, indulged in shudhi 
and sangathan campaigns. So was the case with the Hindu Mahasabha and 
the Arya Samaj and a number of vernacular papers like Darbhanga Gazette, 
Mithila Mihir, Dharambir etc who routinely poured out reckless and 
venomous write ups stoking the communal fire and hence separatism. She 
quotes various pamphlets of such organizations which were in large 
circulation during the fateful decade of 1940s, viz. Hindu kya Karen (a 32 
page booklet, published in Nov. 1946), Hindu Samaj Chetavani No. 1 
written by Sukhdev Sharnia Karmakandi of Silaut, Muzaffarpur, etc. Thus, 
concludes Papiya Ghosh, 
™ Papiya Ghosh, "The 1946 Riot and the Exodus of Bihari Muslims to D h a k a I n 
Sharifudin Ahmad (ed.) Dhaka: Past, Present and Future. Dhaka, 1991. For details of the 
riots, see Sir Francis Tucker, "India's Partition and Human Debasement'" Delhi. 1988. 
pp.180-194. 
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"During the 1946 riot in particular the abducting Hindu, 
reinforced by the 'Hindu Raj' of the Congress, became a major 
factor in transforming Pakistan into an imminent inevitability."^' 
She further emphasizes, 
"The riots of 1946 thus saw the crystallization of communal 
identities.- A combination of propaganda and the dimensions of the 
riot metamorphosed community consciousness among Hindus and 
Muslims into political identities."^^ 
What needs to be emphasized is that the role oi Hindu Mahasabha and 
the considerably communalized lower strata^f Congress have not been 
explored adequately. But a careful look on the sources and some of the 
recent studies reveal that the complicity of Congress and of course of 
Hindu Mahasabha was perhaps more than that of the League, at least in the 
case of Bihar. 
Taqi Rahim's grievances against the Congress are all the more stronger. He 
says: 
"it were the local Congress workers who were leading the rioters. 
Therefore, the Muslims lost faith not only in the Congress but also 
in the Hindus as a whole. And they got convinced that whatever 
Papiya Ghosh, "The Virile and the Chaste in Community and Nation Making: liihar 
1920s to 1940s". Social Scientist, 22, January-February 1994. p.82, p.91. 
^^  Papiya Ghosh, The 1946 Riots 
52 
their political position may be the Hindus did believe in the two 
nation theory and counted the Muslims as 'ghair qaum' otherwise 
why would have they killed the Muslims of Goriakhari, Telharha 
and Ghorahwan in revenge of the bloodshed of Hindus in 
Noakhali."'^ 
In fact, what made the 1946 riot more consequential was the irony that it 
took place more virulently in the Magadh region of Bihar, which had 
produced the great luminaries of the freedom struggle. Moreover, this region 
was considered as the repository of cultural, religious and political life of the 
Muslims of Bihar. From Maulvi Kareem, Justice Sharfuddin, and Hasan 
Imam to Mazharul Haq, Md. Yunus, Sir Sultan and many more belonged to 
this very region. This coincidence added to the disaffection and alienation of 
Muslims. So much so that even the most influential and popular 
organizations .like the Imarat-e- Shariah found itself in a dilemma and was 
rendered ineffective during the last 5 months of colonialism They had all 
along championed the cause of muttahidah qaumiyat in conformity with the 
Congress, whereas the Congress had, by that tinfe, come to embrace the idea 
of the two-nation theory. This complete turn arfa^nd of the Congress left the 
Imarat-e Shariah in confusion as to the programme/message with which it 
could go to the people. The assassination of Abdul Bari on 28 March 1947, 
" Taqi Rahim, op cit p.526. 
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by a constable created yet another distrust between the Hindus and Muslims. 
Prof. Abdul Bari was then the president of the provincial Congress.The 
clarification that the assassination was accidental and not communally 
motivated came much later i.e. after Independence. 
Thus we see that, in Bihar, where the Muslims strongly favoured the 
composite nationalism {muttahidah qaumiyat) and opposed separatism, the 
two-nation theory had the support of communalized lower strata of Congress 
and the Hindu Mahasabha/Arya Samaj. The Bihar Provincial Muslim 
League was, on the other hand, weak and incongruous with the All India 
Muslim League, which any way remained a weaker political force in Bihar, 
till the end. 
Shashi Shekhar J ha, therefore concludes: 
"Political history of Bihar shows that the Provincial Muslim 
League could not project any upper rank leader to the All India 
Muslim League whereas the Provincial Congress Committee since 
the beginning have some Muslim leaders of all India political 
stature. Dr. S. Mahmud, Prof. A. Bari, S.M.Zubair, Z.H.Hashmi, 
and others who formed the core of nationalist Muslims in 
Bihar."'' 
Shashi Shekhar Jha, Political Elite in Bihar. Bombay, 1972, pp. 112-131. 
54 
It was weak; and incongruous with the Ail India Muslim League so much so 
that even the Muslim League of Bihar had to chart out a course entirely 
different from that of the All India Muslim League, in the sense that though 
they were not opposed to the two-nation theory per se, but they did oppose 
Pakistan. And in its stead, in the face of the riots of 1946, they, in April 
1947, demanded independent homeland in Bihar itself. They asked "what 
will happen to the five million Muslims of Bihar, who...are surrounded by a 
hostile majority all over the province" and that their salvation lied only in 
having a homeland of their own within the province of Bihar where they 
could develop socially, politically and economically. The reason for such 
demand, given by the BPML General Secretary, Jafar Imam, was that both 
the Congress led ministry in Bihar and the common cadres were involved in 
the massacre of the Muslims of Bihar in 1946.^ ^ 
It therefore becomes quite clear that the migration towards Pakistan 
took place only because of the unprecedented scale of the riots rather 
than due to the ideological appeal of the League. In fact Syed Abdul Aziz, 
the leader of Bihar Muslim League, kept persuading the Muslims not to 
migrate from Bihar in any case. 
As for the Congress, its refusal to incorporate the Muslims in the power 
structure in a judicious proportion and its lower units being dominated by 
' ' Papiya Ghosh,' Partition's Biharis" in Mushirul Hasan (ed ), "Islam Communities and the Nation Muslim Identities 
in South Asia and Beyond , Manohar. New Delhi, 1998 p 235 Also see Pyare Lai. op cit, pp.681-82. 
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the Hindu Mahasabhites led to the alienation ofltro^-b'f the nationalist 
Muslim leaders. First to be alienated was Shafi Daudi and Mazharul Haq. 
Maulana Sajjad was also not too happy with the treatment meted out to the 
Muslims by the Congress ministry of 1937-39. Maghfur Ajazi left the 
Congress in disgust in 1940, yet he continued to resist the 'Pakistan' of 
League with his own All India Jamhoor Muslim League. And above all, 
Syed Mahmud also felt betrayed by the Congress, which he expressed only 
in 1960s. Yet remarkably despite all their grievances, none of them went 
over to the League. They remained firmly committed to the composite 
nationalism {muttahidah qaumiyat) and kept contesting the two-nation 
theory till the very end. 
Besides, the religious minorities (Muslims) of Bihar, the linguistic 
minorities of-the south India also underwent the similar experience of 
discrimination. The protagonists of Tamil movement also felt betrayed by 
the Congress. MSS Pandian says that owing to the exclusionary 
nationalism of the Congress (characterized as 'Sanskrit, English and 
Brahman Hegemony'): 
"a number of non-Brahman Tamil enthusiasts within the Congress 
got estranged with Congressite nationalism either on the question 
of caste or language - both of which were closely linked in the 
Tamil context. Varadarajulu Naidu left the Congress in 1928 
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protesting against the separate dining arrangements for the 
Brahman and non-Brahman students practised in the Seranmadevi 
Gurukulam, a national school partly funded by the Congress. 
Somasundara Bharti joined the anti-Hindi agitation of the late 
1930s opposing Rajagopalachari's decision to introduce Hindi in 
schools. Thiru Vi Kalyanasundara Mudaliar aligned himself with 
the non-Brahman movement on an anti-Hindi platform in the 
1940s. Chidambaram Pillai, during his last days, left the Congress 
and joined the non-Brahman movement." 
Thus, we see that, in order to understand the politics of Partition; the existing 
historiography has focused mainly on UP, JPunjab and Bengal while 
neglecting not only Bihar but also Orissa, Maharashtra, Gujarat, and South 
India. Despite such inadequacies, an all India, paradigm has been made. 
Obviously, such paradigm is bound to have pitfalls. 
It offers new challenges to the historians of modem India (dealing 
particularly with nationalism, communalism and separatism in Bihar, which 
still broadly remains an unexplored area). Deeper explorations into the 
dynamics of Bihar politics will surely explode many a myths dominant 
in the existing historiography. It is important to understand that while the 
meta-narratives of Congress nationalism need to be challenged anyway, 
there is also a need to realize that these meta-narratives, which relied on 
high-flown ideas, like Congress socialism and secularism had absolutely no 
meaning at the provincial and local levels. Thus, there existed a vast 
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disparity between the political principles and rhetoric voiced by the national 
Congress leadership and the operation of the Congress units at the district 
and Moflissil level. This needs to question Congress meta-narratives and the 
disparity between Congress principles and actual politics may be an area that 
can be illuminated by the Subaltern school of historiography'^ with the kind 
of tools and insights that it has been able to generate and thereby help in 
understanding some of the discrepancies and anomalies mentioned above. 
In addition to that, such explorations may also help us understand the quest 
of Muslims for intra-community democratization. Because, in Bihar, the 
assertion of marginalized social groups/castes/biradaris of Muslims had 
started during the colonial period itself''^ . It may explain the reason for the 
composition of Muslim leadership (of post-Independence Bihar) being 
relatively less feudal, almost non-conservative and relatively more 
connected to the masses, so much so that the struggle for making Urdu the 
second official language succeeded, precisely because the leadership relied 
more on building up a democratic mass movement around the issue of 
The Subaltern school has many limitations. In the j^i^oriography of Partition it has not 
contributed mucli whereas this particular theme aw^ts explorations at micro level in 
terms of region/locality and groups through the kind l&f^ources they claim to work upon 
like oral history, songs, fiction, poems, forgotten or imbred reports, personal diaries, re-
reading traditional archival sources etc. ^ i ' 
For a detailed understanding about the merits and imitations of Subaltern school of 
historiography refer to Achin Vanaik, "Communalis^ Contested: Religion, Modernity 
andSecularizalioir.pp. ;S0-192. New Delhi. 1997., 
' ' Papiya Ghosli, " E n u i .crating for Social Justice" in Ajit Bhattacharjea (ed.), Social 
Justice and the Indian Constitution Shimla, 1997. fAlso Papiya Ghosh, "Partition's 
Biharis". 
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Urdu'^. The success of this struggle and consequent implementation of 
Urdu as the sccond official language created employment avenues in the 
government offices, \^•hich has considerably contributed (particularly since 
1980s) in the emergence of a 'sizeable' middle class among Muslims, 
despite the fact that Bihar does happen to be the most backward province of 
India in socio-cconoiv.ic terms. 
Nevertheless, before jiroceeding to the next chapters, it must be said that 
notwithstanding the ideological deviance of the lower strata of the Congress, 
it should not b ^ ignored that this was the only organization, which had not 
put forward an}' secti(\ial and bjctoral demands, unlike the Muslim League 
and the Hindu Mai'isabha. it was largely due to the programmatic 
formulations ( i h e Congress ihat religious pluralism or multi-culturalism 
and sccular dciiiocracy and socialism remains a constant reference point in 
the politics ofz-idcper lent India 
This is in sh:ii ^ contra> t^ with UP where the Anjuman Taraqqi-e-Urdu "was and is a 
private ficfdom > i partiv:i;lar faniil\ ...(it) is less a pressure group than an extension of 
Congress itself or at least the extension of a particular Congress MP (Hayatullah 
Ansari)". See, Sc''iia K. Sonntag. "The political Saliency of Language in Bihar and UP" 
in Journal of Cui. ,nonwculih and Comparative Politics, July 1996. p.6. Also see Zoya 
Hasan, "Quest for Power: OpposUional Politics in Uttar Pradesh" OUP, New Delhi, 
1998. 
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MUSLIMS IN BIHAR POLITICS - AN OVERVIEW UPTILL 1940 
' Bihar emerged as the nerve-centre of the strongest anti Colonial 
movement, known as the 'Wahabi' Movement. The influence of the 
'Wahabi' Movement continued particularly in Bihar till 1880\ The 
Muslims of Bihar, therefore, had to bear with the anger and repressions of 
th^Raj. Gradually, Muslims had also come to realize and conclude that 
they have to come to terms with the British Raj as well as, modem 
education. Therefore, both Ulema and the modernists responded to Sir 
Syed's campaign for modern education^. The Muslims of Bihar quite 
eagerly showed interest in acquiring English education. There were large 
number of Madarsas and Maktabs in the various districts of Bihar where 
they were imparting a traditional education and religious teachings. 
Unlike other regions, the traditionalists quickly moved towards modem 
education and learning. The 'Wahabi' movement had very significant and 
distinctive impact on the political and cultural atmosphere of Bihar. The 
' Qeyamuddin Ahmad, Wahabi Movement in India, Calcutta, 1966. 
- Sir Syed Ahmad Khan was the first to realize the importance of modem 
education through English medium. Also that the British rule in India is 
permanent. (See his Asbab-e-Baghawat-e-Hind, 1859 and Loyal 
Mohammadans of India, 1860). 
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'Wahabis' (more correctly to say Ahl-e-Hadis or Tariqa-I-
Muhammadiya) had left a large literature on social reforms among the 
Muslims of India. They had set up a number of Maktabs and Madarsas, 
orphanages and craft training centers. Madarsa Islahul Muslemeen of 
Patna, Muzakira-I-Ilmiya of Arrah, Darul Uloom Ahmadia Salfia of 
Darbhanga are few of those institutions. The Salfia Madarsa at 
Darbhanga had its own press and brought out newspaper called Al Huda.^c^ 
Apart from these madrasas they also started many modern schools and 
colleges in Bihar, for example the Anglo Arabic School of Patna. 
As early as 1836, Shah Kabiruddin of Sasaram Khanqah had even 
demanded from the Governor General of India to appoint persons who 
could teach English language in Madarsa. The Muhammaden Education 
Committee was formed in Patna in 1884. Its principal objective was to 
induce and encourage modem education and science among the youth of 
Bihar.'^  The Muslims, along with the kayasthas, frequently submitted 
memorials against the substitution of Hindi for Urdu as the court 
language in Bihar.'' Bihar witnessed the foundation of many societies in 
the 60s of the 19th century. The first literay society called the Anjuman-
e-Islamia was establhised at Arrah in August 1866. The Society was 
opened by both Hindus and Muslims. In May 1866, Syed Imdad Ali 
^ K.K. Datta and J.S. Jha (eds.). Comprehensive History of Bihar Vol. Ill, Part-
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Started the Bihar Scientific Society in Muzaffarpur. It enjoyed the support 
of both Hindus and Muslims. It also had a journal Akhbar ul Akhiar and 
translated many books in Urdu. The Society invited the Lt Governor 
Campbell to lay the foundation of collegiate School. They handed over 
the School to Langat Singh in 1899 to start a College there. The Society 
had many branches in Bihar, even in the rural areas. The aim of the Bihar 
Scientific Society was to prepare translation of English books in Urdu 
with a view to show that even scientific instruction could be imparted 
through the mother tongue of the students. Be it said to the credit of the 
Society that it succeeded in getting many works on Trigonometry, 
Material Media, Optics, Animal physiology. Chemistry, Dyeing, 
Geography, Botany, Physical History, Mechanics, Law of Hospitals, 
Mineralogy, Masonry etc. translated into Urdu within a few years of time. 
It may be mentioned here that Sir Syed Ahmad Khan also, in his efforts 
to dispel the prejudices of his community against English education, had 
established a Scientific Society. The objective of this society was also the 
same as that of the Bihar Scientific society. At both the places the Lt. 
Governors of the respective places had laid down the foundation stone of 




Explaining his motive for the establishment of the society, Imdad Ali 
avered: 
^ "The deplorable state of ignorance in which greater portion of 
my countrymen have for many years been immersed excited 
my deepest sympathies and actuated by the desire of 
ameliorating as far as lay in my power their unenlightened 
condition. I took active and principal part in founding the 
scientific society"'^ . 
The efforts of Imdad Ali proved very successful and under his inspiration 
vernacular schools for teaching European Sciences were also opened not 
only in the towns but also in the villages of Saran, Narhan, Jaintpur, etc. 
He received cooperation and financial help from the Hindu Zamindars of 
Narhan and Jaintpur. In this way, the Bihar Scientific Society was far 
more advanced and conclusive than the Sir Syed's Society. Because, the 
Bihar Scientific Society had percolated down to villages and was having 
a broader social base among both Hindus and Muslims. 
This type of inter conununitarian and consensual approach in the field of 
education exercised a positive impact on the Hindu - Muslim relation in 
the political domain also. 
Letter from Imdad Ali to the Viceroy, Lord Northbrook, Proceedings of the 
general meeting of the Bihar Scientific Society held at Muzaffarpur on 
LFebruay 1872. Cited by B.K. Sinha, "Syed Imdad Ali Khan - An Eminent 
Educationist of century Bihar", Journal of Historical Research, Ranchi 
Vol., Xm, 1970. (pp. 1-5) 
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A large number of Associations, Anjumans and Sabhas played their key 
role in the reconstruction of the moral and intellectual life of the Muslims 
of Bihar. Some of these institutions may be mentioned here. The Bihar 
Literary Society of Patna (1873), the Bihar Association of Patna (1871), 
Bihar Upkar Sabha (1876) of Patna, Anjuman-e-Tehzeeb of Muzaffarpur 
(1869). There were also a number of branches of Syed Ameer Ali's 
National Mohammedan Association in Bihar by 1880s. 
These educational and social organizations also brought out a number of 
Urdu newspapers also came out. Starting from the Nurul Anwar of Arrah 
1852, one may mention the National Akhbar (Munger, 1872) The Anis 
(Patna, 1876), The Qasid (Patna, 1876), The Murgh-e-Suleman (Munger, 
1876), The Musheer-e-Bihar (Patna, 1880), The Al Punch (Patna, 1885), 
The Al Hadi (Patna, 1897), Raftar-e-Zamana (Patna 1902), The Ittehad, 
the Imarat, Naqeeb, Sada-e-Aam (Patna 1942), etc. These newspapers 
inculcated not only the cultural values but also imparted political 
education and advocated for the Hindu - Muslim unity to overthrow the 
coloniahsm. 
In Bihar, the political awareness of Muslims kept pace with the modem 
education. The Initial phase of the political awakening of the Muslims 
evolved around Hindi-Urdu controversy. In January 1881, the 
Cf. J.S. Jha, "Origin and development of Cultural Institution in hi \mUournal 
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government had replaced Urdu and introduced Hindi as court language. It 
presented a serious threat to the educated elite among Muslims and 
Kayasthas of Bihar. They both opposed it. It even witnessed some tension 
between the two communities. But, because both the Muslims and 
Kayasthas opposed the use of Nagri, therefore, the controversy could not 
deteriorate into a sharp communal divide. Whereas, during the same 
period, on the same issue, we see a great cleavage among the Hindus and 
Muslims of U.P 
Even the cultural and religious institutions like Khanqahs and shrines also 
played a significant role. Unlike Punjab (where the Sajjada Nashins of 
Sufi Khnaqahs engaged themselves in separatist politics in 1940s.) due to 
a variety of reasons, the khanqahs of Bihar pursued a policy of tolerance, 
unity and brotherhood, which benefited both Hindus and Muslims. In the 
modern social and political life of Bihar, the Khanqah-e-Rahmania of 
Munger and the Khanqah-e-Mujibia of Phulwarisharif (Patna) played a 
remarkable role in the freedom movement and were up against the 
of Historical Research Society, Ranchi, 1961. Vol. VIII. 
See Francis Robinson, Separatism Among Indian Muslims: United Provinces 
1860-1923. Cambridge, 1974. 
Also see Paul Brass, Language Religion and Politics in North India. 
Cambridge, 1974. 
^ David Gilmartin, Empire and Islam: Punjab and the Making of Pakistan. 
Berkley /London, 1988. 
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League's policy of separatism'. The Khanqahs of Maner, Biharshareef, 
Patna, Sasaram, Bhagalpur, Munger, Kako, Sheikhpura, Darbhanga, 
Chapra, etc. pursued a policy of tolerance, unity and brotherhood which 
benefited both the Hindu and Muslim masses . The Anjuman Ulema-e-
Biliar (1917) was in a way the predecessor of the Jamiatul Ulema-e-Hind 
and the Imarat-e-Shariah remained the strongest and consistent asset for 
the Indian National Movement to check the tide of the Muslim League's 
separatist politics during the last decade of retreating colonialism in India. 
Sir Syed's call to stay away from the Congress had elicited very few 
support from Bihar. Sir Syed's suggestion was to concentrate on modern 
education not on politics of the time because politics would have 
antagonized the Raj, hampering the educational prospects of the Muslims. 
But in Bihar, the situation was different. Even before the establishment of 
Mohammaden School and Mohammaden Education Committee (1884), 
not less than 6 Zilla schools were operating. These schools were 
imparting modern education in English. Fifteen more high schools were 
running with the government's aid. Patna College had been established in 
1863. And the Muslims were benefiting from all these common schools. 
^ Papiya Ghosh, "Muttahidah Qaumiyat in Aqalliat Bihar: The Imarat-e-
Shariah (1921-47)". lESHR, 34, 1 (1997). 
^ Ghulam Husain, Sufia-e-Karam Ki Rawadari, in Bihar Ki Khabrein, 15 
August 1969. 
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So, they never felt like opening up separate schools exclusively for 
Muslims. In many ways the Muslims were educationally ahead of Hindus 
in Bihar. In the Patna College and its affiliated schools, the proportion of 
Muslim students was as high as 23%, whereas their total population was 
only 13%.^ Moreover, in Bihar, two things checked the growth of 
separatist tendencies among Muslims, firstly the modern educated people 
felt for preserving and reviving traditional religious cultural educational 
institutions. Secondly, the Ulema never shied away from responding to 
the modern education. In the maktabs and madarsas, even Hindus also 
got their elementary education. Sri Krishna Sahay, Dr. Sachidanand 
Sinah. Dr. Rajendra Prasad and several other prominent Hindus of Bihar 
had got their primary education in the Maktabs and Madrasas 
It is interesting to see that the first three Biharis to return from England 
after receiving the higher education in 1880 were all Muslims viz. 
Sharfuddin, Noorul Huda and Ahsanuddin Ahmad. Out of the total 71 
appointments that were made in 4 years from 1895 to 1898, only 20 were 
Biharis, and out of these 20, 13 were Muslims, 7 were Hindus 
' Taqi Rahim, Tehreek-e-Azadi Mein Bihar Ke Musalmanon Ka Hissa, Patna, 
1998. p. 99. 
p. 100 
'' V.C.P. Chaudhry, The Creation of Modern Bihar, Patna, 1964, p.72 
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Therefore, a considerable number of Muslims who rather than going on 
separatist path, joined the Indian National Congress and did not respond 
to separatism. 
Sharfuddin, who later became Judge of the Calcutta High court, presided 
over a meeting at Arrah, to elect delegates for the second session of the 
Congress to be held at Calcutta in 1886. As many as 222 Muslims 
delegates attended the Allahabad session of the Congress in 1888 of 
which 35 Muslims delegates were from Bihar itself. Sharfuddin declared: 
"I can assure you that, at least in my province of Bihar, the 
Momammadens have the fullest sympathy with the objects of 
the Congress" 
Whereas Syed Ali Bilgrami delivered a speech in March 1901 observing. 
"With the beginning of the 20"^ century, which saw many 
political and economic changes in India, uneasiness among the 
educated Muslims began to mount and they wished for a 
political organization like the Congress which could espouse 
their cause. The younger Muslims suggested that the best 
course for the Muslims was to join the Congress in large 
number to play their part in all activities and ensure the 
protection of their rights and interest 
12 AH Ashraf, The Muslim Elite. Delhi, 1992. pp.30-31. Also see Report of the 
Indian National Congress, 1888. p.l28 quoted by Kamta Chaubey, op ciYp. 
11 
' ^  Kayastha Samachar, March 1901, p. 194 
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Apart from the pan Islamic and revolutionary activities, the Muslims of 
Bihar had popularly participated in the national activities of the Indian 
National Congress. Since the very inception of the Indian National 
Congress in 1885, the Muslims of Bihar had taken liberal participation in 
that organization. They conspicuously and enthusiastically joined the 
Congress and remained associated with that national organization 
The opposition of the Congress by the leaders like Khuda Bakhsh Khan, 
Khawja Wajihuddin of Gaya, Molvi Md. Hasan of Patna, Kazi Syed Raza 
Hussain of Patna however, received a very lukewarm response from the 
Muslims of Bihar 
All classes of the Muslims, including the ulema of Bihar associated 
themselves with the Congress. The Muslim political activities 
increasingly moved round the Congress. The number of the Muslim 
delegates to the Indian National Congress kept on increasing. In Lahore 
session of 1900, there were 20 Muslim delegates from Bihar 
Thus, by 1905, on Bihar's political horizon, somehow, Muslim separatism 
could not make much headway; the politically conscious Muslims aligned 
Muzaffar Imam, Role of Muslims in the Indian National Movement: A Study 
of Bihar 1912-1930, Delhi, 1987, pp. 27-28 
15 Ibid, p.27 
Ihid. p.30 
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themselves with the Congress for the promotion of the national interests. 
In 1899, under the chairmanship of Afaq Khan, Bar-at-law of Darbhanga, 
the Boys' Association was formed. This association became the centre of 
political activities in North Bihar Mazharul Haq, Sarfaraz Hussain 
Khan and Syed Ali Imam had made early efforts to bring the Hindus and 
the Muslims together in the political arena through their active role in the 
Bihar Provincial Conference, sponsored by the Bihar Provincial Congress 
Committee. The Bihar Provincial Congress Committee was formed under 
the chairmanship of Sarfraz Hussain Khan in 1908. The BPCC selected 6 
delegates for the annual session of the Congress in Madras in 1908. They 
included Hasan Imam, Najmul Hoda and others. 
The first session of Bihar Provincial Congress met at Patna in 1908 with 
Syed Ali Imam as its President. The two communities made common 
cause in the work of the conference. Syed Ali Imam in his short speech 
dilated upon the current problems of the province. He then suggested his 
co-religionists to come forward and join the national movement of the 
Country. Consequently, the Muslims joined the Congress in a body and 
thus, Bihar, then, presented a unique spectacle in the whole of India, 
17 K. K. Datta, History of the Freedom Movement in Bihar. Vol. 1. p. 150 
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where Muslims and non-Muslims were working with full cooperation and 
18 unity for the common ideals . 
Bihar was having a distinct problem of its own which affected the Hindus 
and Muslims alike. In the last quarter of the 19th century and the first 
decade of 20th century, the educated middle class in Bihar (Hindus & 
Muslims both) confronted with the Bengalis in every walk of life, but 
more particularly in the public services and employment. Bengalis had 
managed to get most of the government jobs in the province. This was 
largely due to the fact that till 1912, Bihar was an appendage to Bengal. 
Hence the Hindus and Muslims in Bihar forged a joint front in political 
activities. For this reason, Muslim politics in Bihar presents a somewhat 
different picture from that of other provinces. Dr. Sachidanand Sinha in 
his book Some Eminent Bihar Contemporaries has pointed out this fact. 
Along with Sachidanand Sinha and Mahesh Narayan, Muslim leaders like 
Ali Imam, Hasan Imam, Mazharul Haq and Md. Fakhruddin fought 
jointly for a separate province of Bihar. The first session of the Bihar 
Provincial Conference was held at Patna, in April 1908, under Ali 
Imams' presidentship. The resolution for Bihar's separation from Bengal 
was moved by Fakhruddin. 
18 Sachidanand Sinha, Some Eminent Bihar Contemporaries. Patna, 1944. pp. 
79-80 
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The three leading public associations viz. Bihar Landholders' 
Association, the Bihar Provincial Association and the Bihar Provincial 
Muslim League had sent a joint deputation to the governor. 
Speaking on the 5th death anniversary of Mahesh Narayan, Mazharul 
Haq demanded a high court and a University for the province of Bihar. 
Thus, when, during 1905-12, the movement against partition of Bengal, 
the Swadeshi Movement had witnessed the growth of communalism and 
separatism in U.P., Bihar presented a different picture where Hindus and 
Muslims stood united. 
There was mutual understanding between the two communities and had 
reached a high stage. When the third session of the Bihar Provincial 
Congress (Muzaffarpur), was held in 1910, the president. Deep Narayan 
Singh even urged the necessity of extending the principle of separate 
electorate to the Hindus where they were in minority. The Muslim 
delegates supported his proposal most enthusiastically. Its significance 
lies in the fact that in the meeting, more than fifty percent of the delegates 
were Muslims.^' The Beharee (May 20, 1910) noted that it was difficult 
to find any other province where such harmonious and friendly co-
operation between the Hindu and Muslim communities in public and 
political activities existed. In this respect Bihar provided exemplary 
19 The Beharee, May 20, 1910 
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lesson to other provinces. The Minto-Morley reform and separate 
electorate of 1909 had created a vicious political atmosphere in India. In 
Bihar, both Hasan Imam and Mazharul Haq were opposed to it whole-
heartedly. So also Reza Husain, Md. Yunus and Ali Imam opposed 
separate electorate vehemently. What is to be noted, particularly, that in 
local bodies, they were not ready to extend the principle of separate 
electorate at any cost. 
However, in 1907, there was a movement for the establishment of a 
Hindu association {Hindu Sabha), which posed a serious problem to the 
Hindu Muslim Unity. The initiator of this idea was Maharaja of 
Darbhanga.^" The Beharee (dated October, 1907) viewed it with great 
regret that this would be disastrous if the movement gained any headway. 
The paper was skeptical and sanguinely doubtful about its success. 
Again in 1911, there was a renewed endeavour to revive the Bihar Hindu 
Sabha. It caused flutter among the Muslims. In spite of this, the 
vernacular newspapers remained critical of these efforts and attempts and 
lost no opportunity to emphasise the importance of Hindu-Muslim 
unity.^' 
J.S. Jha, "An Unpublished Correspondence Relating to the Bihar Hindu 
Sabha" in Journal Of Bihar Research Society, 1968, vol. LIV 
-'The Beharee, 23 June 1912. 
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It would be worthwhile to examine the attitude of the Bihar Muslims 
towards the All India Muslim League. 
The Bihar Provincial Muslim League which was set up in 1908, presented 
a very different picture, because a majority of the members of the Muslim 
League in Bihar were veteran Congress leaders viz. Fakhruddin, 
Mazharul Haq, Sarfaraz Hussain Khan, Nurul Hasan etc. 
"In Bihar Hindu Muslim unity and cooperation was a unique 
feature of the political life of the people. The aim and object of 
the Bihar Muslim League was similar to the Congress. There 
was no difference between the two both in political 
programmed and in the social composition of the leader. Hence 
they worked cordially and smoothly in Bihar for considerable 
period."^^ 
Syed Ali Imam, in his presidential address at the Muslim League Session 
of Amritsar in 1908 said: 
"The League's aims and objectives were not against national 
interest or against any community. It had been made quite 
identical with the National Congress. It had many similarities 
with the Congress in its demand of reforms and self 
government in India soon." 
The Muslim leaders of Bihar therefore urged upon the League to conform 
to the nationalist standard and maintain harmony with other national 
" The Biharee, 8 November 1907. 
^^ The Biharee, 1 January 1909. S. N. Sinha, Some Eminant Bihar 
Contemporaries.Patna, 1944. p. 78 
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organizations. The Muslim League in Bihar kept itself out of the agitation 
for separate electorates. Hasan Imam characterized the scheme of 
separate electorate as "pernicious scheme". 
Mazharul Haq too opposed it and declared, 
"to my mind the question was to bring the two communities 
together in order that they work unitedly for the regeneration of 
our motherland."^'^ 
Having discussed these developments, the impact of Nadwatul Ulema, in 
shaping the political behaviour of Muslims is worth mentioning. 
Among Muslims. Maulana Shibli Nomani was a great source of 
inspiration because he had injected anti colonial feeling into them. He 
was a pan-Islamist and opposed to the Western Imperialistic designs. He 
not only influenced the anti colonial younger generation of Aligarh in 
1890's and thereafter the Nadwatul Ulema (Club of Ulema) had received 
great response among the Muslims of Bihar.^^ Bihar had many important 
Muslim leaders such as Maulana Md. Ali Mungeri, Maulana Shah 
Suleman Phulwari. Maulana Tajammul Hasan Dasnavi, Maulana Syed 
The Beharee, 16 December, 1910. 
Taqi Rahim, op cit p. 136. 
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Sulaiman Nadwi who were the were the close associates of Maulana 
Shibli Nomani in this movement. 
The seventh Conference of the Nadwa was held in 1900 in Patna. Its anti 
imperialist content had attracted modern educated Muslim youth. 
Maulana Shibli Nomani visited Patna, first in 1896 and then in 1912. In 
1907 he also visited Muzaffarpur. As early as 1906, Maulana Shibli had 
vehemently criticized the League describing it as the source of conflict 
between the two communities.^^ 
"They succeeded in keeping the Muslimi League different 
from what its originators wanted to make of it. The Muslim 
leaders of Bihar were liberal in outlook, tolerant and nationalist 
and therefore they organized and nursed the Muslim League 
along national Lines. Since most of the members of the Muslim 
League in Bihar were also the members of the Congress, their 
attitude differed from that of their counterparts in other parts of 
India, and the Bihar Provincial Muslim League could not 
become the citadel of the communalists and reactionaries till 
1937"". 
It was largely due to the efforts of the leaders like Mazharul Haq that the 
Muslim League adopted the Congress ideal of self-government in the 
year 1913 at the Agra session of the League.^^ 
-^ M/ Punch, 13 December 1906. 
Kamta Chaubey, Muslims and the Freedom Movement in India: A Study of 
Bihar 1905-28, Allahabad, 1990. p. 213. 
28 The Indian Year Book, 1914. of. Kamta Chaubey. Op cit. p.l 1 
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Mazharul Haq, who presided over the League session and Lord S.P. 
Sinha who presided over the Congress session in 1915, travelled to 
Bombay by the same train and both showed their presidential address to 
each other. In this address, Mazharul Haq told the Muslims that the 
welfare of India depended on the Union of the Hindus and Musalmans. 
He firmly declared that, 
"In the affairs of the country I stand for goodwill and close co-
operation between all communities, with a single eye to the 
progress of the motherland". 
This address was widely appreciated by most of the newspapers including 
the Leader, (1st January 1916), the Express, The Mithila Mihir, The 
Beharee, Behar Herald etc ^^ 
In this background both the Muslim League and the Congress held their 
annual sessions at Lucknow in 1916. It was largely due to the effort of 
Mazharul Haq (and others) that the Congress and the League concluded 
the famous Lucknow Pact. 
The British administration was watching these developments with 
anxious concern, the dilution of their scheme of divide and rule policy 
through the separate electorate. In Bihar, the Muslim hostility against the 
29 For more see Kamta Chaubey, op. cit. p. 11 
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British Raj was becoming acute due to the campaign by the Anjuman-e-
Khuddam-e-Kaaba of Maulana Abdul Bari Firangi Mahali.^" 
Despite the Shahabad riots and consequent Muslim alienation, nationalist 
vigour continued and the separatism could not breach the unity. The same 
spirit was evident in the Champaran Satyagraha, Non co-operation and 
Khilafat movement. In all these movements, Muslims remained in the 
forefront. 
The Champaran Satyagrah had exercised great impact on the political and 
cultural life notably in the North Bihar. In this region, we find the 
emergence of a large number of leaders but also see the mobilization of 
even those sections of the Bihari population who had hitherto remained 
silent sufferers of colonialism. 
Contrary to the existing historiography on Champaran Satyagrah, which 
starts only with Gandhi's visit, the real picture of the Champaran 
Satyagrah can be drawn only when we trace its history at least from 1907 
if not further back. 
Much before the Champaran Satyagrah of 1917, as early as 1907, we find 
evidences of commendable role played by many Muslims in this region 
J.S. Jha, "Anti British Connections of JBRS, 
1975, vol. LXI. 
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among peasants. In a way, it was their work, which proved conducive, 
and Gandhi could mobilize them for the Congress. 
Shaikh Adalat Hussain, Shaikh Gulab and Pir Md. Munis were the real 
leaders of Champaran Satyagrah whose role has not received proper 
attention of scholars in general. Much before the advent of Gandhi on the 
scene, Pir Md. Munis (1894-1948) had played a very important and 
significant role as the correspondent of Hindi daily Pratap (Kanpur) 
edited by Ganesh Shankar Vidyarthi. In order to avoid English 
administrator's wrath he used to write with pseudonyms. He wrote 
numerous essays on Hindu-Muslim Unity as well.^^ 
Shafi Daudi, Manzur Ajazi, Mazharul Haq and Syed Mahmud were the 
leading lights of the national movement in the province. It was during this 
struggle (i.e. Non Cooperation movement) that Muzaffarpur district unit 
of the Congress was established (mainly by Shafi Daudi besides others at 
Tilak Maidan). The establishment of the Sadaqat Ashram at Patna by 
Mazharul Haq is too well known to be repeated here. 
Shafi Daudi addressed several meetings at Purnea, Katihar, Bhagalpur, 
Munger etc. He along with his wife Zubaida Begum Daudi used to collect 
foreign cloths on bullock cart and burn them at their residence in 
^'P. K. Chaudhary and Shrikant. Bihar Mein Samajik Parivartan Ke Kuch 
Auyam (1912- 1990). (Hindi). Delhi, 2001. pp. 37-38. 
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Muzaffarpur. He had left his lucrative practice at Muzaffarpur court. In 
Munger, Shah Md. Zubair and in Muzaffarpur Abdul Wadud were the 
active leaders. Daudi made a tour of the remote villages of the 
Muzaffarpur district and explained to the people the congress scheme of 
Non co-operation.^^ Zubaida Begum Daudi was one of the most 
prominent women freedom fighters from Bihar.^^ A significant feature of 
the national movement in Bihar had been that the Muslim women were 
active participants. They held a meeting at Shafi Manzil Patna and took a 
pledge for complete non-cooperation with the Raj and to use Khadi as 
their permanent dress. The Patna Women Association had already held a 
session including Mrs. Hasan Imam, Mrs. Sami, and Mrs. S. P. Sen etc. 
The enthusiasm among women of Bihar was injected by Begum Abadi 
Bano alias Bi Amman (mother of the Ali brothers) who had visited Bihar 
in February 1922. She went to many places in Bihar joined by 
distinguished ladies of the respective towns addressing large gatherings 
of as many as 10,000 women.^"^ 
^'Shafi Daudi Papers, Maghfoor Ajazi Papers NMML, New Delhi. Mujalla 
(Urdu) Shafi Daudi Memorial Committee, Muzaffarpur, 1993. Booklet on 
Maghfoor Ajazi, published by the Maghfoor Ajazi Memorial Committee, 
Muzaffarpur. 
^^  Abeda Samiuddin, ""Hindustan Ki Jang-e-Azadi Mein Muslim Khwateen Ka 
Hissa". (Urdu). Patna, 1990. 
34 The Searchlight (Issues of February 1922) 
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Apart from these individual Muslim leaders, the hnarat-e-Shariah as an 
organization played a leading role in the freedom movement and in 
promoting the spirit of religious tolerance. This was set up as a legal-
spiritual institution in 1921. This institution enjoyed the blessings of two 
of the most influential Klumqahs in Bihar. It was inspired by Jamiat-ul-
Ulema-e-Hind (JUH) concept of muttahidah qaumiat (Composite 
nationalism). Its moving spirit, Maulana Md. Sajjad was greatly 
influenced by Maulana Abul Kalam Azad. It brought out a journal 
called Imarat (fortnightly) which was banned by the Raj during the Civil 
Disobedience Movement. Subsequently another organ called 'Naqeeb' 
(weekly) was launched. In the post Khilafat years, it was not the Muslim 
League but the JUH that survived well into the 1930s to keep its ideals 
and national entity intact. 
It would be interesting to examine the political behaviour of dominant 
Muslim Organizations of Bihar after the collapse of the Khilafat 
Movement in 1923-24. 
The Shudhi, Sangathan compaign of Arya Samajists and Hindu 
Mahasabhites and the tableegh, tanzeem movements of a group of 
Muslims had created great divide between the two communities. In this 
atmosphere of disharmony, Imarat-e-Shariah''& Maulana Sajjad and 
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Maulana Fazlur Rahman appealed to their co religionists to maintain 
communal harmony and to stop cow sacrifice.^^ 
A Khilafat Committee meeting was held at Muzaffarpur under Md. Shaft 
who urged upon Muslims to maintain Hindu Muslim Unity.^^ 
The Khilafat Conference, presided over by Syed Sulaiman Nadvi, 
condemned the communal discord and appealed for national unity. He 
urged the Muslims of Bihar to join hands with the Congress. 
Bihar had become an important itinerary of national leaders also. Bi 
Amman along with her son Shaukat Ali, visited Munger, Jamalpur, 
Lakhisarai, Muzaffarpur to enlist mass support for the freedom struggle. 
Khwaja Hasan Nizami on his visit to Patna on 25"" June 1925 said that, in 
India, Hindu Muslim unity was natural and traditional and it could not be 
jeopardized by artificial means. He appealed to the people to maintain 
Communal peace in the greater interest of the Country. He urged the 
Ulema of Bihar to play their traditional role in maintaining Communal 
peace in the province. Maulana Shah Suleman and Ruknuddin Dana also 
spoke on the same lines." 
Fortnightly Report Govt.of Bihar & Orissa, 1923, D.O.No. 853-C, Patna 14-
4-1923. 
^^ Ibid. 
" The Searchlight, 28 June 1925. 
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In 1926, (despite great provocations due to Communal riots in 
Muzaffarpur, Darbhanga, Sasaram, Munger etc.) The enthusiasm of the 
Muslims of Bihar for communal harmony and Swaraj remained unshaken 
even after the communal riots in Muzaffarpur, Darbhanga, Sasaram, 
Munger etc. in 1926. 
Syed Sulaiman Nadvi presided over the All India Khilafat Conference at 
Delhi (8-9 May, 1926). In his presidential address he explained that in 
order to attain Swaraj and Unity narrow mentalities should be 
abandoned.^^ 
The Muslims everywhere boycotted the Simon Commission. Shafi Daudi 
addressed the Muslims at the Jama Masjid of Muzaffarpur urging the 
audience to observe hartal against the Simon Commission. In Munger, 
Shah Md. Zubair mobilized the people against the Simon Commission. 
However, on the issue of the Motilal Nehru Report, the Muslims of Bihar 
did have their misgivings. Even then, due largely to the influence of the 
Muslim organizations like Imarat-e- Sharia, Momin Conference, 
Jamiatid Ulema, etc. The participation of Muslims remained notably high 
during the Civil Disobedience Movement. 
^^  H.N. Mitra, Indian Quarterly Register, 1926, vol.1, pp. 409-411. 
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On 26"^ January 1930, Independence Day was celebrated in all the towns 
of Bihar and everywhere the participation of Muslims was quite large in 
number.^' 
Shah Mohiuddin, Amir -e- Shariat, (Bihar), in pursuance of the JUH, 
appealed to the Muslims of Bihar to adopt independence of the country as 
their motto and play their traditional role to achieve freedom of India."*® 
The Jamiat ul Ulama of Bihar held its session on 22""^  October 1930, at 
Bankipur under the Presidentship of Maulana Syed Shah Lutfullah of 
Munger. It expressed full faith in the Congress and appealed to the 
Muslims to play their historic role for achieving the independence of 
Country. It congratulated the Ulema who were active for the cause of 
Country's independence. It also did not favour the Round Table 
Conference without the participation of the Congress.''^ 
Before this session, on 30"^ June 1930, the Jamiat ul Ulema of Bihar had 
convened a meeting at Patna under the president ship of Hasan Imam. In 
^^  The Searchlight, 29 January 1930. 
The Imarat, 16 January and 6 February 1930 
Ibid. 30 October 1930. 
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this meeting Maulana Abul Kalam Azad was also invited to deliver a 
speech to allay the misgivings of the Muslims against the Congress/^ 
It extended its active support to the Civil Disobedience movement, 
which invited criticism of the League. Maulana Sajjad, Usman Ghani 
(Secretary, Imarat-e- Shariah), Hafiz Md. Sani and Shaikh Adalat Husain 
were imprisoned for their participation in the Civil disobedience 
Movement.'*"^ 
The crux of difference between it and the Muslim League was the 
concept of Muttahidah Qaumiycit. The Imarat-e-Shariah was the most 
vehement opponent of the Lahore Resolution for Pakistan of 1940. The 
Imarat-e-Shariah contested the League's Pakistan movement due to its 
neglect of the minority provinces. So much so that they declared the 
League's leadership as un-Islamic. 
Maulana Sajjad said that since the League did not have any answer for 
the problems of the Muslims of Bihar and U.P., therefore there was no 
logic for the Muslims of these two provinces to extend their support to 
the 'Pakistan' Movement. He even wrote a very long article in Naqeeb 
^^  Taqi Rahim, op cit. pp. 292-293. 
43 The Indian Nation, Nov. 9 1924. Also see Papiya Ghosh, "Muttahidah 
Qaumiyat in Aqalliat Bihar: The Imarat-e-Shariah (1921-47)". lESHR, 34, 1 
(1997), Maulana Md. Zafiruddin Miftahi, Imarat-e-Shariah: Deeni Jidd o 
Johad ka Roshan Baab, (Urdu) Patna, 1974. pp. 51-70. 
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with the title ''Muslim India aur Hindu India key scheme par ek aham 
tabsera'' on 14 April 1940. 
He said: 
"This country is inhabited by the people whose religious faiths 
are different and the differences have reached extreme which is 
very painful e.g. practice of idolatry which is offensive for 
monotheists, beef eating which is painful for cow worshippers 
and when the situation is like this our leaders should chalk out 
the ways and fix limits for religious freedom in a way that no 
sect feels to have been adversely discriminated. Then he 
suggests that the religions should be made a private matter 
rather than demonstrating it publicly. So that the practice does 
not become instigatory or inflammatory".'*^ 
An analysis of the character of Muslim Leadership in Bihar throws 
ample light on the Hindu Muslim Unity in Bihar. 
'the role played by the leaders like Ali Imam, Hasan Imam, 
Mazharul Haq. Sarfraz Hussain Khan, Sharfuddin, Shafi Daudi, 
Abdul Bari, Shah Md. Zubair, Syed Mahmud, Maulana Sajjad, 
Maghfur Ajazi etc. Though most of the leaders were trained in 
western, Liberal principles and were secular in their attitudes 
towards political problems. They were broadminded and 
nationalist in outlook. They all rejected the thesis that the 
MusUms were a separate nation and they stood by the cause of 
Recently some representative essays written by Maulana Sajjad in Naqeeb 
has been compiled and published by the Imarat-e-Sharialt. In one of these 
essays Maulana Sajjad has suggested the ways to avoid communal conflicts 
and effect harmony. This reflects his political leanings. (Qazi Mujahidul Islam 
Qasmi (Compiler) Maqalat-e-Sajjad, (Urdu) Patna, 1999.) 
^^  Qazi Mujahidul Islam Qasmi (Compiler) Maqalat-e-Sajjad, (Urdu) Patna, 
1999. pp.51-52. 
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the nation. Hasan Imam was popular equally among the Hindus 
and the Muslims'.'*^ 
G.A. Natesan too wrote: 
"If there is anybody in Bihar today who also enjoys in an 
extraordinary degree the confidence alike of the Hindus and the 
Musalmans, who is acclaimed as the accredited leader of the 
present generation of public men in the province and whom the 
social reformer, the public list and the student of politics, 
equally regard as the greatest champion of all their movement, 
it is surely Mr. Hasan Imam". 
Both the brothers, Hasan Imam and Ali Imam, consistently opposed 
separate electorate for Muslims. Mazharul Haq was the greatest apostle of 
Hindu Muslim unity and remained a staunch nationalist throughout his 
life. He always protested against the demand of separate electorate for the 
Muslims. It was his earnest desire to forge a common front of the 
Muslims and Hindus, of the League and Congress and his endeavours 
bore fruit in Lucknow in 1916 where the Congress-League compromise 
was effected. 
Abdul Bari, belonged to those type of leaders who, like Subhash Chandra 
Bose and Jawaharlal Nehru, strongly criticized the Nehru Report for 
having recommended only Dominion Status for India because nothing 
Kamta Chaubey . op cit pp. 217-25. 
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short of complete independence could satisfy him. He represented the 
new Muslim middle class. 
Kamta Chaubey says: 
"The Muslim politics in Bihar remained non communal, anti 
sectarian and nationalist in outlook so long as the Hindu 
leadership was also non communal. The honeymoon of Hindu 
Muslim co-operation and understanding could not last for long. 
The Municipal, District board and Bihar legislative council 
elections of 1923, 1926, produced a rift in the lute of Hindu 
Muslim co-operation in Bihar. In the district board elections of 
Muzaffarpur, Shafi Daudi was defeated by a European planter 
Danby due to betrayal of the Congress. It gave him a rude 
shock and he began to think differently. It poisoned the 
political atmosphere of Bihar." 
Some later developments caused a breach in the harmony that had existed 
and received a jolt. But even more shocking was the defeat of Mazharul 
Haq who, in utter disillusionment, withdrew from active politics creating 
a void. 
Taqi Rahim, in his memoir holds the same view ^^  that. 
"In the politics of Bihar Communalism and casteism started 
after the electoral politics of Swarajists. In the local bodies 
there was no provision for separate electorate. There, 
communalism was practised quite openly." 
47 Kamta Chaubey, op cit. p. 229. 
Taqi Rahim, op cit. pp 249-256. 
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Dr. Rajendra Prasad, in his autobiography, wrote that certain Hindu 
candidates carried calves to the doors of electorates during election 
campaign and votes were demanded on religious lines. Swami 
Shradhanand, Dr. Moonje, Lala Lajpat Rai, Pt. Malaviya etc. who were 
Hindu Mahasabhites, stoked the fire of communalism. The Congress 
leaders themselves campaigned on caste and communal lines. These 
things depressed and disappointed the Muslim leaders of Bihar and the 
Muslim leaders opposing the separate electorates stood discredited by the 
Muslims. Such developments took place at the time when even Jinnah 
had been persuaded to agree for conditional joint electorate. 
Taqi Rahim observes: 
"Undoubtedly, the Hindu Congressmen displayed narrow 
mindedness and opportunism in the local bodies' elections. It 
shocked the Bihar's Muslims who had not witnes.sed communal 
chauvinism earlier. Therefore, from upper to lower classes of 
Muslims got disillusioned against joint electorate, and this 
tendency went on increasing subsequently. Even then credit 
goes to the Muslims of Bihar that in the collective social life, 
they did not develop separatism and kept supporting the 
Congress". ^^  
Taqi Rahim significantly remarks that communal tension and riots were 
not occurring due to religions but it was a tussle for political power. 
49 Ibid. p. 254. 
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The Nehru Report had further alienated Muslims in these circumstances. 
Even then, in Bihar, the leaders of Jamiat-ul-Ulema and Imarat-e-
Shariah actively participated in the Civil Disobedience Movement, 
Maulana Sajjad, Nooruddin Bihari, Maulana Usman Ghani, Abdul 
Wahab Darbhangwi, Abdul Wadud etc. joined in the movement along 
with hundreds of Muslims. 
Again, during the Salt Satyagraha in Bihar, the maximum numbers of 
people arrested were Muslims. 
Shah Omair and Abdul Bari told that it was the duty (farz) of every 
Muslim to support the Lahore Resolution of Complete Independence 
passed by the Congress in 1929. 
There was no high-ranking Muslim leadership except Abdul Bari and 
Syed Mahmud at the provincial level but at the district level, the Muslims 
dominated the leadership. Syed Mahmud concentrated on mobilizing the 
Muslims in Saran, Champaran and Muzaffarpur while Abdul Bari 
concentrated on Shahabad, Jamshedpur and Panta. 
Some of the district level leaders were Aiiz Munami, Sagir Hasan Arzoo 
and Zaheer Qasim in Patna, Md. Ismail (Wakil) in Mazuffarpur, Shah 
Omair in Gaya, Zahurul Hasan Hashmi and Molvi Zakariya Hashmi in 
Bhagalpur, Abdul Wahab in Darbhanga and Abdul Wadud and Abdul 
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Ghafur, Hafiz M. Sani, Shaikh Adalat Husain and Pir Md. Munis in 
Champaran were leading the Civil Disobedience Movement.^" 
Besides all these leaders, several new leaders emerged and put great 
resistance to the League's Pakistan movement in the 1940s. 
Jcimiat ul Ulema held several conferences in many places to mobilize 
support of the Muslims in the Civil disobedience movement. Begum 
Hasan Imam, Begum Sami, etc. worked among women for prohibition 
and boycott of foreign goods. 
In 1930s, many nationalist Muslim leaders of Bihar died. Already 
considerable disillusionment had set in among Muslims against the 
Congress. For all their disillusionment, the Bihar's Muslims did not 
desert the Congress. They, at most, became inactive but such passivity 
did not degenerate into support for any Muslim separatist organization. 
This was in sharp contrast with the Muslims of Punjab and Sindh where 
disillusionment against the Congress was fast developing/degenerating 
into separatism. ^^  
Ibid.^. 288. Also see Muzaffar Imam, op cit. p. 195, 206. 
Taqi Rahim, op d rpp . 312-313. 
Ibid. p. 288. Also see Muzaffar Imam, op cit. p. 195, 206. 
"" Taqi Rahim, op dr pp. 312-313. 
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Even the Muslim Conference of Shafi Daudi, which for a time took 
positions against the Congress, became defunct after the announcement of 
the Communal Award in 1932. Moreover it was never well taken by the 
Muslims of Bihar notwithstanding their grievances against the Motilal 
Nehru Report. At this time there was hardly any prominent Muslim leader 
propagating separatist agenda. The nationalist ranks, on the other hand, 
had leaders of stature of Syed Mahmud, Prof. Abdul Bari and Shah Omair 
who were quite popular and commanded considerable influential among 
the masses. 
Maulana Abul Kalam Azad too commanded popularity among the 
Muslims of Bihar. In the elections of 1937 the Muslims of Bihar did not 
have any concern with Jinnah and his League. The League was virtually 
non-existent in Bihar. The Khilafat movement of 1920s, with its sharp 
anti colonial thrust, had struck a severe blow to the existence of the 
League as it found it hard to live down the image of being a loyalist party. 
Moreover, anti colonialism always struck a responsive chord among the 
Muslims of Bihar as they had strongly imbibed this streak under the 
influence of the "Wahabi" movement. It won't be out of place to mention 
here that the Deoband movement, the Jamiat ul Ulema and the Imarat-e-
Shariah are the ideological offshoots of the Wahabi movement. Anti 
colonialism being its main plank, the Imarat-e-Shariah soon captured the 
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imagination of the Muslims of Bihar and by 1937 it emerged as their 
most popular organization. The Imarat-e-Shariah's organizational 
network had penetrated deep down to the remotest villages. It had 
religious as well as political credibility. Its social works and religious 
services had earned great reputation. And it was uncompromisingly anti 
colonialist, staunch nationalist. It had become so popular that sheer 
demand of the nationalist Muslims prompted it to take part in the ensuing 
elections of 1937. 
"In this election, the Muslims of Bihar did not have anything to 
do with Jinnah and his Muslim League. It was the Imamt-e-
Shariah, which had the greatest influence on the Muslims of 
Bihar. That 's why Mr. Jinnah had to nominate Mufti 
Kifayatullah (a non Bihari) to his Parliamentary Board. In fact 
the disillusionment that had set in against the League and 
Jinnah during the Khilafat Movement, could still be felt in the 
minds of the Muslims of Bihar. The anti-British sentiments 
were still quite strong. Consequently, the League did not exist 
even on paper (so to say) whereas the Imarat-e-Shariah had 
penetrated deep down to villages. Moreover, the Imarat-e-
Shariah was the product of fierce anti imperialist sentiments. 
Therefore, its role was both religious as well as political. Hence 
its associates used to go hand in hand with the Congress in the 
freedom struggle. Simultaneously, they also thought that the 
Muslims of Bihar should be led only by the Imarat-e-Shariah. 
Thus, they formed the MIP to contest the provincial elections 
of 1937"." 
Consequently, it launched a party called Muslim Independent Party 
(MIP), on 12th September 1936, in the Anjuman Islamia Hall, Patna. 
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Maulana Sajjad was elected its president. Complete Independence was 
declared to be its goal. Its election manifesto was akin to the Congress. 
On the question of land reforms and mahajani loot, its radicalism 
foreshadowed the Faizpur agrarian programme of the Congress. 
It should be noted, that it was only in Bihar and NWFP where the Muslim 
League did not field any candidate for the elections in 1937. They were 
realist enough to realize that they stood no chance of winning any of the 
seats in these provinces. The MIP on the other hand could secure as many 
as 15 seats. In other provinces the League did succeed in winning some 
seats. This amply demonstrates that the Muslims of Bihar were more 
pronouncedly opposed to the political stance of the League, than their 
counterparts in any other province. 
Thus, Taqi Rahim concludes that with regard to anti imperialism and 
independence, the Muslims of Bihar was more committed than those of 
any other provinces.^^ 
Thus, till the formation of the Congress ministry, despite all odds and 
ruptures in the Hindu Muslim unity, the League's separatism was almost 
non-existent in Bihar. The Muslim League could make an organizational 
and ideological headway in Bihar only after 1937. Yet the dominant trend 
52 Taqi Rahim, op cit. pp 319-320. 
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among the Muslims of Bihar was that of anti League anti Pakistan till the 
riots of 1946. 
And even this separatism was expressed in an entirely different manner 
and forms, a form or shape, altogether different from that of the All India 
Muslim League. 
The Bihar Provincial Muslim League, after the riots of 1946, convened a 
conference at Gaya, known as "Division of Bihar Conference" on 19 
April 1947. In the meeting, rather than approving and stressing the 
demand of Pakistan, they demanded the division of the province of Bihar 
into Hindu and Non Hindu autonomous provinces. The meeting 
expressed its agony over the 1946 riots and indicted the Congress 
ministry for its failures or complicity. It stressed that 
" The Congress hopelessly and totally failed to protect the life, 
honour, property and religion of the Muslim minority of the 
province. Hence, it (Bihar) be forthwith partitioned into Hindu 
and Non Hindu autonomous provinces and separate ministries 
be immediately formed for the Hindu and Non Hindu 
autonomous provinces, and each ministry be made responsible 
to the Governor." 
Thus, the wordings of the resolution suggest that even as late as in April 
1947, the Bihar Provincial Muslim League was talking of the division of 
Ibid. p. 323. 
'''^Z.H. Zaidi (ed.), Jinnah Papers, vol. I, Part I, National Archives of Pakistan, 
Karachi, 1998. pp. 801-802. 
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the province and not of the country. Notwithstanding the fact that this 
provincial division was being sought along the religious lines, what is 
conspicuous is that it was not toeing the lines of the Jinnah's scheme of 
separatism. This is definitely an indicator of the weak influence of the All 
India Muslim League on its Bihar wing. 
Here it should be recalled that during the period of the Congress ministry 
(1937-39), a massive alienation of the Muslims had taken place, giving 
way to the League's dent in Bihar. Great misgivings against the Congress 
grew among the Muslims of Bihar. Even Maulana Sajjad of Imarat-e-
Shariah had a number of grievances, which he expressed only in a secret 
letter to the Congress High Command He kept it secret, thinking that if 
he would make it public, the League would make a political use of it 
against the Congress and thereby enlist the support of the Muslims to its 
cause. 
Even after having grievances against the Congress, they remained with it 
in order to attain an independent united India. Besides Imarat-e-Shariah, 
the Momin Conference was another popular organization among the 
Muslims, who kept on contesting the League's separatism and its stance 
of politics. 
' ' AICC Papers No. G-42/1939. 
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Started as Falahul Momineen in 1914 by the Momins of Bihar and UP 
living in Calcutta, the All India Momin Conference, 
"fostered and helped the Congress when there was an 
ideological conflict between progressive and secular Congress 
and conservative, reactionary and Communal All India Muslim 
League and left a record of its active participation in the 
freedom struggle. During 1937-38, it was converted into a 
separate political entity to counteract the venomous communal 
politics of the Muslim League Largely through the efforts of 
Abdul Qaiyum Ansari".^^ 
Since the Momins rallied behind the Momin Conference in large numbers, 
the League could not succeed in extending its support base among this 
group, which was the most numerous caste group of the Muslim 
community. 
" In Bihar it was an organization with 'considerable grass root 
support', was in the 'forefront of the Muslim Mass Contact 
Campaign' to enlist the support of the Momins and other 
sections of the Muslim community to the struggle for freedom 
and national unity... 
It succeeded in preventing the spread of the poisonous Two-
Nation theory in the Momin community in particular and 
among the other Backward Muslims in general.. 
Hasan Nishat Ansari, The Momin-Congress Relations: A Socio-Historical 
Analysis. Patna, 1989. p. 7. 
57 It is noted by S.M. Wasi, Director, Publicity, Govt, of Bihar, in a chapter 
about political and general events relating to Muslim organizations in the govt, 
publication, Bihar in 1938-39, that the 'Momin Muslims advanced criticisms of 
the aims and objectives of the Muslim League'. Also see Hasan Nishat Ansari, 
op cit. pp. 9-10. 
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In 1930s and 1940s the Momin Conference grew from strength to 
strength. Because: 
"The Momin movement was necessitated as the Muslim League 
represented the Muslim feudal, capitalists and upper classes 
and ignored the interests of the general Muslim masses of the 
Muslim commonalty. The aristocratic or so called high classes 
of Muslims, consisting of nawabs, zamindars, capitalists, 
religious leaders and others were indifferent to their 
58 conditions.. ." 
The Momin Conference attempted to use those very 'weapons' against 
which the League had employed against the Congress.^'' 
To oppose the League's separatist resolution of Lahore, a 'Nationalists' 
Muslims' Conference' was held at Delhi from iT^ to 29'^ April 1940. 
This is also known as Azad Muslim Conference. This conference was 
convened on behalf of the Jamiat ul Ulema-I-Hind. Due to a considerable 
influence of Deoband educated ulema in several districts of Bihar and 
particularly great influence of the Imarat-e-Shariah, the participation of 
Muslims from Bihar was spectacularly very high. Besides these ulema, 
Abdul Qaiyum Ansari, the leader of All India Momin Conference, played 
a remarkable role in mobilizing the Muslims, particularly the Momins of 
I 
Bihar. Abdul Qaiyum Ansari's influence can be gauged from the fact 
58 
59 
Hasan Nishat Ansari, op cit. p. 6. 
Humayun Kabir, Muslim Politics 1906-47 and Other Essays. Calcutta, 1969, 
pp. 38-39. 
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that, in 1940, when Sir Stafford Cripps came to India and asked Jawahar 
Lai Nehru as to who were the Muslim leaders in the Congress with 
formidably great mass base in opposition to Mr. Jinnah of the League, 
Nehru replied, they were. Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, Husain Ahmad 
Madani and Abdul Qaiyum Ansari.^" 
According to some estimates, not less than forty thousand (40,000) of 
Momins had attended the Azad Muslim Conference 
The All India Shia Political Conference also attended this conference. 
All these organizations proved to be great obstacles before the League's 
project of Pakistan in 1940s. 
All these organizations had support base among the students and teachers 
of several madrasas of Bihar who played a very active role during the 
Quit India Movement of 1942. Most prominent of these madrasas were 
Madrasa Shamsul Hoda of Patna, Mcidrasa Salfia of Darbhanga, 
Madrasa Jamial Uloom of Muzaffarpur etc. 
Interestingly, most of these anti colonial (and anti League) madrasas had 
come into existence after the movement of 1857. 
Ali Anwar, Masawat Ki Jung: Pas-e Manzar, Bihar ke Pasmanda 
Musalman, (Hindi). Delhi, 2001. p. 11. 
Tufail Ahmad Manglori, Rooh-e-Raushan Mustaqbil, (Urdu). Badayun, 
1946. pp. 140-142. 
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Taqi Rahim traces the roots of such deep seated and lingering anti 
colonial sentiments of the Muslims of Bihar in the 'Wahabi ' movement . 
He says: 
"In fact the leaders of the 'Wahabi' movement like Wilayat Ali 
and Enayat Ali had injected hate against British colonialism 
into the Muslims of Bihar so effectively that this tendency 
could never peter out and kept manifesting in the 1940s also".^^ 
62 Taqi Rahim, op cit. pp. 432-33. 
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CHAPTER-3 
THE POLARIZING TEXTURE OF BIHAR POLITICS: 
A SURVEY UP TILL 1940 
General ly it is seen that that mult iple political trends interact and co exist 
among a particular social group. The Musl ims of Bihar were no exception. 
However , here our main objective is to trace the origin and growth of 
discord between Hindu and Musl ims that led to the emergence of separatist 
political t rend among the Musl ims of Bihar. 
W e have seen that Nat ional ism and communal i sm in India are essentially 
m o d e m phenomena. Sectional consciousness was growing and it was even 
encouraged by the colonial administration. Instances of localized skirmishes 
between Hindus and Musl ims could be found even before 19th century, but 
communa l riots were extremely rare be fore 1 8 8 0 \ 
In Bihar, as elsewhere in India, communal i sm sprang up in the confl ic t ing 
situation to seek political favour and competi t ion for l imited employment 
opportunit ies in the colonial rule. It was not conf ined to educated elites; 
rather, it had percolated down to the masses f rom the very beginning. 
Sumit Sarkar, Modem India 1885-1947. Delhi, 1983. p. 59. 
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Moreover, in general it was mainly elite manipulation that communalism 
began to influence every aspect of life^. 
The landlords were prevailed upon and a prey to imperial conspiracies as 
well as they had their own personal interests in laying emphasis on 
protecting the cows. Since the formation of Gaurakshini Sabhas, the 
incidents of communal rioting became recurrent. On 17th April. 1890, a 
serious riot broke out in the Berhampur village cattle fair. Here Gopalnand 
Swami, a member of the Benaras Gaurakshini Sabha was found to be 
instigator^. On 30th March 1891, at Nurnagar (Chapra) Muslims were 
attacked by a large Hindu mob resulting into loot and arson"*. 
There was a spurt in the Gaurakshini Sabhas in Northern India. Therefore, 
Arrah, Saran, Gaya and Patna were the worst affected districts where serious 
rioting took place over the issue of cow slaughter between 1888-1893^. 
To give religious colour to the cow protection these societies, propagated 
that the cows were sacred to Hindus and that Hinduism found its sole 
expression in it. The Ploughmen's Begging Movement had strong roots 
among the villagers who kept the cow protection movement afloat. Rumour 
niongering was adopted to convince the Hindus that the Lord Mahadev will 
' Ibid. 
• Political (Police) Proceeding (1891-95). Bihar State Archives (BSA), Patna. p. 6. 
' Ibid. 
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not expiate the sins of those Hindus who don't rescue the cattle f r o m over 
working, what to say of kiUing them^. 
The cow protectors were active and instrumental in inciting communa l riots. 
Several of the communal riots were thus planned and organized by these 
elements. Even a short notice f rom them could mobil ize thousands of 
people. Somet imes the rioters came on horses, elephants, and cycles f rom 
different areas to neighbouring villages and towns to indulge in riotous 
fights' ' . 
The butchers driving their cattle along the roads in normal way were 
suspected and generally attacked. In March 1895, a serious riot engul fed the 
village of Mathurapur in the Sheohar thana of the then Muzaf fa rpur district. 
The Hindus attacked the Musl ims on the plea that the latter were going to 
sacrif ice a calf at the mosque on the occasion of Idul Fitr . 
Instances of the involvement of the landlords were to the extent that they 
f inanced the rioters. Most of the people responsible for these crimes went 
'Scot f ree ' because administrative bureaucracy and judiciary both were in 
^ Sumit Sarkar. Op cit. p. 59. 
LSS O Malley, Bengal District Gazetteers: Muz.ajfarpur. Calcutta, 1907. pp.32-
33. 
^ Akhilesh Kumar, Communal Riots in India. Delhi 1991. pp. 49-51. 
^ LSS O Malley op cit. p.32. 
league to protect the landlords ^. 
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The a tmosphere was vitiated so much so that even the catt le fairs ended up 
in conflicts . Berhampur , Sonepur, Ainkhaon were the main cattle fairs ended 
up in conflicts . Berhampore, Sonepur, Ainkhaon were the main cattle fairs. 
In Sonepur, the British policy of winning over some local allies by creating 
wedge between the two communit ies became quite evident in 1893 and 
1915^^. It should be noted that cow was being used only as a symbol for 
communa l mobil izat ion. 
The Gaurakshini Sabhas spread sacredness of the cows fo r the Hindus. No 
resentment was shown against the beef eating Egnl ishmen, at any stage, it 
was solely aimed against Musl ims. Maha tma Gandhi , while speaking on 
communi ty relat ionships could see through this part isan ou t look and said, 
"I have never been able to understand the ant ipathy towards the 
Musa lmans on that score. W e say nothing about the slaughter that 
daily takes place on behalf of Engl ishmen. Our anger becomes hot 
when a Musa lman slaughters a cow.^^" 
Besides religious affi l iations, the cattle were a great asset of agrarian 
economy for the lower middle class Hindus, whereas for the lower 
Akhilesh Kumar, op cit p.53. 
The Behar Herald, December 11, 1915. Also see Anand A. Yang, " Sacred Symbol 
and Sacred Space in Rural India: Community Mobilization in the Anti Cow Killing Riot' 
Comparative Studies. 22 (1980) pp. 576-96. 
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middle class Mus l ims , cow slaughter was a source of i ncome in lea ther 
t r a d e ' ^ 
Otherwise , the upper class Mus l ims in order to avoid tens ions w e r e in f a v o u r 
of g iv ing it u p " . Apar t f r o m the leading l andowners of Bihar , the M a h a r a j a s 
of Darbhanga , Ha thuwa , Bett iah, D u m r a o n were f o u n d cont r ibutors and 
sympathetic to the Gaurakshini Sabhas^'^. 
Another ma jo r irritant be tween the t w o communi t i e s w a s the mus i c p lay ing 
before mosques . Process ions by rival communi t i e s demons t ra t ed the 
an tagon i sm resul t ing into violent clashes. This r ivalry, however , w a s 
relatively a recent phenomenon . This is confessed by a colonia l author , L S 
S O Mal ley , itself ' that previous ly Mus l ims and H i n d u s shared o n e 
ano ther ' s , cus toms and rel igious ce remonies ' . 
He says: 
"Hindus and Mus l ims did adopt some rel igious cus toms of thei r 
rival communi ty . Mus l ims a lso observed the H indu prac t ice of 
launching paper boats on the Ganges af ter mar r iage or bir th. In 
Patna , a m o n g Panch Pir, two are Hindu names . 
" The Bc'luir Herald. June 7, 1924. 
Akhilesh Kumar, op cit p. 54. 
" The Behar Herald. December 11,1915. 
Peter Robb, " The Evolution Of British Policy towards Indian Politics 1880-1920: 
Essays on Colonial Attitudes, Imperial Strategies and Bihar". Delhi 1992. p. 131. 
LSS O Malley, Bihar and Orissa District Gazetteers: Patna. Calcutta, 1924. p. 63. 
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On 10th July 1891, in Phulwarisharif (Patna), a riot took place when 
Muslims attempted to stop the Rath Yatra procession. 
In 1892, Patna, Chapra, and several other places remained troubled due to 
the cow killing and playing music before mosques during Rath Yatra 
procession^^. 
We find that by 1895 incidents of communal riots had become an infrequent 
occurrence. The frequency of such riots however increased after the partition 
of Bengal 1905. Moreover, these riots took more violent forms. However, in 
Bihar, it was only after 1917 that frequency of riots increased. The riots from 
1920s were marked by greater degree of violence as these were planned, 
organized and well financed by the communal socio-religious organizations, 
landlords and bureaucrats. The imperial administration whose sole purpose 
was to check the tide of national movement nurtured these vested interest 
groups. On the other hand, landlords used it as a potent weapon to bring 
disunion among the exploited peasantry. 
The factory owners too had their class interests, had no hesitation in using 
such communal organizations and religious movements to cause disunion 
amongst the exploited workers on religious grounds^^. 
Political (Police) Proceedings (1891-95). p.4. 
Akhilesh Kumar. Op cit p. 55. 
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For example, in village Sagi (Begusarai), a riot on qurbani issue took place 
on 21st November 1912 in which Mr. Macdonald, an owner of Daulatpur 
1S 
factory, close to Sagi, had hired some goons to start the riot . 
The Shahabad riots of 1917 were the most vicious of such riots. This riot 
and subsequent developments provided grist to the mill of separatist politics. 
During the years 1917-23 Hindu Muslim antagonism hardened and started 
getting manifested in political articulations^'. Notwithstanding the riotings 
that took place, the nationalist unity still held firm. The Hindu Muslim 
divides did not petrify into permanent divisions which is evident from the 
massive participation in the Rowlalt Satyagrah and Non co-operation and 
Khilafat movements^". 
As compared to the riots of late 19"^  century, the riots of post 1917 were 
more organized in terms of planning and timing. Like choice of the day of 
Bakrid for staging these riots. The Shahabad riots were manifestation of 
these planned riots. Every day, 15-20 villages were attacked by large 
marauding mobs. 
The Behar Herald, December 5, 1912. 
Papiya Ghosh, "Community Questions and Bihar Politics 1917-23". Indian 
Historical Review. Vol. XVI, No. 1-2. July 1989-January 1990. 
^^  Gyanendra Pandey, " The Cons 
India. OUP, Delhi, 1990. p. 203. 
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Within 9 days of riotings between 28"" September to October, as many as 
129 villages were looted Subsequently, the riots spread to other districts 
of Bihar. The riots were meticulously planned with even the dates and 
locations of acts of looting being specified beforehand. 
This outraged Muslims throughout the province. Incensed over the riots, 
some Muslims joined akharas for lathi practices, primarily for self-defense 
and some for taking revenge. Speeches made in the mosques reflected a 
persecution complex and there were insistence on performing Qurbani, 
otherwise, they feared rest of the Islamic religious practices would be 
banned. Handbills, pamphlets detailing the atrocities during the riots were 
distributed throughout the province. A fund raising drive was also launched 
to help the riot victims^^. 
A crowd of about a 1000 Muslims which, had assembled in Patna on 14th 
October 1917, appointed an enquiry committee to enquire into the riots. 
Significantly, no Home Rule supporter was included in the committee. 
Because there was a feeling that some of the Home Rule leaders of 
Shahabad were involved in the riots. The findings of the committee reported 
Gyanendra Pandey, "Rallying Round the Cow: Sectarian Strife in Bhojpuri 
Region 1888-1917". In Ranajit Guha (ed.) Subaltern Studies. Vol. II OUP, Delhi, 
1982. 
Mushirul Hasan, Nationalism and Communal Politics in India 1885-1930. New 
Delhi, 1979. pp. 123-24. 
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the devastations of 150 villages, noted the partisan role of Hindu 
chowkidars, defiling of mosques and Quran, rape of women and their mass 
suicides by throwing themselves into wells. 
The report prepared by Mazharul Haq on behalf of both the Congress and 
the Muslim League, expediently concealed the accounts of outrages 
described in the public enquiry committee report . This report particularly 
outraged the Muslims. Ghandhi was then busy in Champaran and he 
considered Shahabad riots as local outbreak and not an indication of disunity 
between the two communities. He insisted on preventing cow slaughter but 
also advised Hindus to pay the Muslims twice the value of their losses, if 
necessary with the help of Hindus from all over India. These riots however 
did have echoes outside Bihar and pamphlets distributed by Muslims in 
Kanpur, Calcutta, Dhaka etc., reveal that the impact of the riots was not 
localized. The Shahabad riots had changed the texture of Bihar politics, 
which paved the way for the All India Muslim League to implant itself in the 
province. 
At the 10th session of the All India Muslim League observed: 
"The laissez faire attitudes of the Hindu leaders are the most 
regrettable part of he whole affair. They have refrained from 
Qeyamuddin Ahmad and J.S. Jha, Mazharul Haq. New Delhi, 1976. pp. 76-77. 
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denouncing the rioters even in the name of humanity if nothing 
e l se" ' ' . 
The Bihar Provincial Muslims League, which had hitherto kept 
progressively different attitude from the All India Muslim League in the 
province, also criticized the gross apathy on the atrocities and loss of life and 
property during the riots. For very obvious reasons because at joint meeting 
of the Bihar Provincial Congress Committee and the Bihar Provincial 
Association, chaired by Hasan Imam failed to make a mention of the riots. 
For this reason the Lucknow Pact of 1916 received no encouraging response. 
The Muslim League leaders of Bihar came under heavy pressure to leave the 
Congress. On 29th October 1917, the Bihar Provincial Muslim League 
resolved that the joint reform scheme prepared by the League and the 
Congress did not sufficiently protect the interests of the Muslims and formed 
a committee to draw up a scheme, which would safeguard Muslim interests 
more adequately than provided under the Lucknow Pact 
There was an impression among the Muslims that some leaders of the Home 
Rule Movement were involved in the riots. The Muslims were therefore, 
very critical of the Home Rule Movement. Several towns and interior places 
in Bihar became the venue of largely attended anti-Home Rule meetings of 
The Pioneer, Lucknow. 18 November 1917. Also see, A.M. Zaidi (ed.), Evolution of Muslim Political 
Thought in India. New Delhi, 1975. vol. I .p. 53. 
Papiya Ghosh op cit 
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Muslims where the Muslim leaders were dubbed as the traitors. A meeting at 
Arrah, attended by 7000 Muslims in October 1917, denounced the politics of 
Hasan Imam, Jinnah and Sarfraz Hussain Khan. They were described as 
leaders not representing the Shahabad Muslims and their woes. 
It was asserted that the Home Rule would be fatal to the interests of 
Muslims. The Muslim leaders of the Congress were out rightly rejected. It 
was apprehended that the Home Rule would mark the end of religious 
liberty and could even compel for "migration to some other country". In a 
speech on 30th September (2 days after the riot started, Farzand Ahmad had 
left the Gay a District Muslim League with 21 other members and said that, 
"he opposed the Home Rule because there were two nations in 
the country. The successive Baqr Id riots convinced them further. 
It was even felt that- were it not for a third power, the Muslims 
would have been obliterated." 
A speech delivered by a Muslim leader in a remote part of Darbhanga, 
expressed such fears and misgivings. If the Hindus wanted them to give up 
cow sacrifice, Muslims could well have chosen some other animals for 
sacrifice, but what would happen if the very next day Muslims were asked to 
stop azan and gradually give up other religious observances as well? Such 
/ 
was the psyche in which these utterances were made. The setback was 
I l l 
evident because some of the leaders had begun to inject, influence and 
exploit the feelings that a third power^ indispensable for some time to 
come^^. 
Such was the impact of these riots that even a Wahabi Known for his anti 
British stand, Maulana Abdul Hakim Saheb of Sadipur, therefore, opposed 
the participation of Muslims in the Rowlalt Satyagraha. Similar was the 
instruction of Maulana Badruddin of Phulwari, who in many ways 
commanded absolute control over the majority of Bihar Muslims. 
The Gaurakshini movement was revived in April-May 1919 in Shahabad, 
Darbhanga, Champaran, Pumea, Muzaffarpur, Saran, and Dhanbad districts. 
There was also the emergence of Sabhas like Gope Sabha. Sadhus and 
patias began preach against selling of cows to Muslims. This development 
further caused the distancing of the Muslims. 
Earlier, Hindus took little notice of Qurbani, as long as it was done in 
privacy, but now they had organised a "system of spies" and they began to 
* 27 question every case of sacrifice . 
Political Deptt. (Special Section) (PS) 203/1917. The meetings were held in 
Bhadya thana of Gaya and also in the town of Gaya. Also see Papiya Ghosh op cit. 
PS 421/1919 September (1) Also see Hetukar Jha, "Lower Caste Peasants and 
Upper Caste Zamindars: Bihar 1921-25." In Indian Economic and Social History 
Review. October-December 1977. 
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Yet, another confrontational development was revival of the Gaidar festival 
by the Hindus in the vicinity of mosques. The festival centred on the baiting 
of pigs by cattle. There was also a noticeable withdrawal of the Hindus from 
participation in the Muharram processions. In some places, counter 
processions were also resorted to^ .^ 
In order to tackle the problem, some people, including Maharaja of 
Darbhanga had suggested the government to constitute Conciliation 
Committees. Initially these attempts failed. In July 1920, some seven 
Muslims and five Hindus, which included Mazharul Haq also, convened a 
meeting. In this meeting Abdul Aziz (who later on joined the Muslimt 
League in 1937), Syed Fakhruddin (a government pleader) and Molvi Jalil, a 
vakil and vice chairman of the Darbhanga municipality complained that 
Hindus were not opposed to cow slaughter as much as to a Muslim religious 
obligation i.e. Qurbani on Bakrid. Similar was the grievance of Khawaja 
Mohammad Ahad Noor (a Gaya Vakil). In fact their grievances that in this 
way the Hindus were intending to disallow Muslims to fulfill their religious 
obligations. 
Compared to them Syed Mohd. Ahmad Naim, the Commisioner of 
Bhagalpur municipality, sought to harmonize Hindu-Muslim relations. 
^^  PS 360/ 1919 September. DIG's correspondence to the IG police. 
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Hence the Bhagalpur Conciliation Board had made it a rule to persuade 
Muslims not to sacrifice cows in places where it was not customary^'. 
Conciliation efforts seemed to have some headway. In December 1919, the 
Muslim League gave a call to give up cow sacrifice on Baqrid. It naturally, 
drew a reaction and it was argued that a cow sacrifice could fulfill the 
religious obligation of seven persons while a goat could fulfil only that of 
one person. Moreover, what was involved in it was economics because a 
goat would cost Rs. 8 while a cow Rs. 10-12. The Muslims perceived this 
resolution of the League as unwarranted interference in a religious matter. 
Md. Nairn pointed out that Qurbani of cow was insisted only by ignorant 
low class Muslims who could be educated upto the level of educated classes 
to give up cow sacrifice Syed Fakhruddin and Maulvi Jalil opined that the 
League's directive was hardly known to the people at large. 
The outcome of this July meeting, convened by the provincial government 
was the decision that the conciliation committees of non-officials be given a 
try. Mazharul Haq had suggested employing molvis and pundits and jointly 
tour along with the political activists. Such Committees started functioning 
in seven districts but, in practice, they seldom managed without official 
assistance and their use became rarer after 1922^ ®. 
Papiya Ghosh op cit 
''Ibid. 
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In March 1920 none but Mazhanil Haq chaired the All India Cow 
Conference at Patna. Here he emphasized to stop cow slaughter; giving 
agrarian reasons and gave two suggestions: 
(a) The Muslims should be persuaded peacefully to give up cow sacrifice 
(b) Hindus and Muslims should jointly give a representation to the 
government demanding abandonment of cow slaughter in military mess^\ 
Simultaneously, following the Muslim League's resolution against cow 
slaughter (19 December, 1919) the Congress leaders made efforts to effect 
unity in Shahabad which resulted in Muslims of Arrah demanding release of 
'X'J 
the Hindus who had attacked them and were imprisoned . 
Thus, 1920 Baqrid went peaceful, by and large. But in 1921 a campaign 
aiming to end the cow sacrifice by using the tactics of threats, intimidations 
and pamphlets spread from Gaya to the adjoining districts. Hasan Imam 
therefore called on Gandhi to visit them. He came along with Mohd. Ali, 
Azad Sobhani, Maulana Sajjad and several Bihar Congressmen to Shahabad, 
Gaya, Biharsharif and Patna to defuse the tension. The thrust of their 
speeches was to conciliate and maintain unity. Rajendra Prasad recalled, 
"during the year there was mutual trust and cordiality not seen before"^^. 
" The Searchlight, April 8, 1920. 
The Searchlight, January 29 and February 12, 1920. 
RsLjendra Prasad, Autobiography. Bombay, 1957. p. 138. 
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Maulana Sajjad of Imarat-e-Shariah and Shah Sulaiman of Phulwarisharif 
advised against cow slaughter. 
By 1921-22 provincial Ulema took up the Khilafat/ Non co-operation work 
very vigorously. This was not much to the liking of the supporters of the 
colonial rule and administration. Most notable ulema among them were the 
Imarat-e-Sharia of Phulwarishareef (Patna). Its Naib Amir-e-Shariat, 
Maulana Sajjad was a member of the provincial Khilafat Committee and was 
very close to Maulana Abul Kalam Azad 
But this unity so laboriously achieved received a heavy blow due to the 
resurgence of Arya Samaj's Shudhi Movement in 1923. The Shudhi 
campaigners had their focus on Shahabad district. Shahabad had a sizeable 
number of Malkana Rajputs in the district, where, by 1923, the population of 
Muslims Rajputs had increased from 500 (in 1911 census) to 1300. Seeing 
this, a rich Marwari expressed his desire before the police superintendent to 
launch the Shudhi movement in the district^^, 
Imarat-e-Shariah, therefore, issued a firman pointing out that the Muslims 
were being converted to Hinduism by the Arya Samaj claiming that th|e 
Rajput Muslims were Hindu in appearance and habits. Therefore, the 
Gail Minault, Khilafat Movement: Religious Symbolism and Political 
Mobilization in India. OUP, Delhi, 1982. pp. 153-54. 
Papiya Ghosh op cit 
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Imarat-e-Shariah exhorted Muslims to give up non-Muslim dress and habits 
etc. The Jamiat-ul- Ulama needed Rs. 10 Lakhs for organizing and 
campaigning to meet the Arya Samaj onslaught. So in the month of Ramzan, 
Muslims were asked to make contributions to save Bihar, which, like 
Punjab, was threatened by the Arya Samaj's invasions^^. 
Maulana Sajjad started a vigorous campaign from April 1923 to counter the 
shudhi of Malkana Rajputs. The vitiated atmosphere heightened the 
communal tensions in the districts of Gaya, Munger, Shahabad etc. In June, 
the Congress leaders had decided to tour the disturbed areas but they did not 
do so. In August, when Swami Sharadhanand visited Arrah, Patna, 
Bhagalpur etc. Maulana Sajjad, issued a poster demanding funds to counter 
the shudhi onslaught. However Muslims were peeved at Khilafat 
committee's inaction over the issue^^. 
A meeting was convened by the Hindus in Patna against the Muslims who 
were opposed to shudhi movement. Here, the protagonists of shudhi 
campaign spoke on the outrages against the Hindus in Malabar, Amritsar 
and Multan where they were converted to Islam. Here, Sukhlal of UP 
suggested that a society should be formed consisting of Hindus, Sikhs and 
Jains to prevent Hindu women from worshipping at the graves of pirs. The 
PS 120/1923. 
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audiences were asked to warn the Muslims that if the water of a dirty 
handhna and the kalima are powerful enough to convert Hindus, the water of 
the Ganga and the Gayatri mantra were far more powerful to convert men of 
38 
any religion to Hinduism . 
The ground gained had been lost. The war of rhetoric undoubtedly 
communalized the politics and social relationships. 
Community feeling was implanted in the majority community also. At the 
famous Sonepur fair in 1922, some prominent Congress members from north 
and south Bihar were elected to the Provincial Boards of the All India Hindu 
Mahasabha and the Akhil Bharat Gosewa Mandal. The secretary of the 
Bhagalpur district Khilafat committee expressed his grievances in a letter to 
Shafi Daudi in 1923, against the Congressmen who were involved in setting 
up a district branch of Hindu Sabha 
The Hindu Mahasabha made much propaganda of the conversion of Hindus 
in Malabar and atrocities against them in the Multan riots and some 
Congressmen too joined the Hindu Mahasabha in this campaign. Rajendra 
Prasad narrates his observation of Multan riots. He says that weeping 
women made a deep impression on him and the Hindus. These riots caused 
" PS 208/1923 
• 'PS 120/1923. 
PS 120/1923. No. 480. March 10, 1923. cf. Papiya Ghosh op cit 
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excitement and necessity of a Hindu organization began to be felt. He 
proposed it to Malaviya who agreed to attend it but a condition was put that 
Rajendra Prasad should be present. Rajendra Prasad agreed to do so because 
he saw nothing wrong about it. The venue was Gaya 
Shri Krishna Sinha also said that it was Moplah riots, which outraged the 
Hindus. He, while addressing the 15th session of Bihar Provincial 
Conference in Purnea, in 1924, said that while the non co-operation 
movement was an antidote to the Hindu Muslim tension, the Moplah 
uprising reversed the situation. Hindus thought that the Congress was 
incapable of protecting their sacred places of religion and temples. The 
Hindus, therefore, took to organizing themselves with a view to protecting 
themselves. He further said that the Muslims either because of their 
numerical weakness or due to some other reasons became suspicious of 
Swaraj. Their fears were confirmed by the shudhi and sangathan movement 
where several Congressmen were also included and the two communities 
took different paths. Even Sinha was associated with the Hindus Sabha for 
many years'^ V 
Dr. Rajendra Prasad, At the Feet ofMahatma Ganhdi. Bombay, 1961. pp. 136-
37. 
The Searchlight. December, 7, 1924. 
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This shift in the Congress was also reflected in the idioms and contents of its 
report written in early 1930s. 
"The language was characteristically head-in-the-sand"'^^. It praised the 
brutality exercised by the Hindus in the riots of 1917 and this brutality was 
called "vigorous continuance of the national movement"'*^. 
Both at the ground level and at the level of the Congress leadership, a major 
shift in the political spectrum had taken place. Syed Mahmud opined that 
Shudhi movement finished the communal amity of 1920-22. He gave vent to 
this frustration in a letter to Shaft Daudi'^. After 1923, the Muslims started 
falling into the lap of "more and more intransigent leaders" and the Congress 
developed a tendency to combine "conmiunalism in Culture with 
nationalism in politics." Thus the Congress neglected the plans of Hindu 
Muslim unity'* .^ And the Bihar Congress represented a dominant trend of 
Hindu Sabha\ expressing anger against the Muslims, Rajendra Prasad said: 
"No Muslim, whatever his opinion in other matters may be, thinks 
or believes that it is wrong to convert non Muslims to Islam yet 
Papiya Ghosh op cit 
A History of the Hindu-Muslim Problem in India: Being a Report of the 
Committee Appointed by the Indian National Congress to Enquire into Cawnpore 
Riots of March 1931. Allahabad. 1933. p. 166. 
PS 120/1923. Patna, 14 April. Dr. Mahmud to Shafi Daudi. 
^^  Syed Mahmud, Hindu Muslim Cultural Accord. Bombay, 1949. pp. 47, 78-79 
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Swamia Shradhanand's movement aroused such bitterness in them 
that they became his deadly enemies"'*^. 
He indicted Gandhi also. He said: 
"Gandhiji had fanned the flames of religious bigotry and the 
Muslims became fanatical by supporting the Khilafat agitation. 
Even as the Khilafat movement grew weaker the cleavage 
between the two communities grew deeper and the riots began to 
occur". 
Sometimes later said that, "the consciousness created among the Muslims 
spread to the field of politics. They began to think in terms of political 
supremacy"'*^. 
In fact, in the 1920s, it was increasingly becoming "difficult to disentangle 
religious community and political activism" which hardened the communal 
divide getting articulated in politics. 
This polarization gave a way to the Muslim League in Bihar where it started 
receiving wide support. Gulf went on increasing between the two 
communities. In April and May some minor clashes took place in Sasaram, 
Shahabad, Munger, Muzaffarpur, Darbhanga, Santhal Pargana''^. 
Rajendra Prasad, At the Feet ofMahatma Gandhi. Bombay 1961. P. 137 
Rajendra Prasad, Autobiography, Bombay, 1957. p. 141. 
K.K. Dutta, History of Freedom Movement in Bihar. Vol. HI. Patna, 1958. pp. 496-97. 
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"The Muslim League and the Hindu Mahasabha took to 
belligerent communal propaganda. This had the effect of 
undermining national unity and national consciousness"'*^. 
As a result of these developments the Muslim League got way to span its 
influence in Bihar. So did the Hindu Mahasabha. There was a growing 
disenchantment against the Congress. It was felt that the Congress had 
almost increasingly become a Hindu organization^®. 
The period between 1923-27 witnessed an unprecedented growth of Hindu 
and Muslim communalism not only in Bihar but also in the whole of India. 
There were riots on a large scale in Kohat, Calcutta, Dhaka, Patna, 
Rawalpindi, and Delhi. At least there were 91 outbreaks of riot in U.P. The 
communal bodies made the most rapid proliferation. 
"The crucial factor behind the growth of communalism in the 1920s lay in 
the very logic of participation in the post 1919 political structure. The 
Montford reforms had broadened the franchise, but preserved and even 
extended separate electorates, there was, therefore, built in temptation for 
politicians working within the system to use sectional slogans and gather a 
I 
following by distributing favours to their own religious, regional or caste 
groups. Hereafter, communalism thrived more due to electoral factor rather 
49 
50 
A.R. Desai, Social Background of Indian Nationalism Bombay 1959. p. 328. 
Administrative Report to the Government of Bihar and Orissa, 1924-25. p.4. 
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than socio-economic and religious reasons. In any analysis, it was at the root 
and the bane of Indian politics. The second factor was the considerable 
spread of education in the 1920s without corresponding growth in 
employment opportunities"^\ 
Thus, "the resentment and bitterness of school, office and shop.... were 
sharpened by the disappointment of rising expectation"^^. That's why from 
this period onwards the frequent communal riots widened the gap between 
the communities in urban centres. The question of cow slaughter gave way 
then to the problem of playing music before mosques. In rural areas, 
communal riots were mostly organized and financed by the landlords in their 
vested class interests for diverting the resentment of the rural masses against 
Zamindari oppression, taxation, and money lending. The politically 
ambitious groups to make their political fortunes out of communal 
polarization played the same role. They took recourse to vicious propaganda 
against the Congress for taking up the cause of peasants everywhere^^. 
This polarization and cleavage found its expression in the elections of 1924 
and after. More pften, even the staunch nationalist. Muslims of Bihar lost the 
elections. These results affected very badly the body politic of Bihar. The 
''' Sumit Sarkar, Modern India 1885-1947. Delhi, 1983. p. 234. 
" Peter Hardy, Muslims of British India. Cambridge. 1972. p. 204. 
Akhilesh Kumar, op cit pp. 60-61. 
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municipal and District Board elections in 1924 left behind a legacy of bad 
blood. Hadi Hussain contested for the vice presidentship of the Gaya District 
Board against Sidheshwar Prasad Singh. Hadi Hussain lost the election. This 
annoyed Hasan Imam and Sir Sultan Ahmad (Hadi was Sultan's brother). 
Even more disastrous things happened at Muzaffarpur. Shafi Daudi was a 
great Congress leader, a devout nationalist and a valiant Non co-operator. He 
was the builder of the Congress organization in north Bihar, the founder of 
Muzaffarpur Congress. He was a candidate for the membership of the 
Muzaffarpur District Board, against Danby, a European planter. Daudi lost 
the election. Obviously the Congressmen had deceived him and not voted 
for him. This disillusioned him. He turned against the Congress and 
subsequently retired from the politics. 
Resulting into massive alienation of Muslims from nationalist mainstream^'*. 
Communal and caste considerations gained an upper hand over preferred 
ideals. 
Writing about the 1926 elections, Dr. Rajendra Prasad, in his autobiography, 
writes: 
Anugraha Narayan Sinha, Mere Sansmaran (Hindi). Patna, 1961. pp. 85-89. 
Also see Taqi Rahim op cit p. 253. 
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"In Bihar, vigorous election campaigns were conducted by leaders 
of the different parties and regrettable communal/ caste 
cosiderations influenced the election propaganda very much"^^. 
The shocking result of many constituencies redefined the Bihar politics 
retrogressively. Most tragic result was the defeat of Mazharul Haq who had 
vigorously fought against communal feelings throughout his life. He was 
deserted by his own community for what they called his pro Hindu attitude, 
while the Hindu voters disowned him due to his being Muslim^^. 
Extremely outraged by this, he retired from active politics for good. He 
retired at a time when he was needed most by the nation^^. Maulana Abul 
Kalam Azad persuaded him to become the president of Indian National 
Congress, as he was the only most suitable person to effect Hindu Muslim 
unity. But he remained adamant on withdrawal from active politics . 
These tragic developments paved the way for rapid growth of communal 
organizations and ideas. Now elite and popular communalism combined. 
Tabligh and tanzim spread from 1923 onwards. Kohat riots (1924), murder 
of Swami Shardanand (1936) by a Muslim fanatic, the revival of the Muslim 
Cf. Kamta Chaubey, op cit. p. 185. 
Kamta Chaubey, op cit. p. 186. 
On this kind of ironical situation, the following Urdu couplet fits in very aptly. 
Zahid-e-tang nazar ne mujhe kafir samjha 
Aiir kafir yeh samajhta hai Musalman hoon main 
" Bihar and Orissa in 1926-27. 
ris Ahmad and Jha, Mazharul Haq. pp. 83-84. 
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League on the debris of the petered away Khilafat bodies, are too well 
known to be repeated here. 
For the first time, after 1918, the League met separately from the Congress 
at Lahore session in 1924. This session was presided over by Jinnah. Here, 
he raised the demand for federation with full provincial autonomy to 
preserve Muslim majority areas from the danger of 'Hindu domination'. 
This demand was in addition to the separate electorates, a demand that 
persisted till 1940s while insisting on the demand for Pakistan®^. 
The Hindu Mahasabha (founded in 1915 by M M. Malaviya) had become 
defunct for a while but a major revival began from 1922-23. In August 1923, 
at its Benaras session, it incorporated the Shudhi programme, called for 
armed squads, and advocated for an alliance with Arya Samaj and Sanatan 
Dharma conservatives to form a common, enlarged Hindu communal front. 
Emphasis was laid on Hindi-Hindu link. It is significant to note that as much 
as 87% of the delegates were from UP, Delhi, Punjab and Bihar^ ®. 
In 1925, at Nagpur, the RSS was set up by K. B. Hedgewar. Thus in 1926-27 
an atmosphere of "fear psychosis" and acute nervousness prevailed in Bihar. 
Hindus and Muslims were laying in secret stores of lathis and other 
weapons. Patna, Gaya, Saran, Munger, Darbhanga, Sasaram and Santhal 
59 Sumit Sarkar, op cit p. 235. 
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Pargana were caught in the fire of communal riots. The communal riots that 
took place on 4th August 1927 in Bettiah were consequence of the activities 
of Arya Samajists. It disturbed the whole Tirhut division. Here a new kind of 
provocation ensued i.e, coinciding of Muharram procession to Mahabiri dal 
procession. This type of provocation was quite absent in the previous 
years^'. 
In 1928-29, during Baqrid, major riots took place in Patna, Gaya, 
Muzaffarpur, Bhagalpur. At several places the police was also conniving 
with the rioters^^. 
This is testimony to the colonial government's scheme of dividing the two 
communities to check the tide of national movement and the colonial 
administrators saw their success when prominent Muslim leaders in Bihar 
drifted away from the Congress. Some of them became active in the Muslim 
League. This was manifesto of their demand for separate electorates against 
the Delhi proposals for joint electorate in 1927. Muslim representatives of 
Bihar and Orissa met on 8th May 1927 in the Anjuman Islamia Hall at Patna 
to deliberate upon the proposal. Though Ali Imam, Shafi Daudi and 
Ibid p. 265. 
Administrative Report to the Government of Bihar and Orissa 1926-27 and that 
of 1927-28. Also see Political Special (PS) File No. 216/1927. p. 9. Bihar State 
Archives, Patna. 
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Syed Abdul Aziz supported the Delhi proposals, a large number of the 
Muslim leaders opposed". 
The Muslim Conference of Delhi, presided by Jinnah had unanimously 
decided about joint electorates because they said that the separate electorates 
were one of the causes of the bitterness between the Hindus and Muslims^'*. 
The pertinent question that arises is. Why did it happen that the issue of 
separate electorate dominated the Muslim politics in spite of being opposed 
by many prominent Muslim leaders including Jinnah? 
The answer to this question comes from Shashi Shekhar Jha. He says: 
"This was prompted due to the riot that took place in Bihar 
following the Hindu Mahasabha conference at Patna in 1927 and 
the belligerent attitude of the Hindu communalists in majority"^^. 
It is worthwhile to reproduce the text of the resolution passed at Patna's 
Anjuman Islamia Hall on 8th May 1927, where separatism was expressed 
with least ambiguity. 
"In view of the fact that some leaders of the sister community are 
taking advantage of the proposals made at the Delhi Muslim 
Conference and there is danger that Muslims could be deprived of 
Political Special File No. 115/1928. Special Report of Crime, Schedule XLVII. 
Form No. 23 
Shashi Shekhar Jha, The Political Elites in Bihar. Bombay, 1976. p . l l 8 . . 
The Indian Quarterly Register, 1926. vol. I. 16. 
The Indian Quarterly Register, 1927. vol. I. J'p. 39-40. 
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their rights of separate representation without their rightful 
demands being accepted and in view of the fact that separate 
representation of minorities was necessary so long as 
communalism reigned supreme in the country and also in view of 
the fact that in spite of all sorts of friendly gestures on the part of 
Musalmans the sister community has developed marked tendency 
towards communalism which is evident from its hostile attitude 
towards all political and religious rights of Musalmans and has 
recently been given public expression on the platform of the All 
India Hindu Mahasabha at Patna, this conference of Musalmans of 
Bihar and Orissa is of the opinion that the proposals for replacing 
separate electorate by mixed electorate are pre mature and as such 
harmful to the interests of Musalmans and therefore this 
conference deprecates any attempts to take away the rights of 
separate representation from Mussalmans and declares that in the 
circumstances mentioned above the Musalmans are not at all 
prepared to give up the rights of separate representation for any 
price. 
This conference ... hopes that Hindu as proof of their change of 
heart will support the demands of Musalmans and thus pave the 
way for settlement of political differences"^^. 
The languages of the resolution gives an impression that the demand for 
separate electorate was not an obsession, rather this demand was fuelled by 
^^  Shashi Shekhar Jha op cit p. 118. 
^^ The Indian Quarterly Register, 1927. vol. I. f^p. 39-40. 
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the growing strength of the Hindu Mahasabha otherwise nationalistic trend 
was quite stronger in Bihar^'. 
The provincial Muslim League in its ideology was somewhat different from 
the All India Muslim League. The Bihar Provincial Muslim League was 
more close to the Congress. The leadership of the provincial Muslim League 
was nationalist to the core. In general, for quite a longer period, up till late 
1920s, it remained so. 
"Political history of Bihar shows that the Provincial top Muslim 
League could not project any top rank leader at the level of the All 
India Muslim League whereas the Provincial Congress Committee 
since its beginning was able to have in its ranks Muslim leaders 
of all India political stature. 
Such as Dr. Syed Mahmud, Prof. Abdul Bad, Shah Md. Zubair, S. 
Zahurul Hasan Hashmi, Shah Md. Umair, Molvi Ismail, Dr. 
Zainuddin Nadvi, Kazi Ahmed Husain and others who formed the 
core of Nationalist Muslims in Bihar during late 1920s, and early 
1930s. 
Many of them had attended All India Muslim Nationalists 
Conference at Lucknow in 1931 and supported the resolution in 
67 At the Bankipore Congress session in 1912, Mazharui Haq and M. A. Jinnah 
had urged upon the Congress leadership not to pass any resolution moved by Tej 
Bahadur Sapru that separate electorate for Muslims should not have the advantage 
of both the general seat as well as separate electorate. The resolution was not 
pressed when these two leaders impressed upon that they are attempting to get it 
resolved, if this resolution is passed at this stage, their efforts would be nullified. 
But nothing came out of their efforts. 
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favour of joint electorate. They also formed a Muslim Mass 
Contact Sub committee for the enrolement of large number of 
Muslims as Congress members" . 
The efforts of these nationalist Muslim leaders to bring in Muslim masses 
into the Congress were successful. However, the Provincial Muslim League 
started making ascendancy only after 1937. The anti Congress attitude and 
anti Hindu feeling, fanned by the Muslim League evoked a ready response 
from the Muslim community in Bihar, who were already scared of the 
belligerent attitude of the Hindu communalists. On 22nd September 1937, 
the Muslim League held a meeting and passed a resolution against the 
recitation of Bande Matram as a national song and asked the Congress 
ministry to stop its singing at public meetings/ schools/ colleges^^. 
Jinnah and other top ranking Muslim League leaders, especially those from 
Bengal, paid frequent visits to Bihar and made efforts to see the merger of 
other Muslim groups of the province in the Muslim League. Numerous 
meetings were held and several new local branches of the League were 
opened. In January 1938, Jinnah addressed a large gathering of Muslims at 
Gaya. The League's membership began to increase. It extended its activities 
Shashi Shekhar Jha, op cit, pp. 120-121. Also see K.K. Dutta, op cit Vol. II. p. 
163. 
K.K. Dutta, op cit vol. II. p.232 
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by forming All India Muslims Students Federation, training volunteers and 
holding parades even in remote villages of Bihar^ ®. 
We have known how one communalism feeds another. The activities and 
developments of the League were in response to the rapid rise of the Hindu 
Mahasabha. And the changing scenario of national politics after the Round 
Table Conference and the Act of 1935. 
By mid twenties, (1920s), together with qurbani and music playing before 
mosque, the abduction of women came to be regarded as one of the factors 
polarizing the politics. When Mazharul Haq converned a conference at 
Chapra in 1926 to salvage the Hindu Muslim unity plank of the Congress, 
the question of women abduction was hotly discussed'V 
The origin of the Hindu Mahasabha's Shudhi movement under B.S. Moonje 
was attributed to the fate of Hindus in Malabar, especially the reports of 
wells filled with bodies of Hindu women who had jumped into to save their 
honour, as well as to prevent their rape under "the very eyes of the 
menfolk". 
In Bihar, it was Jagat Narayan Lai who pitched the Shudhi campaign. He 
was a member of both the Congress and the Hindu Mahasabha. Initially, his 
Ibid pp. 332-36. 
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anger was directed against "Christian peril" but later shifted against 
Muslims. 
Stereotypes were deployed to justify the shudhi campaigns of Hindu 
Mahasabha and Arya Samaj. The vernacular press like Darbhanga Gazette, 
Mithila Mihir, Dharambir, Kayastha Patrika all began to pour out venoms 
against Muslims^^. 
The central theme of the Hindu Mahasabha propaganda was against the 
Congress, that Hinduism should be the agenda of nation making. 
They were up against the assumption that swaraj was unattainable without 
Hindu- Muslim unity. They contented that if the Hindus unite, they would be 
strong enough to attain it alone^^. 
Similarly, the Urdu papers in Bihar like Imarat and A1 Mobashir voiced 
complaints against specific targeting of Muslim women, as well as, Shudhi, 
Sangathan campaigns. They interpreted it as an attack on Islam. The 
argument was stretched to the extent that all these coercions were meant to 
force the community out of the country '^*. 
The Searchlight, June 13, 1926. Also see Papiya Ghosh, " The Virile and the 
Chaste in Community and Nation Making: Bihar 1920s to 1940s." Social Scientist 
(22). January-February 1994. 
79 " For more see Papiya Ghosh, op cit. 
^^  Raghunandan Prasad of Munger Hindu Mahasabha and many others talked in 
such languages. For more See Ibid . 
^^  PS 30/ 1926. annual report (the Imarat) PS 15/1927 Annual Report (A/ 
Mobashir) cf. Papiya Ghosh op cit. 
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This polarization shaq)ened after 1937. The British administration could be 
seen as playing on the widening divide between the two communities. They 
had shifted from 'balanced' to 'un controlled' communalism, encouraged 
total communal division and gave virtually open support to the Muslim 
League, particularly in its anti Congress role and tolerated its efforts to 
acquire a mass character. From now onwards, communalism gained rapid 
grounds and communal riots became a general feature. The visits of Jinnah 
in Bihar raised communal tension in the province. When Jinnah arrived at 
Gaya in 1939, an armed procession was taken out. The communal riot of 7th 
May 1939 in Gaya, may be seen as a consequence of Jinnah's visit. In 
Aurangabad also, a riot had occurred in 1937. Such visits of Jinnah 
galvanized the local leaders of the Muslim League who engaged themselves 
in intensive campaigns, and which often tended to promote communal hatred 
against the other community. Towards the end of the year 1938, we fmd first 
expressions in the speeches, delivered at the session of the Provincial 
Muslim League in Patna arguing that the two communities were separate 
entities. The Congress ministry of the province was dubbed as the 'Hindu 
Raj meant to endanger Islam'. Naturally, the atmosphere got further vitiated 
and which greatly excited the Muslim population of Bihar, which had, thus 
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far, not taken any extreme stand and view, in spite of the deteriorating 
communal situation^^. 
The Shahabad riots of 1917 and the League's stereotyping of the nationalist 
Muslims as Congress-Muslims, led Muslims away from the nationalist 
Muslim leaders in the 1930s. 
Hereafter, it became a "mobilizational bottom line of the (Muslim) League". 
The rise in alienation of Muslims increased in 1926, as is evident from the 
electoral politics of 1920s. Nevertheless, it took time for decline in support 
for Congress among the Muslims to become noticeable to a certain degree. 
Shaft Daudi through his tours in the countryside tried to arrest any further 
alienation of Muslims from the Congress. Consequently, 6 out of 14 
Swarajist Muslims, who stood for 18 seats, were elected'^. However, in the 
District Board elections held the same year, Daudi had already lost the 
election to a European planter, Danby, mainly due to the betrayal by Hindu 
leaders of the Congress. This had left behind a "legacy of bad blood between 
the two communities"^' and two years later, in 1928, the Nehru Report 
caused a split in the Provincial Congress Muslim leadership with Syed 
Akhilesh Kumar op cit p.66. Also see Valmiki Chaudhry (ed.) Dr.Rajendra Prasad 
Correspondence and Select Documents. New Delhi, 1984. Vol. m. P. 334. 
AICC Papers No. 21/ 1926. Shafi Daudi's letter to Nehru. Quoted by David Page, Prelude to Partition: 
The Indian Muslims and the Imperial System of Control 1920-32. OUP, Delhi, 
1982. p. 138. 
^^  Kamta Chaubey, op cit. p. 182. 
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Mahmud for, and Shafi Daudi against it. The Bihar All Parties Musl im 
Conference condemned the Nehru Report as favouring" the Hindu 
Mahasabha. The Musl im Conference (formed mainly by Shaf i Daudi in 
1928) supported separate electorates and a federal system. 
Though its impact was very limited, Daudi, in 1931, had been alienated to 
such an extent that, he denounced the Lucknow conference of Nationalist 
Musl ims as having been convened solely to enlist Mus l im support for the 
Nehru report^®. Here, Musl im Nationalist Party, M o m i n Conference , Ahrars, 
Khudai Khidmatgars all were united but they fa i led to make much headway 
in winning over the Muslims. The Congress on its part could at tempt merely 
a hesitant mobilization among Musl ims of Bihar, Thus during the Civil 
d isobedience Movement , there was a ' low part icipat ion ' of Musl ims^ ' . 
^^  Papiya Ghosh, " The Making of the Congress-Muslim Stereotype: Bihar 1937-
39". Indian Economic and Social History Review (lESHR). 28, 4, 1991. 
^^  Francine R. Frankel refuses to see the low participation of Muslims in the Civil 
disobedience movement in religious terms. The author says that during 1930-32 
movements, the poor peasants cutting across religious lines abstained because due 
to price slump in 1930s, they were not as much hard hit as they were hit during 
movements of 1920-23 when the prices of the commodities had gone up. The 
author further argues that by 1930, the poor peasants, share croppers and labourers 
had come to realize that the Congress, especially in Bihar, did not care for their 
sufferings. 
See Francine R. Frankel, " Caste, Land and Dominance in Bihar: Breakdown of 
the Brahmanical Social Order" in Francine Frankel and MSA Rao (eds.) 
Dominance and State Power in India: Decline of a Social Order. OUP, Delhi, 
1989. 
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Here, it may be pointed out that by 1930, the greatest stalwart of nationalist 
Mushms, Mazharul Haq, had retired from politics in utter frustration and 
his death in 1930 left a vacuum in the province. 
Another great nationalist, Shafi Daudi, had already left Congress after 
having been betrayed by the Hindu Congressmen in the 1926 elections of the 
District Board. Shah Md. Zubair, an ardent Congressman also died in 1930. 
The absence of such respectable persons had its effect on Muslim response; 
the vacuum had occurred at a time when they were needed most to bridge 
the widening gulf between the two communities and take a stand in the 
developing scenario. 
There had been an unmistakable shift away from the Congress. In spite of 
this, the Muslim League was still so weak in Bihar that it did not contest the 
1937 election. Whereas on nationalistic lines, very similar to that of the 
Congress, the Jamiatul Ulema had launched the Muslim Independent Party 
(MIP) under the presidentship of Maulana Sajjad (of Imarat-e-Sariah). It 
supported the Congress' goal of independence but aimed at securing the 
constitutional safeguards for religion and culture. 
In 1937, of the 40 Mushm seats in the assembly of Bihar, the MIP came 
second by winning 15, MUP 6 and the Ahrar 3. The Congress won 5 of 7 
seats it had contested. 
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Congress formed the ministry in Bihar (after a brief tenure of MIP's Yunus 
led ministry). During the short tenure of the Congress ministry, the 
Congress' Muslim leaders from Maulana Abul Kalam Azad to Syed 
Mahmud, Abdul Bari, the Congress Ulema and the Momins all were closely 
monitored and described by the Muslim League to be the supporters of the 
Hindu Raj of the Congress for their failure to give priority to the mazhab. 
They played on the dismissal of Sir Sultan Ahmad from the post of 
Advocate General. More than three dozen meetings were held all over Bihar. 
The district branches of Muslim League attempted to expand its base by 
citing it as a blatant case of discrimination against Muslims®®. Maulana 
Abul Kalam Azad was especially targeted and was declared a tool in the 
hands of the Congress. 
Different district branches of the League used to discredit the Congress and 
thereby expanding the League's base. Thus, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad's 
challenge to Fazlul Haq to prove that Muslims were being oppressed in the 
Congress ruled provinces was seen as proof of Congress Muslims having 
become too accustomed to seeing things from Congress and Hindu glasses. 
The Muslim League also propagated against S.K. Sinha who was a member 
of Hindu Mahasabha also, and whose parliamentary secretary, Jagat Narayan 
^^^ The Star of India. November, 30, 1937. 
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Lai was general secretary of All India Hindu Mahasabha, responsible for 
pitching the Shudhi campaign in Bihar. Sinha was made Premier and not Dr. 
Syed Mahmud. This issue gave grist to the mill of the Muslim League's 
propaganda against the Congress. 
Notwithstanding the League's intentions, the preference of S.K. Sinha over 
Dr. Syed Mahmud for the Premiership did contribute to the alienation of the 
Muslims. Maulana Abul Kalam Azad has expressed this also. He has 
indicted Rajendra Prasad. Maulana Abul Kalam Azad says: 
"Dr. Syed Mahmud was the top leader of the province when the 
elections were held. He was also a Secretary General of the All 
India Congress Committee and as such he had a position both 
inside and outside the province. When the Congress secured an 
absolute majority, it was taken for granted that Dr. Syed Mahmud 
would be elected the leader and become the first chief minister of 
Bihar under Provincial Autonomy. 
Instead, Sri Krishna and Anugraha Narayan Sinha who were 
members of the central Assembly were called back to Bihar and 
groomed for the Chief minister ship.... 
Stories of atrocities circulated by the Muslim League were pure 
invention but two things happened at the time, which left a bad 
impression about the attitude of the Provincial Congress 
Committees. I have to admit with regret that both in Bihar and 
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Bombay the Congress did not come out fully successful in its test 
of nationalism"*^ 
This discrimination affected even Syed Mahmud's credibility among the 
Muslims. 
"His attending a debating society function at Patna College despite 
the resignation of Muslim students in protest of their non 
representation on its executive committee was read as an index of 
his indifference to the oppression of Muslims in Gaya and Patna 
districts". 
Many Muslims barraged Maulana Abul Kalam Azad and Syed Mahmud 
with letters of derision. Even the Muslims within the Congress were feeling 
discriminated and under-represented. So, some Muslims of Shahabad 
Congress wrote a letter to Rajendra Prasad demanding that some seats be 
fixed for them in Congress organizations and that they should not be ignored 
in government services. The Star of India, the League's mouthpiece reacted 
very sharply against Muslims approaching a Congress leader (for redress of 
their grievances) rather than to the Muslim League. It wrote: 
"These Congressite Muslims by praying and sending petitions to 
Congress are only humiliating the great Muslim community and 
disgracing the self-respect of the followers of Islam"® .^ 
Maulana A. K. Azad, India Wins Freedom Delhi, 1988. pp. 16-17. 
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Such grievances were not totally baseless. It was based also on the political 
lives of the Muslims who had fallen away from the Congress and had gone 
to the League. Shah Md. Qasim, a very old Congressman of Gaya district 
Congress Committee, and Dr. Qamruddin, complained that the Congress had 
become another name of Hindu Mahasabha. He said that 'to catalogue the 
Congress' act of communalism, a book or at least a booklet was required, 
and that the Congress was ready to give Muslims anything but power, or 
could offer position without power'. Because, soon after Shah Omair 
became the Chariman of the Gaya municipality in 1937, his powers were 
reduced. This had caused great resentment. As much as 16 Congressmen had 
sent a memorial to the Congress president Subhash Bose. Consequently, the 
Gaya district Congress lost many Muslims to the League. 
In Bhagalpur, a riot broke out in July 1938 over a Rath Yatra procession. 
Abdul Hamid, Secretary, Congress Muslim Mass Contact Committee, 
alleged that many of the district Congress leaders who were also office 
bearers of the Hindu Mahasabha were actively involved in the riot. The 
enquiry committee that was set up by the Bhagalpur Congress confirmed 
83 this . This was also confirmed by the 3 Muslim League reports viz. Pirpur 
^^  Papiya Ghosh, op cit (The Making of Congress-Muslim Stereotype...) 
AICC Papers No. G-22/1938. 
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report, Shareef report and Fazlul Haq's account. The Star of India got a 
ready made masala to alienate the Muslims from Congress. Darbhanga, 
Dalsinghsarai, Ranchi everywhere the League ranks swelled at the cost of 
Congress. The Muslim Mass Contact Committee was nicknamed as Muslim 
Massacre Committee. 
The Congress was also indicted for having ignored the issue of certain 
grievances of the Muslims such as one in Bagaha (Champaran). 
At Bagaha, the Muslims had suffered a social boycott of 45 days over a 
controversial Mahabiri Jhanda procession and the issue remained 
unaddressed by the Congress. Abdul Aziz, the President of the Bihar 
Provincial Muslim League, attacked the Muslim leaders of the Congress. 
The Muslim League employed all the tricks to give a mass character to its 
campaign^'^. It used mosques, and press most vigorously and frequently. 
When the Congress launched its Rural Development Department, the 
Publicity officer of the Bihar Provincial Muslim League called it a bribing 
exercise to few Congress Muslims. 
Jamiatul Momineen was divided and Latifur Rehman's faction split away 
(from the Abdul Qaiyum Ansari's faction) to merge with the Muslim 
League. The League used the card of caste also. The former's faction (a 
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League member) pointed out that the latter's faction was controlled not by a 
Momin but by a Syed (Nasim Gorganvi). Abdul Qaiyum Ansari was asked 
that why did he remain silent when the Momins were being killed in the riots 
of Tanda, Bhagalpur, Amingaon, Jamui, Majhaul, Triloki etc. 
The Wardha Scheme of education was considered as a Hinduising effort and 
was therefore, resented. Notwithstanding the League's exaggeration, it 
*4 
should be noted, however, that the nationalists substantially corroborate 
grievances also. 
Here a letter^^ by Maulana Sajjad to the Congress Working Committee is 
warranted to be considered at length. It gives insights into the genuine and 
sincere aversion for the Congress. It was submitted only after the resignation 
of the Congress ministry in 1939. 
The of Maulana Sajjad begins" with complaints against the Congress that in 
order to counter the obstructionist tactics of several pro-League Muslim 
organization (e.g. Muslim Conference, Muslim United Party etc.) it was 
blunder not to have made an alliance with the Muslim Independent Party, 
whose political programme was akin to the Congress. 
M. Sajjad, " The All India Muslim League's Techniques of Mass Moblization 
1940-47" Indian Journal of Politics. Vol. 35. Nos. 1-2. January-June 2001. 
^^  AICC Papers No. G-42/1939. 
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He demanded a thorough inquiry into the riots by an impartial tribunal. He 
questioned that why did not the Congress counter the League's allegations 
from the front foot. He suggested the Congress to do a self-introspection as 
to why did it lose the popularity and why did the League become more 
credible for the Muslims, which swept away the popularity of the Congress. 
He expressed the grief that since M.A. Ansari's death, there had never been 
more than two Muslims in the Congress Working Committee (CWC). 'Most 
blantant of all', which 'betrayed the narrow mindedness of the Congress' 
was bypassing of Dr.Syed Mahmud for the premier's post. He also 
mentioned Shah Omair's and Sir Sultan's dismissal, non appointment of 
Muslims for two years to the Rural Development Department, foisting of 
Wardha Scheme, not encouraging Hindustani, not compensating (through 
nominations) the meagre ratio of Mulims in the local bodies election. And 
finally he too came to the conclusion that the Congress was 'communalist to 
the core'. 
Similar was the complaint of Syed Mahmud to Rajendra Prasad and 
Jawaharlal Nehru. He said that the Congress had failed to win the confidence 
of the minorities. 
Within two years of its launching, the Muslim Mass Contacts Campaign 
Programme (MMCP) ran into serious trouble not so much due to the Muslim 
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League's opposition or the lack of Muslim support, but because of Congress' 
own reluctance to pursue it with any vigour or sense of purpose 
The programme was not backed by any social and economic content and 
offered 'too little too late'. 
The Congress right wing was another obstruction. 
K M Ashraf, the chief of the MMCP was posted with letters complaining 
that most of the committee could be effective only with the support of the 
district branches most of which were controlled by the leaders of anti 
Muslim proclivities of Hindu Mahasabha etc®'. K. M. Ashraf also told 
sometimes later that one reason why the League turned overnight into a full-
tledged manager was because Congress abandoned the struggle of mass 
88 
contact for ministry making . 
Thus emerged the polarized politics in the province. The Muslim League 
and the Hindu Mahasabha kept on attempting to construct political 
communities based on projections of the putative Hindu and Muslim 
communities. Whereas the Congress tried to oppose the politics of religious 
community by taking the issue of communalism to the masses through 
Mushirul Hasan, 'The Mushm Mass Contact Campaign: Analysis of a Strategy 
of Political Mobilization" in Mushirul Hasan (ed.) India's Partition: Process, 
Strategy and Mobilization. OUP, Delhi, 1993. 
pp. 149-57. 
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Muslim Mass Contact Campaign Programme. But the Congress continued 
its communitarian mobilizational strategies, and could not make the MMCP 
a significant success. 
In these situations combined with the imperial prodding, the League had 
finally come out with its 'Pakistan Resolution' on 23 March 1940 in Lahore. 
^^  Horst Kruger (ed.), Kunwar Muhammad Ashraf: An Indian Scholar and 
Revolutionary 1903-62. Berlin, 1966. pp. 413-14 
'' Ibid. 
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BIHAR MUSLIMS: FROM ALIENATION TO 
EXODUS (1940-47) 
Organizationally the Muslim League was almost non-existent in Bihar after 
1920. During the Khilafat and Non co-operation movements it had been 
virtually wiped out. Even after the withdrawal of the Non co-operation 
movement the Muslims of Bihar remained inclined towards Jamiat ul 
Ulema/ Imarat-e-Shariah. Even the Communal Award of 1932 and the Act 
of 1935 could not lead to revival of the Muslim League in Bihar. At the 
most, certain individuals, self-appointed office-bearers of the non-existent 
League organization, used to issue certain press statements. The League did 
not have any district branch till 1936. Certain individuals of Patna kept the 
provincial branch of the League in their pockets'. 
However, soon after the establishment of the Congress ministry in Bihar, the 
League made a rapid advance and not less than 1200 delegates were from 
Bihar who attended the Lucknow conference of the League in October 1936. 
Prominent among them were Latifur Rehman and Moinullah (the then 
secretary of Bihar Provincial Muslim League) who had attended the 
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Conference. Jinnah looked elated to see so much of support from a province 
where it had failed to enlarge its base. Moinullah impressed upon Jinnah to 
make Patna the venue of League's 26th annual session to be held in 1936. 
Ten days after the Lucknow conference, Jinnah reached Patna where he was 
given a warm reception. Here, he addressed a meeting and warned Muslims 
that the victory clinched by the Congress in the provincial elections of 
1937,was not going to give them freedom and that India's freedom was not 
necessarily freedom of Indian Muslims. He cited an example that free USA 
does not mean that the Blacks of USA are free^. He also addressed Muslim 
Students' Federation meeting in Anjuman Islamia Hall, Patna. A significant 
development was that the Ahrar Party and the Muslim Uninted Party (MUP) 
merged with the Muslim League. 
Nevertheless the Muslim Independent Party (MIP) of Imarat-e-Shariah did 
not merge. Moreover, it remained opposed to the League. 
Haji Sharfuddin of Barh, Chaudhry Nazeerul Hasan of Simri Bakhtiarpur, 
Molvi Badrul Hasan of Muzaffarpur, Molvi Tahir of Pumea etc. joined the 
League. The Provincial Committee of the Muslim League was set up with 
' Taqi Rahim, "Tehreek-e-Azcidi mein Bihar ke Musalmanon ka Hissa". Patna, 
1998. pp. 324-336. 
^ Ibid (The author was present there as audience) 
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Molvi Ibrahim as President and Jafar Imam as Secretary. Within a few 
months, the League appeared to become organizationally strong in Bihar. On 
1st January 1938, Jinnah visited Gaya and his meetings were attended by 
large crowds. Mr. Abdul Aziz (who later in 1939, became wazir of 
Hyderabad) and Nawab Ismail were the main people who organized the 
League in Bihar after 1937. They claimed to have recruited as much as 7500 
members by March 1938. Now Muslim League held its meetings in almost 
every town and qasba. In all such meetings, the Congress ministry was 
severely attacked. In general the allegations were that it had failed to prevent 
communal riots, for restricting Baqrid slaughter, singing Bande Matram in 
schools, encouragement of Hindi/ Devnagri at the court and neglect of Urdu. 
The League sneered and ridiculed Congress' Muslim Mass Contact 
Programme. 
Interestingly, at the Patna session of the League Sher-e-Bengal, Sher-e-
Punjab and Qaid-e-azam titles were given respectively to Fazlul Haq, 
Siknadar Hayat and Jinnah. 
In order to further enlarge the social base of the Muslim League at its 
Lucknow session of October 1937, the membership fee was reduced from 
Rs. 10 per annum to 2 annas. Significantly the dual membership was 
149 
discontinued and instead of Self Government its goal was of 'complete 
independence'. 
There are several explanations for this development in Bihar. 
Taqi Rahim explains the alienation of Muslims from the Congress due to its 
opposition to go in for coalition government, even with those parties who 
were nationalists and close to the Congress in its political programmes like 
the MIP. 
The introduction of electoral principle under the Act of 1935, therefore, 
injected a new element in intra communal and political relationships. The 
Muslim League had not been also score on mere communal appeal. 
Therefore the concept of Two Nation was evolved. The wedge that had 
existed was widened by the elections. Congress dilemma was to 
accommodate communal demands or go wholeheartedly for its goal of 
Indian Independence. Where elections had failed to widen the gap the Two 
Nation concept had made inroads, and its full implications had not been 
realized by Muslims in general and Bihar Muslims in particular. The 
Parliamentary majority system of government had been introduced. Sharing 
of power arises when there is fluidity. 
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In Bihar, out of 152 seats, the Congress won 95 seats. Of these 95, 90 seats 
were General and where Muslims had no franchise, which revealed that the 
Congress had won due to Hindu votes. That's why Rajendra Prasad and 
Sardar Patel refused to make a Muslim the premier of Bihar. It was first 
democratically elected government. Muslims in Bihar had lost trust in the 
Congress and felt betrayed. The Bihari Muslims were in forefront of the 
movement to separate Bihar from Bengal. 
The provincial headquarters of the Congress - Sadaqat Ashram, was their 
creation, remained always with the Congress. Even in 1937, the Congress 
' had secured as much as 65% of votes from Muslim constituencies, which 
was equal to the percentage of votes secured from General constituencies. 
Dr. Syed Mahmud had proposed to the Congress to make an alliance with 
the MIP and to extend financial support to their candidates with the 
Congress fund but Rajendra Prasad refused to do so even while insisting to 
have as many Muslim candidates on the Congress ticket as possible^. 
Therefore, their exclusion from power was a big tactical blunder by the 
Congress'^. 
^ Dr. Rajendra Prasad to Dr. Syed Mahmud, October, 1936. Rajendra Prasad 
Papers. File No. 1/36. ( I am thankful to Mr. Rizwan Qaiser of JMI, for pointing 
out about this letter to me) 
Taqi Rahim, op cit. pp. 324-36. 
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On all India scale, the situation was even more disturbing, which further 
added to the Muslim alienation. 
"If top Congress leaders in the late 1930s, now insisted more than 
ever before on secularism, their attitudes were not being 
implemented at lower down in party hierarchy or even by 
ministers. ...The Congress men from Central Provinces could not 
join the League, but were found active in the Hindu Mahasabha". 
The Hindu Mahasabha was gaining strength during these years, its President 
VD Savarkar declared at the Nagpur session of 1938 that 'we Hindus are a 
nation by ourselves. Hindu nationalists should not at all be apologetic to 
being called Hindu communalist'. By 1940, under Golwalkar's leadership, 
the RSS had 100000 trained and highly disciplined cadres pledged to an 
ideology of uncompromising communalism, most Congressmen did not 
regard the communalism as a serious challenge they were utilizing the 
ministries for personal gains^. 
This blunder on the part of the Congress leaders led to the alienation not 
only of Muslims but also of peasantry and of working class. Not much was 
done for Harijan welfare. Ambedkar himself had become a bitter critic of the 
t 
Congress and went to the extent of joining League in celebrating the 
' Sumit Sarkar,"MoJem India 1885-1947, Delhi 1983. pp. 356-57. 
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resignation of the Congress ministries on 29th October 1939 as a day of 
'deliverance'. 
The failure of the Congress to develop and implement genuine socially 
radical measures, proved disastrous. The Muslim Mass Contact Programme 
remained largely on paper, and secularist and radical rhetoric in the end 
merely alarmed the Muslim vested interest without winning over the Muslim 
masses^'. 
Thus, Khan Bahadur SM Ismail's leadership (a big Zamindar, and the 
President of the Bihar Muslim League in 1940s) revitalized the League 
through new slogans and frequent demonstrations. At various places, Urdu 
Day and Pakistan Day were observed. Top ranking leaders from Bengal 
started visiting Bihar. In April 1940 a mass meeting at Jamui (Munger) was 
held under Nazimuddin's presidentship (he was premier of Bengal). He gave 
a new slogan 'Pakistan is our birthright and have once for all decided to 
achieve it'. 
The secretary of Bihar Provincial Muslim League sent a circular letter to all 
the secretaries of the district Muslim League to hold public meetings on 
' Ibid. p. 354 
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Friday, 19"^  April. 1940, throughout the province to explain fully to the 
public the 'Pakistan' resolution of Lahore^. 
Thus even the mosques were used to mobilize the support for the League's 
religious bi-national nationalism. On March, Pardah Conference at 
Nagpur had decided to establish the Women Muslim League. Here, not less 
than 2000 women had participated. It had appointed a committee to tour all 
village and cities . 
On i9th April 1940 the League observed 'Independence Day' in every 
district. Consequently, in April, several riots broke out. 
In Ballia (Begusarai) (on Mahbiri Jhanda procession), in Rajmahal, and in 
Hazaribagh on Ramnavami procession. 
These riots became the staple item of speeches in the League meetings. 
Hindu communal forces also increased their activities. Pro-communal 
faction in the Indian National congress also started growing. Uptill 1945, the 
political scenario of the country forced even the secular organizations to join 
forces with the communal and reactionary organizations. The Congress 
leaders proclaimed electoral alliance with the Hindu Mahasabha to safeguard 
^ The Searchlight April , 26, 1940 
' The Searchlight March, 9, 1940 
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their electoral fortune. The pact on this line was initiated by Rajendra 
Prasad, one of the active Congress workers. But the idea was resented by 
Jawaharlal Nehru not so much to maintain secular character of the Congress 
but out of fear of losing Mohammedan support in the Muslim majority 
provinces 
The conferences and meetings of the Hindu Mahasabha increased in Bihar. 
In April 1940, at Ranchi, 9th Bihar Provincial Hindu Conference was held. 
Processions were brought out on elephants etc. Bhai Parmanand said that 
now the Muslims have forteited all their rights. The Maharaja of Dumraon 
organized the meeting of All India Kshatriya Sabha at Patna. Addressing 
this meeting, Bhai Parmanand spoke that Muslims were no longer needed, 
Hindus alone could wrest freedom. 
Even before the Lahore Resolution of Pakistan, i.e. as early as in January 
1940, the Hindu Mahasabha was much active throughout Bihar. Moonje 
addressed the meetings of Hindu conference at Begusarai and Muzaffarpur 
where processions were taken out, Gandhi's Hindu-Muslim unity 
programme was denounced and the Congress was condemned very strongly 
'' Nehru to Rajendra Prasad. October 6, 1945. in B.N. Pandey (edj, The Indian 
National Movement: Select Documents. Delhi, 1979. p. 172. Also see Akhilesh 
Kumar, Communal Riots in India. Delhi, 1991. p. 68. 
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At Dumka, a Congressman, Lambodan Mukherji participated in the 
Hindu Mahsabha meeting on 23 January 1940. Moonje attended Bihar 
Hindu Masabha meeting at Hathuwa (Saran) on 20 January. Thousands of 
people welcomed him. Processions were carried through streets and roads on 
elephants, camels, horses etc. It was surrounded by 500 trained Hindu Sainik 
Dal. Here military training to all Hindus was emphasized. Rajmata of 
Hathuwa had presided over the meeting. Kumar sahab of Manjha and Pt. 
Govindpati Tiwari, (M L A) were present there. 
On the one hand the Muslims had been complaining about discrimination 
against Urdu, which was a major cause of Muslim alienation, and this was 
fully used by the League to broaden its base among Muslims. On the other 
hand, Hindu right wing was increasingly becoming assertive for Hindi. On 
30-31 Dec. 1939, the Saran district branch of Hindi Sahitya Sammelan held 
its meeting in a village Shitalpur Bairya. This was attended by students, 
teachers, Kisans, Zamindars, public workers etc. The conference was hosted 
by Hindi Mandir, which was founded as back as in 1930-31. The chairman 
of the reception committee, Pt. Upendranath Mishra Manzul, in his address, 
complained against the 'unwholesome movement carried on in the sacred 
name of Hindustani' the common national language of India, which he said. 
The Searchlight January, 28, 194
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was bound to prove dangerous to the growth of Hindi literature and 
language. He exhorted the members of the conference to gird up their loins 
to oppose this anti-national campaign''. 
This shows that even around the issue of Hindi-Urdu controversy, the 
communalism was entrenching itself into remotest village. This also 
indicates the spread of communalism at popular level, so much so that the 
district branches of Hindi Sahitya Sammelan were having meetings and 
conferences in various villages. 
Even the Hindu Mahasabha, also had spread its branches far and wide in 
Bihar. By June 1939, Bagaha (Champaran) village was having a very strong 
branch of Hindu Mahasabha, with Shyamacharan Shukla as its local 
secretary. 
Here, a serious riot had broken out in several villages around Bagaha. The 
Mahabiri Jhanda procession (through the route along which a mosque was 
existing) led to the riots and social boycott of Muslims. 
The Congress ministry and the colonial police remained helpless and could 
not tame the Hindu Mahasabha^^. 
" The Searchlight January, 10, 1940 
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In Bhagalpur and in Samastipur the Hindu Mahasabha could fearlessly 
bypass the administration orders and making riots inevitable. The discourse 
of religious nationalism centred on the 'women as a community signifier'. 
Hindu Mahasabha's Shudhi campaign rationalized its activities on taking 
revenge with the Muslims, who according to them had vilified, raped and 
killed Hindu women in Malabar in 1920 and in (Noakhali, Bengal in 1940s). 
Thus, after Noakhali, women became the agenda of nation making. In Bihar, 
after Noakhali, the women symbolized the victim hood of an embattled 
community'^ 
The grievances against the abduction of Muslim girls figured most 
recurrently in the Shareef report prepared by the Bihar Provincial Muslim 
League. The League propagated these cases of abductions massively, 
through various mechanisms to inflict a persecution complex amongst the 
Muslims. And thus, the League increased its votes in the elections of 1946 
on an unprecedented scale. In June, 1946, in a village of Bihar Shareef, 
Andhana, a riot broke out when the Muslims wanted to recover an abducted 
Muslim girl. In September, 1946, at Benibad (Muzaffarpur), a riot broke out 
Papiya Ghosh, " Articulating Community Rights: The Muslim League and the 
Hindu Mahasabha in the Congress Bihar: 1937-39". South Asia vol. XIV. No. 2, 
1991. 
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when the Arya Samajists got enraged at knowing that a Muslim boy of 
Benibad named Ali Hasan, had 'abducted' a Hindu girl named Kalyani Dey 
from Bengal, and converted her to Islam. The records of Tirhut 
Commissioner reveal that the 'idea of retaliation' flowed more from the 
accounts of abductions of women and forcible conversions rather than from 
those of the killings in Noakhali. 
BS Moonje of All India Hindu Mahasabha and Ganganand Sinha of Bihar 
Hindu Mahasabha made extremely offensive statements that 'the Muslims 
had been fully paid back in their coins yet without any cowardliness'. 
"Beneath the self congratulatory rhetoric lay the pedagogy of 
Akhand Bharat that came to recommend violence as the most 
effective means of shudhi". Moonje noted that among the 
Muslims of Bihar, the fear of death was great ... some Muslims 
approached Moonje while on his Bihar tour, with folded hands 
and said, "sir we will leave Islam and become Hindu". That was 
the first experience of its kind in his life. He advised Hindus to 
acquire fire arms both lawfully and otherwise"^'*. 
Many booklets were distributed by the Hindu Mahasabha in Bihar. Like 
Hindu Kya Karenl In which it was warned that the Hindus, due to obsession 
' ^  Papiya Ghosh, " The Virile and the Chaste in Community and Nation Making: 
Bihar 1920s to 1940s" in Social Scientist (22), January-February, 1994. 
" I hid 
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with Swaraj, had neglected Hindutva and at Noakhali, Hindu dharma, jati, 
sanskriti, everything had been destroyed. Another booklet "Hindu Samaj 
Chetavani No.-l" written by Sukhdev Sharma Kanmakandi of 
Silaut,Muzaffarpur said that Hindustan belonged to Hindus alone 
From the early 1940 the Hindu Mahasabha had been triumphant. Streets 
echoed with the slogans 'Hindustan Hinduon ka hai'. Hindudom was 
declared by Savarkar as an organic National being. These stridencies of 
Hindu Mahasabha, supplied yet another content to the Muslim League's 
discourse. And "during the 1946 riots the abducting Hindu, reinforced by the 
'Hindu Raj' of the Congress, became a major factor in transforming Pakistan 
into an imminent inevitability"^^. 
During the 1946 riots in Bihar, the government officials were also conniving 
with the anti social elements who were local Congress workers also. A 
prominent Congress worker, deputed by Dr. Rajendra Prasad, was reported 
to have told a gathering of Hindus at Fatwa High school on 27 September 
1946, "I'm one of the 86 persons deputed by Dr. Rajendra Prasad and this is 
PS 209/147 of. Papiya Ghosh op cit. 
Papiya Ghosh op cit. 
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the right tiem for us to destroy and annihilate our enemies"'^. These goonda 
elements went scot free, moved fearlessly and took an active part in riots. 
The anti Muslim, arrogant and callous attitude of many Hindu officials were 
evident. In many cases it so happened that though the majority of the 
Muslims were killed, survivors had been arrested on charges of arson, 
murder loot etc while those Hindu goondas who actually did the killings 
were left scot free or if arrested, were let off on bail. 
"Some Muslim residents of village Rupahua in Munger district 
appeared as prosecution witness ... when these Muslims were 
narrating how even children have been massacred, the high police 
officer immediately interrupted and said that this was revenge for 
Noakhali one of the officers used abusive language"'^. 
In many places, the officers seized lawfully held arms of the Muslims on the 
assurance that they were to protect them, and then quietly withdrew from the 
scenes of occurrences and allowed the Muslims to be butchered. On the 
other hand Hindus were allowed to retain their licenses secretly. The 
relatives of Shri Krishna Sinha and other ministers could get the license 
without any inquiry. All these actions of the Government officials went 
unnoticed because the imperial ruler seated at the centre enjoyed the fun of 
The Morning News, October 20, 1946. cf. Akhilesh Kumar. Op cit. p. 68. 
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the Congress ministry getting discredited. They had to convince the people 
that the claim of their leaders to rule the country by their own people and in 
their own interests was nothing but a farce. 
Frustrated at such developments Nehru wrote a letter to Sardar Patel, saying: 
"In Patna, Gaya and Monger there has been a definite attempt on 
the part of Hindu mobs to exterminate the Muslims. The local 
officials including the ICS elements brought much damage"'^. 
The CID reported that a Hindu procession that paraded through the streets of 
Gaya for two hours with important Congress leaders holding up Gandhiji's 
and Nehru's portraits, shouting slogans such as Noakhali ka Badla le kar 
Ralienge, and Hindustan Hinduon ka, nahin kisi ke bap ka^^. 
•lagat Narayan Lai, a leading Congressman and erstwhile secretary of Hindu 
Mahasabha, organized an anti Noakhali meeting at Patna, led a procession 
with provocative banners and slogans. 
Wavell recorded that the outbreaks were planned by the lower rungs of the 
Congress. 
I S 
Akhilesh Kumar op cit. p. 69. 
" Ibid. p. 70 
CID SB 40/1946 vol. II cf. Taqi Rahim, op cit. p. 
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Some of them confessed to Gandhi for having joined the rioters^'. Nehru 
also reported that notwithstanding the involvement of some Congressmen 
(who had Hindu Mahasabha inclination), several Congressmen did excellent 
work in 1946. The League obstructed relief and rehabilitation works, 
discouraged Muslim refugees from returning to their villages rather they 
actively forced them to migrate from Bihar. The League, in fact, was more 
interested in making a political capital out of it than in helping the 
evacuees^^. The vagueness of Pakistan was more acute in Bihar than 
anywhere else. This was evident from the quickly shifting views of the 
League about the Bihar Muslims. In November 1946, the League demanded 
that a committee should be appointed to plan and arrange for the exchange 
of population and property (with Muslim majority provinces.) . By mid 
December, some League leaders had realized that the mass transfer of 
population was impractical. 
The Bihar Muslim League leader, Abdul Aziz, wrote a pamphlet, in which 
he urged upon the government to provide armed protection to Muslims in 
certain areas. But exodus of Muslims from Bihar went on. In early February 
Mansergh, Transfer of Power. Vol. IX. P. 140, p. 150. Also see Anugraha 
Narayan Sinha, Mere Sansmaran (Hindi). Patna, 1961. p. 425. 
" Pyare Lai, Mahatma Gandhi: The Last Phase. Vol. II. Ahmedabad, 1956. p. 
648. 
Mansergh,Transfer of Power. Vol. IX. P. 130. 
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the AIML Working Committee demanded that at least 10% of Bihari 
Muslims should be given licenses for arms, 50% in Police should be 
Muslims, to protect the Muslim populated pockets. However, by early 1947 
the idea of pockets and the partition of Bihar had become favourable 
proposition even to Jamiat ul ulema-e-Hind. Having seen the exodus in 
uncertain conditions, there were advocates for the division of Bihar and such 
ideas were aired. 
The Muslim Students Federation issued a pamphlet, "Divide Bihar" at Gaya, 
in April 1947. This was proposed that the homeland for the 5 million 
Muslims was to include the regions of Purnea, South Bhagalpur, South 
Munger, Patna, Jehanabad, Nawada, Gaya etc^ "^ . In the second conference of 
"Divide Bihar" at Patna, as much as l/6th area of Bihar was demanded as a 
homeland for the 'oppressed Muslims 
In another meeting of "Divide Bihar" at Gaya on 19 April 1947, not only 
Bihar's division into Hindu and non Hindu autonomous provinces was 
demanded but also formation of two interim governments was demanded 
Pyare Lai op cit p. 681. Also see K.K. Dutta, History of Freedom Movement in 
Bihar vol. III. p. 
^^  Z. H. Zaidi (ed.), Jinnah Papers vol. I. Part I. Karachi, 1998. p. 801. M.A. Warsi 
to Jinnah 
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at the center- one in charge of the Pakistan provinces and another in charge 
of the Hindustan provinces"^. 
This later idea was perhaps vaguely present in the common rural Muslim 
masses also. Because the people had neither idea nor imagination that 
Pakistan will be formed somewhere else. Nor did they imagine migration. 
They thought that they would only be governed by the League rather than by 
the Congress"'. 
Nevertheless, migration of Muslims from Bihar had begun soon after the 
riots. In the Patna refugee camps, the League propaganda that Hindus were 
planning to attack the Muslims from all sides between 22 December, 1946 
and 3 January, 1947 resulted in a further exodus of Bihari Muslims to 
Benual^^ 
There was acute disillusionment among Muslims who had been supporting 
the Congress, now resolved to migrate. 
ibid. p. 805. Some people whom I interviewed in the villages around 
Muzaffarpur also confirmed thi.s. 20 December 1998. 
Attia Husain's novel. " Sunlij^ht on the Broken Columns". The central character 
of the novel could noi imagine that Delhi, Agra, Lucknow won't be included in the 
proposed Pakistan. 
^^ Sada-e-Aam. January, 2, 1947, cited by Papiya Ghosh, "The 1946 riot and the 
exodus of Bihari Muslims to Dhaka" in Sharifudding Ahmad (ed.) Dhaka: 
Past, Present and Future. Dhaka, 1991. 
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The "Rioters had not shown any mercy even to such Muslims 
(Congress Muslims) and their families. For example when the 
Secretary of the Telmar Congress Committee refused to take 
shelter in the house of the nearby Khusrupur Zamindar household 
of the Husains, he was confident that no one would touch a 
Congress Muslim. But he was killed with 16 members of his 
family. The Momins were among the worst sufferers in 
Biharsharif, despite the fact that they had been supporters of the 
Congress. They alleged that many people high up in the Congress 
had taken part in the riot". 
The Muslim League had played a leading role in organizing the exodus of 
Bihar Muslims. Yet the Congress cannot be absolved. Because it was the 
riots of 1946 which 
"Saw the crystallization of communal identities. A combination of 
propaganda and the dimensions of the riot metamorphosed 
community consciousness among Hindus and Muslims into 
political identities"'"^. 
"The party (Congress) failed at another level as well. The Congress policies and 
altitudes towards the minorities, and especially towards the Muslims, demonstrated an 
unhealthy association with Hindu communal forces. In consequence. Congress 
nistitutions failed to gain the confidence of Muslims of all sections of the community. 
PcilKips most serious of all the police were seen to be clearly biased in favour of the 
inaiorKy community. Thus, both during the period in office from 1939 to 1939 and during 
the ciitical year of 1946 a considerable number of district committee actively encouraged 
communal rioting. In this vital respect, the Congress in power revealed itself to be a God 
with feet of clay white the economic betrayal of the poorest classes may have been 
seiious enough, the failure to protect the religious minority constituted, in the long term a 
fai more serious failure on the part of Congress. Indeed it was a failure which helped to 
set the scene for a sad history of communal friction in post independence India". Vinita 
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It is therefore, necessary to give an analysis of the economic, political and 
social context in which communal-separatism took its ugliest form in the 
1940s. 
The post World War II situation effected a great change in India and Bihar 
viz. rising inflation, increasing unemployment, adding to these problems was 
demobilization of two million soldiers from Indian army. As a natural 
corollary of these problems emerged a series of agrarian upheavals and gory 
communal rioting. 
In several districts, communal riotings and agrarian unrests broke out almost 
simultaneously. The storm centres of Kisan Sabha were hotbed of 
conimunalism also. Gaya, Darbhanga, Muzaffarpur, Munger, Bhagalpur 
districts were most disturbed regions of Bihar in 1945 - 1946. 
Thus nationalism, religious communalism and peasant unrest all ideologies 
were co existing and operating at several different layers of consciousness. 
A careful scrutiny of the internal dynamics of the communal riots of 1930s 
and 1940s reveal that mere elite manipulation was not the only reason for 
Damodaran, Broken Promises: Popular Protest^ Indian Nationalism and the Congress 
Party in Bihar 1935-1946. OUP. Delhi, 1992. 
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growing incidents of communal riots'^ ". Herein Bihar, sectarian conflict and 
class conflict co-existed and one cannot identify which of the two 
contradictions was primary. The communal polarization had already 
assumed a popular dimension during 1880-1920, around the issues of cow 
protection and music before mosque. The polarization was never confined to 
the elite alone. 
A quick survey of the economic situation of Bihar in the post World War II 
era will give an understanding about the backdrop which was defining the 
politics of nationalism and separatism. 
The post war inflation reached its zenith in 1943-4 and then started 
slackening by 1946. It again started increasing due to failure of rice and 
rabbi harvest. Thus, hoardings increased in Barh, Buxar. Daltengang 
witnessed black-marketing. Food scarcity prevailed in Saran, Hajipur, 
Munger, Chotanagpur etc. The newspapers like The Searchlight and the 
People's Age give us the details. 
Indian industry was hit hard and the demand had slackened. Distress sales 
and mortgaging of lands became frequent. By 1940, the rural crisis was 
accentuated by the prospect of zamindari abolition. Evictions became 
^^  For details about the configuration of communal and agrarian rioting that 
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common. These all developments resulted into massive agrarian rioting. By 
the time Congress formed the ministry in April 1946, Bihar was in for 
massive scale rioting. Police went on strike demanding an increase in pay 
and perks to keep up with rising inflation, followed by workers strikes in 
industries. 
Colonialists' compulsion to transfer the power had become imminent. 
Therefore, the Muslim League was challenging the Congress' bid for 
supremacy, by 1946. Jinnah was looming large on Indian politics as the 'sole 
spokesman' of the Muslim political factions^V 
Communal propaganda and passions were running high pushing the situation 
on the brink of widespread rioting. 
League had taken full advantage of the period of 1942 - 45 when the 
Congressmen were in jails. And it had built up its organizational machinery. 
The end of first Congress ministry in 1939 had seen a rapid development of 
the League more particularly and significantly in Muslim minority provinces 
and simultaneously growing communal tension at the popular level. During 
the war years, the League had succeeded in further broadening its base 
developed in Bihar in 1946, see Vinita Damodaran op cit. 
" Ayesha Jalal, The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah, Muslim League and the Demand of 
Pakistan . Cambridge, 1985. 
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through various novel mechanisms and methodologies, slogans, populism 
and propaganda etc and mobilized the Muslim majority provinces around the 
communal banner and over a demand of 'Pakistan' that was conveniently 
unspecific and vague. In Bihar, by 1944, recurrent meetings of Pakistan 
Conferences were being held in several towns/ villages. The Khaksars and 
the Muslim League National Guards' militant outfits were aiding League in 
bringing huge crowds to its meetings. Purnea and Munger was the strongest 
base of Khaksars. Students and educated unemployed youths were specially 
attracted towards it 
Similarly, the Hindu Mahasabha was also becoming increasingly stronger in 
Bihar. It was aided by the RSS. Its membership increased dramatically up. 
it believed that India would not be able to overcome her national problems 
or to achieve a prominent international position until the Hindu community 
had organized effectively. By 1940, it was having its branches all over India 
Its main base was urban area but had spread down to villages also. Arya 
Samaj and Hindu Mahasabha's Shudhi campaign had already entrenched 
itself into the remotest villages. The RSS gave military training to its cadres. 
Y B Mathur, Muslims Politics in India. Delhi, 1979. pp. 218-220. 
" J A Curran, Militant Hinduism in Indian Politics. New York, 1951, p. 61 
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Its recruits were students, unemployed youths, lower middle class, 
shopkeepers, clerks and tradesman. By 1946, large numbers of its cadres 
were actively engaged in whipping up Hindu communal feelings. 
"The attitude of the Congress towards the Hindu Mahasabha was 
interesting for, though the official leadership of the congress 
declared firmly that would have nothing to do with Hindu 
communal parties, many lower level congress functionaries were 
active in the Hindu Mahasabha and sympathetic to its ideology" 
34 
The activities of all these organizations increased the communal tension in 
Bihar. And the incidences of communal riots became quite frequent. Most of 
the times, the riots erupted over petty matters. Between 1940-45 few 
communal riots took place and religious propaganda was also kept low but 
after 1945 the things changed. 
The Muslim League viewed the rising communal tensions in Bihar with 
some satisfaction as it provided the best context in which to use Bihar 
elections of 1946. 
The Bihar Congress, as said earlier, had been overtaken by the right wing. 
Vinita Damodaran, op cit p. 314. 
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During poll campaigns and meetings, Zamindars' private armies were used 
to stifle the dissent against the Congress"^ .^ 
And the alienation of the Muslims against the Congress was so high that 
even the greatest Muslim stalwart of the Congress - Abdul Bari, lost the 
election. Only Congress Muslim to win was Syed Mahmud. That too with 
much difficulty and the poll campaign in his constituency shows how much 
League had gone deep into the masses'^ .^ Of the forty Muslimi seats, 32 went 
to the League; 6 to the Momins; and 2 to independent Muslims. Congress 
was nil in the Muslim seats. The communal divide thus seemed more 
unbridgeable than ever before and the stage was set for the bitter communal 
killings of November 1946. 
On 16 April 1946, Congressmen formed the ministry. The ministers, 
including the Prime Minister (Premier) S.K. Sinha, came mainly from the 
Congress right wing. Food scarcity, economic crises, unemployment, 
hoarding, black marketing, general crime all was rising. Police strike had 
already taken place. In such a situation, the Congress ministry showed utter 
inefficiency. 
The People's Age. February 24, 1946. 
Sho Kwajima, Mu 
India, bdkl^ ll'^S • 
uslim, Nationalism and Partition: 1946 Provincial Elections in 
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Widespread agrarian agitation over the restoration of bakasht land and 
against the exploitative incursions of the Zamindars was occurring in 11 
districts (out of 17) of Bihar from the summer of 1946 onwards. These 
peasant actions included both Hindu and Muslim peasants who made 
common cause against the Zamindars. In November 1946 this situation 
changed. Now communal rioting engulfed rural areas. Between October and 
December 1946, Bihar witnessed one of the worst communal outrages in 
history. In August 1946, great Calcutta killings had changed the situation. 
The disturbances in Bihar were accentuated by the newspaper reports 
inspired by the Mahasabha. Moreover the Congress ministry in Bihar made 
no efforts to scale down the inflated rumours of the numbers who had died . 
Instead it attempted to make political capital out of the matter and on 28th 
October the provincial ministry in Bihar 
authorized the celebration of Noakhali Day, to mourn the death of Hindus in 
East Bengal. This ill-advised action further provoked the feelings of the 
communities against each other. 
"The Congress Working Committee held that the outbreak of 
brutality was the direct result of the polices of hate and civil strife 
" Francis Tucker, While Memory Serves London, 1950. pp. 182-84. 
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that the Muslim League had practiced for years past and of the 
threats'^ ^ 
The RSS - Hindu Mahasabha kept propagating the pohtics of hate and 
vengeance and that, "to establish Hindu Raj, extermination of Muslim was 
quite necessary""^^. Their activities had increased so dangerously that 
Raniesh Jha of Bhagalpur Congress Socialist Party had demanded from S.K. 
Sinha that the RSS must be banned"^". 
Francis Tucker records that between 31 October to 2 November, 8000 men, 
women and children were butchered. In Fatwah the majority of people who 
attacked were lower caste Kurmis, Goalas and Dusadhs. 
In Kanchanpur, both Muslim League and Hindu Mahasabha were especially 
active before riots. 
The cry of Jai Mahabir had become a rallying cry for Hindu militants who 
saw Hanuman, the monkey God, as representing the power and vigour of 
Hinduism. In the village Kanchanpur mass rape of women took place and 
after the rape they were killed and thrown into the well. The rapes of women 
during communal riots symbolized the attempt by one community to defile 
• ^ HimhistanTimes. October 23, 1946. 
Punam Kumari^C/u//ra Andolan ka Itihaas. Delhi, 1999. p. 157. 
Circular, Government of Bihar. File No. 201/44 
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and humiliate the other. It was rarely an act motivated by sexual desire, 
rather more by vengeance"^'. 
During 1880-1920, the indulgence of Ahirs, Koeris, Kurmis in anti cow 
killing riots was directed at improving their ritual status and at emphasizing 
the purity of their faith'*^ But in 1946, looting the belongings became 
anolher motive. The Zamindar of Pachrukhi (Munger) noted 
"the Hindus in my village are looking the houses left behind by 
fleeing Muslims and are determined not to allow them to 
rehabilitate". 
In \'illages like Kanchanpur (Fatwah) and others we have much evidence 
indicating the complicity of Zamindars in fomenting riots. In Gaya, arms 
were supplied by local Zamindars and by a mahanth of Loghar. The 
newspapers of December 1946 alleged that the Zamindars were trying to 
defuse agrarian tension by inciting communal riots and dividing the 
exploited tenants along communal lines. 
At a Zamindar conference held at Patna under Darbhanga Maharaj, 
Vinita damodaran. op cit p. 344. 
Gyanendra Pandey, The Construction of Communalism in Colonial North India 
. OUP, Delhi. 1990. p. 192. 
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some Zamindars suggested to make kisans and khet mazdoors fight among 
themselves"^^. 
However Zamindars were not the only elite group actively fomenting the 
agitation Traders and merchants were also actively involved in financing 
some of the operations. In Chapra, this trend was quite visible. In Masaurhi, 
the local rice and flourmill proprietors organized the rioters and the mil 
sirens were used to collect and disrupt the rioters. 
At a time when the peasantry was under severe economic pressure, loot 
constituted a major temptation. 
"The reactions of the Congress ministry to the communal rioting was 
markedly inefficient." At Chapra and other places, the policemen were 
instigating riots rather than protecting the Muslims'^. 
The number of criminal cases filed after riots were pitifully low. Most of the 
accused were acquitted'^"\ This added insult to the injury to the Muslims. 
And the Muslim League played upon all these things. The socialists who 
h may be recalled here that it was Darbhanga Maharaj (Rameshwar Singh) who 
alongwith the Bihar Landholders' Association and the leaders like Sachidanand 
Sinha, Langat Singh, Deep Narayan Singh, Parmeshwar Lai, Dr. Rajendra prasad, 
Anugraha Narayan Sinha, Krishna Ballabh sahay etc. had revived the Bihar Hindu 
Sabha in August, 1911. J.S. Jha, " An Unpublished Correspondence Relating to 
Bihar Hindu Sabha" JBRS. 1968. LIV, Parts 1-4. pp. 339-344. 
^^  Agrarian Disputes in Munger. FileNo. 6(1) / 47. 
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were conducting relief work often found themselves hampered by local 
Congress leadership. 
Another great worry of the Muslims was house search, which was quite 
tortuous and harassing so much so that it accelerated the process of 
4 6 migration . 
"All in all, the Congress ministry dealt with the riots completely 
inefficiently and without seriousness. It instituted no official 
enquiry, imposed no collective fines, and arrested very few. The 
police had also shown themselves to be hopelessly biased and had 
almost entirely lost the trust of the Muslim. This was the one main 
opportunity the congress organization was to have to strongly 
attack Hindu communalism, to build itself an image as a secular 
party and to create a politically and communally unbiased police 
force. It fowled on all counts, and lost what little support it had 
once had amongst the Muslims. There was a political corollary to 
this. Henceforth, until the 1950s, Hindu communal parties like the 
Hindu Mahasabha and the RSS were able to ally themselves 
closely with the congress and thereby increase their popular 
support in Bihar. The disastrous consequence of this Congress 
45 
46 
Rajendra Prasad Papers File No. 6-B/1946. 
PS (1) 27/ 1946. Also reported by the Dawn November 21, 1947. Some other 
newspapers also reported it. 
177 
policy are still keenly felt today, particularly by the Muslim 
population""^^. 
Thus the clinching event for the League's Pakistan was the riots of 1946 
which "saw the crystallization of communal identities", which 
"metamorphosed community consciousness into political identities". It was 
from the core areas of the riots that the Bihar Muslims migrated first to 
Bengal after partition, mainly to the then East Pakistan. It is significant to 
note that "Pakistan came to be visualized as the embodiment of the sacrifice 
of the Bihar Muslims in the riots of 1946""^^ 
A freedom fighter and Urdu writer Taqi Rahim in his recent book, 
emphasizes this point. He also indicts the growing communalization of 
Congress, which according to him, was most responsible for the 1946 riots 
and consequent migrations. He says: 
"In Noakhali, Muslims rioters killed hundreds of Hindus, burnt 
thousands of Houses, raped women ... and the government took 
time to check it. ... But the congress leaders of the stature of 
Sucheta Kriplani and Acharya Kriplani and others along with the 
Hindu controlled press blow it out of proportion ... Bihar's 
newspapers like Searchlight, Indian Nation, Aryavart, Pradeep all 
published inflammatory news.The Searchlight and Pradeep were 




Congress newspapers. Its editor Murli Manohar Prasad was old 
Congressmen. Searchlight was brought out by the personal 
finance of Syed Hasan Imam. Bihar was already in flames. The 
annoouncement of observing 25th October as Naokhali Day by 
K.B. Sahay, Murli Manohar Prasad, Jagat Narayan lal etc. added 
fuel to the fire. Thus from 25th October stabbings and killings 
started from Patna itself many provocative slogans like ""Khoon ka 
bacUa khoon sex lengey' were shouted. In the conference at 
Gandhi Maidan the Congressmen delivered extremely 
inflammatory speeches (which was resented by Abdul Bari on the 
stage itself). Then the riot spread to Chapra, Bhagalpur, Banka etc. 
The central target of these riots was the Magadh region, which 
was considered as religious, educational, cultural centre of the 
Muslims of Bihar. 
If Chapra had produced a towering nationalist like Mazharul Haq. 
Then Magadh had produced dozens of great nationalist Muslims. 
Molvi Ali Kareem (Dumri), Sarfarosh Salar-e-Azadi, Nawab 
Imdad Khan Azar, Fazle Haq Azimabadi, Dr. Azimuddin, Justice 
Sharfuddin Syed Ali Imam, Syed Hasan Imam (Neova), Ar. Md. 
Yunus (Penhara), Sir Sultan Ahmad Shah Zubair (Arwal), 
Maulana Sajjad (Penhara), Syed sulaiman Nadri (Disna), and 
numerous others ... But in this riot the Hindus completely 
devastated those villages which were the repository of rich 
cultural heritage" 
Papiya Ghosh op cit. 
Taqi Rahim op cit pp. 521-23. 
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He further says that the local Congressmen instigated all these riots. 
Therefore, 'the Muslims lost faith in them and they came to realize that 
whatever might be the intention of the Muslims, the Hindus themselves 
beHeved in two nation theory' and that they considered the Muslims to be an 
'alien population (ghair qaumY^^. 
Having seen the gulf between the Muslims and the Congress, the League, in 
its last bid for clinching Pakistan at any cost, made Suhrawardy announce in 
Bihar that he was ready to give settlement to the Bihari Muslims in Bengal. 
He set up a relief camp at Asansol for Bihari Muslims from where they went 
to Dhaka. Some of them got attracted to the supposedly greener pasture in 
West Pakistan. Hence, in Karachi, a separate Bihari colony came into 
existence even before Pakistan was formally created^'. 
50 I hid. 526 
" Ihid.p.521 
Chapter - 5 
Muslims' Resistance to 




MUSLIMS' RESISTANCE TO THE TWO-NATION THEORY: 
BIHAR 1940-1947 
On 23rd March 1940, at Lahore, the All India Muslim League, in its annual 
session, passed a resolution, which was drafted by Sikandar Hayat Khan. 
However, in the session it was moved by Fazlul Haq and seconded by 
Khaliquzzaman. This resolution read as: 
"That geographically contiguous units are demarcated into 
regions which should be so constituted, with such territorial 
readjustments as may be necessary, that the areas in which the 
Muslims are numerically in a majority as in the north western and 
eastern zones of India should be grouped to constitute 
'Independent states', in which the constituent units shall be 
autonomous and sovereign"'. 
We notice here that neither Pakistan nor the idea of India's Partition was 
explicitly mentioned in the resolution. Yet due to a variety of valid, as well 
as invalid reasons, this resolution was perceived as a demand for separate 
state. Even before the resolution was passed, the League sympathizers were 
in upbeat mood and they had a feeling that, at Lahore, they are going to get 
something substantial. A number of Muslim National Guard volunteers left 
Sumit Sarkar, Modem India 1885-1947, Delhi, 1983, p. 379 
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for Lahore from Allahabad in two motor lorries filled with microphones and 
loudspeakers to join the Muslim League Session there^. There was 
propaganda for huge participation in the session. Even bicycles were used 
for the purpose. 
The secretary of the Bihar Provincial Muslim League sent a circular letter to 
all the Secretaries of the district units of the Muslim League asking them to 
hold public meetings on Friday (19th April 1940) throughout the province to 
"explain fully to the public" the resolution adopted at Lahore regarding "the 
future Constitution of India and the position of Muslims in it"^. It was said 
that in every village and town of Bihar, the Lahore resolution should be read 
in the Jiuna prayers. Khan Bahadur Ismail, one of the important leaders of 
Bihar Muslim League said that it should be read with "well reasoned 
speeches explaining the resolution and its implications without being 
unnecessary provocative""^. 
Here, it should be noted that religion and religious place was being used for 
a mundane political thing, it was, in fact, part of a strategy and mobihzation. 
Reacting against this scheme of the League, Syed Mahmud said. 
- The Searchlight. Patna. March 10,1940. 
' I hid. April 6, 1940. 
' Ihicl. April 9, 1940. 
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"The two-nation theory and Partition scheme does not have any 
historical background. It will benefit not the Hindus nor the 
Muslims but Britishers alone"^ 
Therefore, concerned nationalist group of the Muslims convened a 
conference of 'Patriotic Muslims' at Delhi on 27-29 April 1940 to "defeat 
reactionary and disruptive forces of Muslim Communalism." The prominent 
nationalist Muslim leaders of Bihar like Professor Abdul Bari, Anisur 
Rehman, Syed Hasan Razi etc. appealed to the "freedom loving Muslims" to 
attend the conference^'. 
The Bihar Theosophical Society organized, "Mel-Milap Conference" at 
Chapra, which was presided over by Mohd. Yunus, MLA^. In the meeting he 
emphasized on Hindu Muslim unity and religious tolerance etc. 
The Muslim Independent Party (MIP) of Bihar declared that the 
foundational principle of the Party was to secure independence and to 
safeguard the interest of Musalmans including the sanctity of the religious 
tenets and that it stands for complete independence, hence, the League's 
n 
resolution of Lahore must be opposed . 
' Ibid. April 5, 1940. 
'' Ibid April 6, 1940. 
^ Ihid April 18, 1940. 
Vfe/J April 18, 1940 
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Its president Maulana Abul Mohasin Mohd. Sajjad appealed to the Muslims 
to participate in the Delhi's Nationalist Muslims Conference of 27-29 April 
1940. 
However, most important of all the above responses, the most outstanding 
one is the profoundly logical and convincing criticism that appeared in the 
'Naqeeb' of 14th April 1940. In this organ of the Imarat -e-Sharia, the editor 
Maulana Abul Mohasin Md. Sajjad came out with sharpest possible criticism 
against the League's separatism. This longish article had the caption 
''Muslim India Aur Hindu India hi Scheme par ek Aham Tabsera (An 
important Commentary on the scheme of Muslim India and Hindu India). It 
would be of great importance to have a careful reading of the text, because, 
it not only reflects the political outlook of the Imarat-e-Shaha but is also an 
important document on the application of Islamic resources against 
colonialism. 
In the article, Maulana Sajjad, Comments, to begin with, on the League's 
attitude before the Lahore Resolution of 1940. He stated that: 
"For the last two to two and a half years the Muslim League has 
been resorting only to breast beating against perceived or real 
tyranny of the Congress or Hindu Majority but thus far, it has not 
''Naqeeb, April 14, 1940. 
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come out with any solution whatsoever despite being repeatedly 
asked by the Congress leaders". 
He further questioned the League that: 
"Even if one concedes that the League's allegations against the 
Congress in U.P., Bihar, C.P. are totally correct, the irony is that 
the League has not been able to put forward any principle to 
ameliorate the conditions of Muslims". 
He further wrote: 
"Now when Jinnah has put his scheme before the people any 
person of minimum wisdom can clearly understand that Jinnah's 
scheme does not have any solution whatsoever for the Muslims of 
Hindu majority provinces..." 
In any constitutional scheme, be it, democratic set up, or provincial 
autonomy or unitary centralized government - Muslims of Muslim majority 
provinces are not going to have a problem nor did they have any problem 
nor did the League had any grievance against the Congress in such provinces 
yet Jinnah simply says that Muslims will become free from Hindu tyranny, 
however Jinnah does not talk of freedom from British Colonial tyranny. 
Goya Muslim League aur Mr. Jinnah ko Bartaniya ki Ghulami bahar hal 
manzoor hai. (Thus, the slavery of British is anyway acceptable to both 
Muslim League and Mr. Jinnah)". He went on arguing pertinently against 
the premises of certain concept; ostensibly seeking clarifications: 
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"Regarding the Muslims of Hindu majority regions, Jinnah only says that the 
Muslim majority provinces will be a guarantee to the rights and interests of 
the Muslims of Hindu majority provinces {aqalliat subahs). What it implies 
is that if some oppression against the Muslims of Hindu majority regions 
take place the Hindus of Muslim majority provinces will be subjected to 
oppression in retaliation. This kind of barbarity can be perpetrated only by a 
fool (Ahmaq) or insane (Majnun). 
We find that Maulana Sajjad had in a forthright manner questioned the very 
basis of any such idea of 'hostage' people. He averred: 
"No government can subject its peaceful and loyal citizens to oppression 
only because their coreligionists are being oppressed under another 
government. 
(Koi Hukumat apni pur amn aur wafadar re'aaya per mehaz is liye zulm 
iiahin kar sakti hai ki doosri hukumat men us ke ham mazhabon ke maujuda 
ahd mein aisa Kheyal sirf koi ahmaq aur majnun hi kar sakta hai). He 
branded Jinnah's proposed "Muslim State" as unreal, impractical, 
inappropriate, unjustified etc. Then he puts a question before Jinnah and his 
associates that why is the League doing breast beating on the oppression of 
Muslims of Hindu majority provinces, whereas proposes to make a Muslim 
state only for the Muslims of Muslim Majority provinces (aksariyat 
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snbahs)l He even asked Jinnah and Iqbal, obviously referring to the north 
western province, that why did not they put this scheme of statehood before 
the British during the Round Table Conferences; He wrote: 
"To say that Jinnah and League trusted Hindus is nothing but a 
lame excuse because if recurrent riots are the causes of putting 
forward this scheme, then between 1917 and 1927, more riots and 
casualties have taken place than those during 1937-1939." 
Then the Maulana explains the reason behind Jinnah's /Muslim League's 
desperation to come out with the Pur Fareb (full of treachery) scheme. 
Maulana Sajjad, having condemned the proposal came to the crux of the 
Indian Muslims' condition, which had not been addressed by Jinnah: 
"Since poor and ignorant Muslims have become poorer during 
British rule, they, may get attracted to the fancied idea of Islamic 
rule in a greater part of India, where their Islamic identity will be 
safer, may forget their physical and emotional pains and 
consequently rally round the League's flag so that when elected to 
the assemblies and councils take place then on the slogan of 
Islamic-rule they may mislead the poor ignorant Muslims and 
keep holding power." 
We find that Maulana Sajjad gave a profound analysis and intellectually 
informed, pragmatic arguments against League's desperation to come out 
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with the plan of "separate statehood." So much so that it may degenerate 
into an instrument of further exploitation in the name of religion. 
Therefore, Maulana Sajjad repeatedly stressed that nowhere in the 
resolution, the League commits itself to free India from British Colonial 
yoke. 
Summing up his discourse, Maulana Sajjad made an appeal and opined that 
Hindus and Muslims should together fight for complete independence and 
for setting up a free democratic India where neither Hindus will be 
subordinated by Muslim majority nor Muslims will be subjected by Hindu 
majority in any part of India, and that the state will have no interference into 
the cultural affairs of the religious minorities. 
Maulana Sajjad continued his efforts to explain and inquire even in the 
subsequent issues of 'Naqeeb'. Maulana was deeply concerned on the 
developments, particularly upon ways how to resolve the communal 
conflicts. He pondered over the issues, which were the causes of conflict and 
came out with certain corrective suggestions: 
In another essay written by him, has the caption, 'Firqa Varana 
Maamlat ka faisla kin Usoolon per hona chahiye." (On which 
principles should the communal affairs be decided)^®. Here he 
says that the leaders of a multi religious society like India should 
18 
work out the limits of religious freedom and which should be 
based on judicious treatment with all sects. First of all, the faith 
should not be demonstrated in public in a manner, which proves 
hazardous to other faiths, it should not be provocative; for 
example "every Muslim does have a right to eat beef but the cow 
slaughter should take place within the homes not in public. 
Similarly no religious procession of any sect or community should 
be allowed to be taken out in public spaces. This may not be 
appreciated by all but nevertheless that is desirable and judicious, 
moreover, that will do away with frequent communal riots". 
Like Imamt-e-Shariah's Maulana Mohammad Sajjad, the Deoband 
leadership also stood for the unity of India. 
"The Deoband Leadership was more popular among the Muslim 
peasantry and other backward classes, was aware of the inherent 
danger of the League ideology and stood for the undivided interest 
of the Muslim Community as a whole. Further more, its patriotism 
embraced the whole of India and could not tolerate any idea of the 
division of the country based on political or economic 
considerations. Sometimes it also made religious appeals but only 
to the effect that its was the religious duty of every Mussalman to 
fight for the freedom of the country"". 
Naqeeb 5 Jamadi ul Ula, 1358 A.H. also reprinted in Mujahid ul Islam 
Qasmi(compiled) Maqalat-e-Sajjad. Patna, 1999. pp. 51-53. 
'' Zia ul Hasan Faruqi, The Deoband School and the Demand for Pakistan. 
Bombay, 1963. pp. 95-96. 
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The Jamiyat-ul-Ulama-e-Hind (JUH), along with many other organizations, 
convened "Azad Muslim Conference" in April 1940 at Delhi. Maulana 
Sajjad also being the provincial leader of the Bihar wing of the Jamiatul 
Ulama (besides the president of Muslim Independent Party of Bihar) 
mobilized the masses to attend the above-mentioned conference. 
It is important to quote some excerpts of the resolutions that were passed in 
the conference. 
"This Conference, representative of Indian Muslims, who desire to 
secure the fullest freedom of the country, consisting of delegates 
and representatives from every province, after having given its 
fullest and more careful consideration to all the vital questions 
affecting the interests of the Muslim community and the country 
as a whole declares the following: 
" India will have geographical and political boundaries of an 
individual whole and as such is the common homeland of all the 
citizens irrespective of race or religion who are joint owners of its 
resource. All nooks and corners of the country are hearths and 
homes of Muslims who cherish the historic eminence of their 
religion and culture, which are dearer to them than their lives. 
From the national point of view every Muslim is an Indian. The 
common rights of all residents of the country and their 
responsibilities, in every walk of life and in every sphere human 
activity are the same. The Indian Muslim, by virtue of these rights 
and responsibilities, is unquestionably an Indian national and in 
130 
every part of the country is entitled to equal privileges with that of 
every Indian national in every sphere of governmental, economic 
and other national activities and in public services. For that very 
reason Muslims own equal responsibilities with other Indians for 
striving and making sacrifices to achieve the country's 
independence. This is a self-evident proposition, the truth of 
which no right thinking Muslim will question. This conference 
declared unequivocally and with all emphasis at its command that 
the goal of Indian Muslims is complete independence along with 
protection of their religious and communal rights, and that they 
are anxious to attain this goal as early as possible. Inspired by this 
aim they have in he past made great sacrifices and are ever ready 
to make greater sacrifices"''. 
Tlie Jamiyat ul Ulema and the Deoband leadership considered the British 
imperiahsm the greatest enemy and seriously suspected a British hand in the 
proposed scheme of the partition of the country and repeatedly warned the 
Muslims of the dangers inherent in it. 
1 hey also warned them that the scheme, if it materialized, would divide the 
Muslim community into three groups and would be more harmful to them 
ihaii to any other community in the sub continent; it would be still more 
Syed Tufail ahmad Manglori, Ruh-e-Raushan Mustaqbil. (Urdu) Badayun, 
1946. pp. 140-41. Also see Z.H. Faruqi, op cit. pp. 96-97. 
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ruinous to that group of Muslims who would be left behind in the Hindu 
province as a smaller and less effective minority'^. 
Thus we see that the Muslim League's two nation theory was subjected to 
severest possible criticism by the Imarat-e-Shariah which was led by the 
President of the Bihar wing of Jamiat ul Ulema, they remained consistent in 
their views even after Maulana Sajjad's death on 18 November 1940. 
In October 1945, the Jamiat ul Ulema-e-Hind (JUH), the Momin Conference 
and the Muslim leaders of the Congress jointly convened a meeting in the 
Khanqah-e-Rahmania of Munger. Here, they reiterated their resolve to 
campaign for the independence of the mulk (Country) and, millat 
(Community). Rs. 1 lakh was collected for the forth-coming elections of 
1946. They vehemently opposed the two-nation theory of the Muslim 
League in these elections''^. 
The Mufti (Expounder of Islamic law) of the Darul ifta, Imarat-e-Shariah 
also came out with afatwa, which declared it un-Islamic to join the Muslim 
League. 
The reason it gave was that the League's claims of protecting and 
representing the siyasi (Political) and mazhabi (Religious) rights were not 
' ^ Hussain Ahmad Madani, Khutbat-i-Sadarat: deliverd at the 13th. session of the 
Jamiat-ul-Ulama at Lahore in March 1942 and cited by Z.H.Famqi, op cit p. 111. 
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rooted in Quran but on the arithmetics of majoritarianism'^. Mohiuddin 
Qadri, (the Naib Amir of Imarat-e- Shariah) and Abdus Samad Rehmani 
(The Successor of Maulana Sajjad after the latter's death on 18 November 
1940) lamented the Pakistan movement and lambasted against Jinnah's lack 
of concern for the Muslims of the aqalliat subas (Muslims Minority 
Provinces). 
"The JUH supported neither Pakistan nor Akhand Bharat but 
mukammal azadi (Complete independence) for all the provinces 
within a loose federation. Pakistan implied not just confining 
Islam to the extremities of the sub continent but abandoning the 
Muslims living in India. It was only in the JUH scheme of things 
that the aqalliat subahs (Muslim minority provinces) would not 
get a raw deal. Both Husain Ahmed Madani, the JUH President, 
and Abdus Samad Rehmani pointed to the Islamic roots of 
muttahidah qaumiyat (composite nationalism) and justified 
deploying it to ensure religious freedom in the forthcoming 
polity"'^ 
The Imarat-e-Shariah also defined the nation, which was patently opposed 
of the way the Muslim League or Hindu Mahasabha sought to define it. The 
Naqeeh, 12 Octobcr, 1945, also cited by Papiya Ghosh, "Muttahidah Qaumiyat 
in Aqalliyat Bihar : The Imarat-e-Shariah, 1921-47, in lESHR, 34,1,(1997) 
Naqeeh. 23, February 1946 
Papiya Ghosh, Muttahidah Qaumiyat in Aqalliat Bihar... op cit, p.8 
also see Naqeeh 23 February,1946 and 11 December, 1946. 
193 
Hindu Mahasabha said that common territory alone could not overcome 
religious, racial and cultural differences. Therefore, according to the Hindu 
Mahasabha, the Hindu nation which was a 5000 years old national being did 
not need the partnership of Muslim who anyway could not authentically 
support territorial nationalism given their extra territorial affiliations because 
the punyabliunii (holy land) of the Muslims lies elsewhere. Whereas the 
linarat-e'Shariah visualized mazhabi azadi as a concomitant of watani 
(territorial) azadi, within the parameters of a loose federation'^. Those who 
lived in the country were a pre-existing nation: 'Kul sarzameen-e-Hind ke 
rahne wale ek qaum ke hain' Not only was the Congress flag regarded as a 
qaiimi and miilki (of the land) flag but Urdu too was characterised as a mulki 
not a mazhabi Zaban"". 
The Muslim League. 
"abstained from mentioning the test of watan (homeland) as the 
basis of a nationhood, which the nationalist Muslims, including 
the Jamiyat-ul-Ulema regarded as being the very love of their 
conception of Indian nationalism. In other words, Mr. Jinnah's 
Nation at this stage, was homeless and was striving to have a 
homeland where as the Jamiat's nation had a home which was 
17 
18 
Naqeeb 19, February, 1945. 
Naqeeh 11, December, 1945 and 8, April. 1945 cited by Papiya Ghosh, 
Muttahidah Qaumiyat... 
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under foreign domination from which it was struggling to free 
itself'"^. 
The Imarat-e-Shariah, while expressing its disapproval against the League 
went to the extent that even post- partition trauma of Muslims was said to be 
due to seven years (i.e. 1940-47) of a wrong struggle of Pakistan. Its organ, 
Naqeeb, editorialised that the house searches (for arms) disloyalty charges 
and, in general, the partitioning of Muslim families were a vindication of 
Husain Ahmad Madani's unheeded advise to the aqalliat subahs that 
Pakistan held nothing for them'®. 
The Imarat-e-Shariah's contestation of the Pakistan Movement, concludes 
Papiya Ghosh, 
"Reveals that it was a singular intervention of the ulama and 
Sufi's acting in tandem. "The combination of the implementation 
of the Shariat with the struggle for Swaraj linked the cultural 
autonomy of the millat with the attainment of freedom for the 
mulk"^'. 
In the region (i.e. Bihar) and the period (i.e. 1940s) under study, apart from 
the Itnarat-e-Shariah, another formidable organization that consistently 
fought against the Muslim League was All India Momin Conference. 
Z.H.Faruqi. op cif, p. 94 
Naqeeb 6,October,1947 
Papiya Ghosh, op cit. 
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This was the "decade when the Muslim League was opposed by the Momin 
Conference to replace the 'Islam in Danger' agenda with one aimed at 
correcting the un-Islamic razil-sharif {Labouring and well born) divide""'. 
To protest against the League's Lahore resolution, not less than forty 
thousand Ansaris/Momins attended the meeting that was held in Delhi in 
April 1940^1 
On 21st April 1940, at Alamganj, (renamed as Mominabad) Patna, a Bihar 
Provincial Momin Conference's meeting was held against the Lahore 
Resolution of League. Here, its leader Abdul Qaiyum Ansari said, 
"It is blasphemy to say that Islam is in danger here. It is a tragedy 
to place orders for a Pakistan for the segregation of Islam. It is a 
defeat of Islam to run away from the battle of life in search of a 
privilege. It is a fantastic wavering of a fevered mind"^" .^ 
Abdul Qaiyum Ansari emphasized that the League's plea of cultural 
dissimilarity between the two communities did not hold any water. He 
dwelled on the defects of Pakistan scheme and said, 
"The scheme would not be able to protect the Muslims of the 
minority provinces as they would remain in the hands of the 
majority community with the difference that Muslims would have 
"Papiya Ghosh, "Partition's Biharis" in Mushirul Hasan (ed.), "Islam, 
Communities and the Nation", Delhi 1998. p.232 
Ali Anwar, "Masawat Ki Jung (Hindi), Delhi 2001. p. 111 
The Searchlight, 23April, 1940 
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no control over the administration of the province which they have 
got in the present state of affairs. 
The plea that Muslim states in India would protect the Muslim 
minority province was utterly useless. Even today there were 
Muslim states of Afghanistan, Turkey, Persia and many others but 
they could not interfere in the matters of India even on the 
complaints made by the League that Muslims were being crushed 
by the Hindus. In the same way the Pakistan states would also be 
unable to do anything. And the plea was simply meant to hide the 
reality and hoodwink the Muslims of minority provinces"^^ 
He further said that even the Muslims in general would not be in a better 
position even it the scheme materialized. The Pakistan states would be 
scattered in the East, North-West and the extremes of North and the Hindus 
would be able to make a compact state, organized on a sound basis. If 
antagonized, the Hindu states would prove a great menace to the Muslim 
culture and language for the protection of which the League had been crying 
hoarse. Ansari also warned that Urdu and religious monuments and places 
would suffer in Hindu majority provinces. That Islamic religious places like 
mosques will suffer more. (After Pakistan is made, and Muslims migrate to 
Pakistan). This was in the psyche of the Muslims which finds expression 
''Ibid. 
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also in the character, Kammo Miyan of Rahi Masoom Raza's famous Hindi 
novel Aadha Gaon'^'. 
The apprehensions of a minority against the majority have been always 
argued. 
In the same meeting of Bihar Provincial Momin Conference, another leader 
Zahirul Haq pointed out that: 
"Freedom of the Islamic world in India depends to a great extent 
upon the freedom of the country as a whole. Had the question of 
partition been of any advantage for the Muslims, the Chinese 
Muslims would have been first to propose it because they were 
on only seven crores out of total population of forty crores"" . 
The meeting of the Momins declared that the entire community of Momins 
intended opposing the partition tooth and nail and that since the Muslim 
League did not represent the Momins it did not have the right to decide their 
fate. It was also pointed out that even in the Muslim majority provinces, 
He says, "O Mister When Muslims will migrate to Pakistan, then whether a 
horse is kept in the mosque or a cow is kept there it won't make any difference. 
Hindus won't offer prayer in those mosques, this is illogical that we migrate to 
Pakistan and expect Hindus to take care of the mosques". Rahi Masoom Raza , 
Aadha Gaon, Hindi Novel, Delhi 1998, p.245. 
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Momins and other working class Muslims were regarded and treated as 
razil. There was, therefore, no logic in supporting Pakistan. 
To the Momin conference, the slogan of Islam in Danger was nothing but a 
ploy to distract the Momins from being organized. The Momins were 
advised to stay away from the upper caste led capitalist and power hunting, 
Muslim League. At Muzaffarpur, in a meeting of the district Momin 
conference, all Ansaris were urged to resist the Muslim League^^. 
At the Shahabad meeting of District Momin Conference every true Momin 
had to do everything to make the Un- Islamic Muslim League non-existent^^. 
Qaiyum Ansari's speech at Patna (on 21st April 1940) had baffled the 
Muslim League as the idea of Pakistan was declared to be a defeat for Islam 
by Mr. Ansari. 
Another leader of the Momin conference was Asim Bihari. He said that the 
Momins had no religious linguistic or cultural fears. Whereever they lived 
was their Pakistan. Similar reaction came from A.A. Muhammad Noor. He, 
while addressing the All India Momin Youth Conference meeting at Patna, 
said that the Pakistan Scheme is un Islamic and absolutely impracticable. 
^^ The Searchlight, 23 April, 1940. 
^^ The Searchlight, 2 March, 1940. 
The Searchlight, 22 June, 1940. 
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That it was nonsensical to work to divide India because intermingled 
existence of the communities in country was the only reality. 
In October 1939, A. Q. Ansari had written to Rajendra Prasad craving his 
indulgence, 
"to guard against the numerous injustices, humiliation, and 
indignities meted out to the Inferior-groups of Muslims"^®. 
in the same letter to Rajendra Prasad he also explained the aims and objects 
of the Momin conference, (Founded in 1925 and with branches in many 
districts and in almost all provinces) and goes on saying that, 
"the Momin conference is quite distinct and separate from the All 
India Muslim League in which the Momins (Ansaris) as a 
community have neither faith nor confidence because the League 
is run. controlled and manned chiefly by such Muslims as 
belonging to the rich section or the superior group (ashraf), whose 
interests are obviously antagonistic to those of the poorer section 
or the inferior group of Muslims. The Momins who are poor, 
backward and downtrodden can naturally have nothing to do with 
such a body as the Muslim League".'^' 
30 A.Q.Ansari to Rajendra Prasad, Jawahar Lai Nehru Papers. Vol.136, Date 30 
October 1939. also in S A I Tirmizi (ed.) The Paradoxes of Partition . Delhi 1998 
" Ihid. (Vol. 1.1937-1939), pp-781 -785. 
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He further clarifies that the Muslims in India are divided into two main 
groups, i.e. Shareef (Superior or high) and Razeel (Inferior or low). Again in 
December 1939, he writes another letter to Jawahar Lai Nehru, saying, 
"History and experience have taught the Momins not to trust any 
organization mainly manned and managed by the upper class Muslims. The 
32 
Muslim League is evidently one such institution . 
He further says, 
"Temperamentally the Momins are God fearing and freedom 
loving and it is no wonder that a majority of the thinkers among 
them trust the Indian National Congress and the Jamiat ul Ulama 
more than the Muslim League". 
The British government kept a watch over these developments and the anti-
League attitude of the Momin Conference and Jamiat ul Ulema had been 
reported in the fortnightly reports on the political events in Bihar (July 
1938). It was noted that the meetings of the Momins continued to dissociate 
themselves form the Muslim League and that there was a meeting of Jamiat 
ul Ulema at Bettiah, which condemned the League activities^^. 
'-J.L.Nehru Papers, Vol. 136, pp-10-14. also SAI Tirmizi (ed). Op cit. pp-877-79. 
' ' Home Political. F.18-7/38. Dated 25 July 1938. Govt, of Bihar, Political Deptt, 
Special section. 
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The fortnightly reports of August 1938, found the League's discomfiture 
over Momins' anti- League approach wherein, a good number of Momins 
had declared their allegiance to the Congress in Saran and Darbhanga. The 
report stated that: 
"There signs of defection are worrying the Muslim League and an 
appeal has recently been issued by some leading Moharmnedans 
of Bihar and Bengal stressing the danger of a split in the 
Mohammedan ranks and urging all Momins to stand together 
against the League"^" .^ 
In a similar vein A.Q. Ansari in his telegrams to Gandhiji and Rajendra 
Prasad in November 1939, had taken note of the growing dissension and 
divide among Muslims. 
He said that the four and a half crore strong Momin community did not 
accept the League as its representative and wanted separate representation in 
all matters^^. They demanded that 50% of the Muslim seats should be 
earmarked for the Momins, with introduction of universal adult suffrage 
with separate representations to Momins in central & provincial legislatures 
as well as in the constituent assembly. Because the electoral roll prepared on 
the basis of property, taxpaying and educational qualifications protected the 
interests of the higher-class Muslim capitalists and landed aristocracy 
Z/j/W. F. 18-8/38. pp-1-2. 
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represented by the Muslim League who besides owning property had very 
high percentage of literacy. This voting qualification would deprive the 
Momins, who were mostly poor, landless labourers and artisans, of the right 
to vote^^ On 27 and 29 December 1939, A.A. Muhammad Noor, MLC 
from Bihar, moved a resolution that the future constitution of the country 
should only be framed by a constituent assembly based on universal adult 
IVanchise with separate electorates for the Momins, which will effectively 
outnumber the Muslims League^^. 
It appears that not only at the level of political meetings of the leaders but 
also at the ground level in the day to day social interactions, the League-
Momin divide was sharpening. 
For example at Tappa Deoraj in Bettiah, the graveyards of Momins were 
desecrated and 'everything was done to wound their feelings by the 
Zamindars who belonged to the Muslim League'. 
A.A. Noor, therefore, moved a resolution to institute an enquiry committee 
to go into the volumes of grievances that these Zamindars had meted out 
The Scarchli}>ht 3 November. 1939. ifi Hasan Nishat Ansari, The Momin-Congress Relation: A Socio-Historical 
Analysis.P-dtnai, 1989. pp. 15-16 
^^  H.N.Ansari, "Momins, Cripps Mission and Aftermath", Journal of the Bihar. 
Research Society (JBRS) 13-14. 1977-1978. pp.-689-90. 
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against the Momins^^. Aminuddin Ahmad of Biharshareef headed the 
enquiry commit tee which reported that some Momins of Deawan (a village 
in Hilsa, Patna) were implicated in f ramed / false case, because they refused 
to give up Momin Conference & switch over to the local unit of the Musl im 
League. Aminuddin Ahmad compared it with the legendary animosity of 
Bani Umayya and Bani Abbasiya of Islamic history. He also made a forecast 
that the Musl im League will finally have to take political retirement and 
withdraw to the homeland it had mapped out in 1940^'^ 
Such kind of oppressions perpetrated by the Ashrafs were reported by 
Maulvi Haf iz Din Muhammad (President of Champaran District Jamiyat ul 
Momineen & also rais of Chainpatia). Hafiz Manzoor Husain at the meeting 
of the Shahabad district unit of Momin conference expressed similar 
grievances'^". 
Momin Conference ' s conflict with the League also manifes ted on the issue 
of census. The Bihar Provincial Musl im League directed the Musl ims to 
enroll themselves as Muslims, their language as Urdu and their religion as 
Islam. In this way the League opposed the entry of individuals under caste 
and sub caste heads. This was contested by the Momin conference. It 
The Searchlight, 24 April, 1940. 
'' Ibid lJune, 1940. 
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interpreted the League's stance in this regard as an obvious attempt to reduce 
the number of Momins in the colonial records. Abdul Qaiyum Ansari , in a 
meeting of Momin conference at Ramda Chapra in December 1940, said that 
this move was directed at depriving the Momins of their rights because the 
Momins , who formed the largest single group among Musl ims, had 
demanded them on the basis of their population. 
The Momin conference therefore called upon all members to be enumerated 
as Momins , and not Musl ims in the for thcoming census i.e. the census of 
1941. Six months before the above-mentioned meeting, Zahiruddin, the 
President of All India Momin Conference had advised that all those who 
described themselves as Ansars, Ansaris, Safed bufs, Niir bufs, Momins or 
Julahas were to return themselves as one community'^'. 
Here it is important to mention that even in the census of 1931, Momins 
were the only biradari for which statistics were tabulated separately"^^. 
Thus the Momin conference in "its at tempts to forge a t ransformat ive razil 
collective" subjected the 5 / ian /pol i t i cs of the Musl im League to interrogtion 
and its "verdict about the homogenis ing politics of the League was that it 
Ibid 22June, 1940. 
^^ Ibid .Also cited by Papiya Ghosh in Mushirul Hasan(ed). Op cit.p.249 
W.G.Lacey, Some Aspects of the Census Operations of 1931 in Bihar and 
Orissa, Patna, 1933. pp-78,104 
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was impossible to coalesce all Muslims on a common pla t fom given the 
divergence between the rich and poor. The very fact that labouring Musl im 
communi t ies other than the Momins had organized themselves was, 
according to the Momin conference, a confirmation of the self ishness of the 
League leadership""^\ 
The Momin conference, therefore, in its attempt to build up a consol idated, 
united const i tuency of razil Muslims against the Sharif politics of Musl im 
league also mobil ized non Momin backward biradahs of Mus l ims viz. 
Rayeens (Vegetable selles and growers), Mansoori (Cotton carders) Idrisis 
(Tailors), Quraishis (Butchers) etc. The attempt of the M o m i n conference to 
mobil ize these social groups was premised on two object ives. First, as their 
total number was 8 out of 9 crores of Indian Musl ims, they could ou tnumber 
and over throw the "capitalist" Musl im League leadership and put India on 
the road to f r eedom and which would mean the ameliorat ion of not only 45 
million Momins but also 35 million other backward Musl ims '^ . Secondly, 
the M o m i n conference also aimed at achieving for the Mus l im depressed 
Papiya Ghosh in Mushirul Hasan (ed). op cit p-249, also see The Searchlight 15 
October 1940. 
This numerical computation has been given by A.Q.Ansari himself {The 
Searchlight FebruarylO, 1940). A. Q. Ansari asserts that the Momins formed 
almost 50% of the total population of the Indian Muslims. Whereas the 1931 
census of Bihar does not show Momin population more than 25% of total Muslims 
of the Bihar as recorded by W. G. Lacey 
206 
classes at least some of the 'privileged treatment, recognit ion and tangible 
amenities ' , that had been given to the scheduled castes among Hindus. 
The newspaper reportings of 1940 wonwards reveal that non Momin 
'backward' biradaris of Muslims had become quite active as well as 
ogranised and were ranged against the Musl im League in 1940s. 
Rayeens first organised themselves in Punjab in April 1915. But in Bihar, 
the Rayeen conference was established on 2 October 1938. Its president was 
Dr. Abdus Shakoor of BiharShareef. 
On January 6, 1940 a meeting of the Rayeen conference was held at Arrah 
under the presidentship of Zainuddin, a pleader of Samast ipur . It was 
at tended by many maulvis, some of them addressed the meet ing also. There 
too, like Momins , Zahiruddin was critical against the Shareef polit ics of the 
Mus l im League. Their main theme was that they had no place in the society 
and that they were treated as inferiors or as low castes. The so called 
shareefs in the Musl ims looked down upon them and treated them worse 
than untouchables. Their numerical strength stood next only to Momins , as 
they counted two and a half crores. In view of their populat ion, their rights 
as Mus l ims must be recognised and their posit ion be brought to the same 
level as the shareefs of the Musalmans . They sounded a note of warning to 
the upper class led Musl im League that they would f ight against them with 
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the combined forces of the so called inferiors and would take the protection 
of the Congress as the Momins had done'^^. 
This needs to be reiterated that jus t a month earlier, on 1 
December 1940, in the very same district of Arrah at a place 
called Ramda Chapra, A.Q. Ansari, while address ing a meet ing of 
the local unit of Momin coference had said, " the Mus l im League 
has miserably failed to achieve its object of ameliorat ing the 
condit ion of the Indian Muslims, because its leadership is in the 
hands of selfish people who are mad after grabbing power , and 
position for themselves while leaving the teeming mill ions of the 
Musl ims to their own fate'^^. 
Similarly, another biradari of Musl ims i.e. Mansoor (Dhunia or Carders) 
had formed an organization, Bihar Provincial Jamiatul Mansoor. 
It was funct ioning since IQSOs"^ .^ 
This Jamiat in Bihar also went along with the Momin Conference dur ing the 
elections of 1946. In the same year, the Hazar ibagh district unit of the 
A 0 
Jamiatul Mansoor passed a resolution against the M u s l i m League . In 
addition to these backward biradaris, a sect of Musl im i.e. shias, major i ty of 
\\ hom are put into the category of Ashraf, also organized themselves as All 
The Searchlight, January 9,1940. 
"Ihid. 1,December, 1940 
^^ Ibid. 13, February, 1940 
Ibid. 14, December, 1946 
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India Shia Political conference." It had its provincial units also. The Bihar 
unit of the Shia Political Conference was led by many notables including Sir 
Sultan Ahmad . In April 1940, the Shia Political Conference had its annual 
meeting at Lucknow. Here Sir Sultan Ahmad of Bihar denounced Jinnah"^^. 
The Bihar unit of the Shia Political Conference had its meet ing at Chapra on 
18th April 1940 which was presided over by Dr. Shabbir Hasan. 
This meet ing was attended by a huge gathering including Yahya Nazim, a 
pleader, Sayyed Hasan Askari, Mozaf fa r Husain, Ali Muzaf fa r , Abdul Aziz 
Ansari etc. 
All of them condemned the League ' s resolution of Lahore^®. It appears that 
the choice of Chapra as its venue was a conscious one. Because four days 
earlier, on 14th of April, the Bihar Provincial Mus l im League had its session 
to mobil ize support for the Lahore resolution and the district unit of the 
League was also planning to have similar meet ing at Chapra . It seems that 
the Shia Political Conference chose the venue of Chapra for a counter 
mobilization against the Lahore Resolution of the Mus l im League. 
On 22nd October 1944, the All India Shia Political Conference working 
commit tee met at Lucknow. Syed Ali Zaheer, the president of the Shia 
Political Conference drafted a letter sending to J innah request ing h im to 
Wicl. 21, April, 1940. 
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"elucidate and define the status of the Shias in the scheme of Pakistan as 
proposed by the Muslim League". 
It said: 
(a) Several attempts have been made to propose from the Muslim 
League's platform that the government in Pakistan should be 
modeled on the lines of the Government that prevailed in 
Arabia just after the Prophet's death. Although it is realized 
that it is not possible to put the clock back by so many years, 
yet it is feared that this may be an attempt to curtail the 
freedom of religious rights and observances, which had been 
enjoyed by the Shia heretofore. 
(b) During election for Muslim seats, it is a very common 
experience of a Shia candidate, whenever he is pitched 
against a Sunni candidate, to find that appeal is made to 
the religious fanaticism of the majority of voters and a 
Shia is defeated merely because he is a Shia. It is a 
common practice on such occasions to allege that a Shia 
because of certain peculiarities of his articles of faith, is 
not a Muslim at all, and as such not entitled to their votes. 
(c) The bitter experience which the Shias had during the 
regime of the Congress in U.P. of the two Congress 
Muslim ministers makes them unwilling to trust 
themselves in future to a similar type of Muslim minister. 
50 Ibid. 
210 
They are afraid that although in Pakistan's provinces there 
will be no Congress ministries, yet the men who will form 
the cabinet may be of the same class and type. 
(d) The Shia Political Conference gives considerate 
importance to its creed of complete independence for India 
and desires to carry on the struggle for it side by side with 
other political bodies in the country, which have the same 
creed. The Shias are convinced that with the freedom of 
the country, Pakistan will also be automatically achieved if 
the majority of Muslims so desired"^\ 
The letter of Syed Ali Zaheer, further demanded from Jinnah some 
assurances for the Shias in his proposed state of Pakistan. 
(1) "That there will be no encroachment on there religious 
freedom and observances in Pakistan and no innovation, 
which will hurt their religious susceptibilities, will be 
inflicted upon them. 
(2) That during elections there should be no propaganda 
directly against the religious beliefs or practices of Shias 
and if there is any such propaganda, then irrespective of the 
proof whether it has affected the result of the election or 
not, the election will be set aside at the instance of the Shia 
candidate. It may be necessary to give guarantee that the 
51 Indian Annual Register (July-December 1944). NMML 
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election rules will be amended to give effect to this 
assurance. 
(3) That the Shias should be guaranteed sufficient number of 
seats in the ministries, legislatures, all elected bodies 
and...in proportion to their population. 
(4) That the All India Muslim League, while fighting for 
Pakistan, will at least simultaneously carry on its struggle 
for independence of the country as a whole and should be 
willing to settle its differences with other political parties in 
order that the movement for the freedom of the country 
may not be jeopardized. It should be realized that insistence 
on the attainment of Pakistan is likely to delay considerably 
both independence and Pakistan"^^. 
Thus we see that the Shia conference was giving primacy to fight for 
complete independence. Secondly they were demanding the kind of 
assurances and constitutional guarantees for Shias in the proposed state of 
Jinnah's Pakistan, which was being demanded by the League from the 
Congress. 
Jinnah's response to this demand of Shias was at best extremely vague. 
Jinnah's letter dated 31 August 1944, read like this. 
50 Ibid. 
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"...the majority of Shias are with the League, and such of them are 
still outside the League under some sort of misapprehension are in 
my opinion, unwise, in not joining the League without any 
reservation, in the interest of the Shias as well as of Muslim India 
generally. The Muslim League stands for fair justice and fairplay, 
and will always stand for these fundamental principles and there is 
no need for the Shias to think that they will not be justly treated by 
the All India Muslim League... 
The League cannot recognize any other political organization. 
Besides, most points that you have raised are matters for the 
Muslims to deal with themselves internally. Other points are 
irrelevant"'' 
Thus. Jinnah refused to give any concrete assurance or guarantee that was 
being demanded by the Shias. 
Quite obviously, the Shia Committee Resolution declared Jinnah's reply to 
be unsatisfactory^'*. 
l^\'en before the League passed its Lahore Resolution, the Shia Political 
Conference was opposed to the League. In the first week of January 1940, 
the Shia Conference had its meeting at Chapra where it had lambasted 
against the League so much so that the Searchlight had to come out in its 




"The proceedings of the All India Shia Political Conference which 
met at Chapra during the weekend - the generality of the Speeches 
and most certainly the resolutions adopted - can leave no doubt on 
anyone's mind that as a Community the Shias are progressive and 
patriotic to the core and that they are anxious to contribute their 
share to fight for achieving freedom for the country"^^. 
In the very same meeting, Maulvi Sajjad (not the Imarat-e-Shariah's Sajjad), 
the Chairman of the Reception Committee of the Shia Political Conference, 
in his welcome address had said: 
"The aim of the Shia Political Conference is to live and die for the 
nation and the country and to do all and stake all for the 
attainment of freedom of our land"^''. 
Another speaker, Syed Haider Mehdi spoke: 
"The Shias must champion all movements based on nationalism and 
patriotism launched by any political party". 
He further prayed for the day when all parties would be merged and there 
would be left only the Indian National Congress as only Indian National 
Congress was for all both Shias, Sunnis, Hindus. 
The Searchlight, January, 4, 1940 
Ibid. 
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The editorial of the Searchlight, commented upon Shias' relationship with 
the League and wrote that: 
"Shias as a body are not with the League and do not want at all to be with 
Kalb-e-Abbas, the President of the Shia Political Conference, addressed the 
meeting. The speech was full of bitter references against the League, almost 
every resolution of the Conference showed opposition to the ideals and 
programmes of the League. He said, 
"Reasonably and logically the Muslim minority can not and 
should not deny to the Shia minority the very same demand which 
it considers essential and indispensable for its protection against 
the Hindu majority, for the only justification for claiming such 
safeguards is the difference of religion and the fear of invasion of 
those rights by the Hindu majority and both these grounds exist 
with equal force in the case of the Shia minority as well". 
He argued that: 
"If the tyranny of the Congress ruled provinces had necessitated 
Royal Commission to go into the grievances of the Muslim 
minority, the Shias can, with greater reason demand that such a 





"If other factors and not merely its numerical strength including 
the political importance of a community in the past play an 
important part in determining the proportion of representation of a 
community then the Shias are entitled to the lion's share of the 
weightage given to the Muslims for the major part of the Indian 
territory was taken possession of by the British from the Shias". 
Having contented in this way, the resolutions passed at the Conference 
repudiated the Muslim League's stand by, "knocking on the head of the 
League". 
They observed: 
"It is necessary in the opinion of the Conference to make it clear 
that the League which has always trampled upon the feeling and 
susceptibilities of the Shia minority claiming in the same breath to 
be the only representative body of the Muslims of India, is utterly 
wrong in its pretensions because, in so far as the Shias are 
concerned, as a sect, they have never considered the League to be 
their representative and they declared that any pact in which the 
League enters into with other bodies without consulting the Shia 
Political Conference, will not be binding on the Shias of India". 
The resolution even questioned the raison d'etre of the separate electorate 
provisions by stating that: 
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"joint electorates are the only panacea for the present evils and 
demands from the British Parliament that in the future 
Constitution of India separate electorates should be abolished and 
joint electorates should be introduced in all the legislatures"^^. 
The resolution went to demand that, "sectarian bias campaigned by a Party 
should be declared a corrupt practice"*"®. 
Having explored and analysed the views and attitude of the Momins, 
Mansoors, Rayeens, Shias etc. against Muslim League's contention for 
separate electorates, we would, similarly, examine the views and attitudes of 
the Muslim leaders of the Indian National Congress. As to, how did they 
react against League's Lahore Resolution, and how did they go to the 
masses, explaining and expressing their reaction against the League? 
in Bihar, during the period under study, Muslims were not in as large a 
number in the Congress as they were during the early decades of the 
twentieth Century. In fact during the first two decades of the twentieth 
Century and at least till middle of 1920s, the Bihar wing of the Congress was 
overwhelmingly led by the Muslims. But by 1940 most prominent Muslims 
in the Congress were Dr. Syed Mahmud, Prof.Abdul Bari, Shah Md. Umair, 




many other Muslim leaders who enjoyed considerable support among 
Muslims of their respective districts. 
Among them we find: Maulvi Ahmad Abdul Ghafoor and Sayeedul Haque 
of Darbhanga, Maulvi Fazlur Rehman of Patna, Quazi Md. Hussain of Gaya, 
Hafiz Md.Sami of Bettiah, Quazi Md. Ilyas of Begusarai, Md. Noor of 
Purnea, Isa Rizvi of Sheikhpura, Sami Nadvi, Rafiuddin Rizvi and Doman 
Babu advocate of Siwan, Syed Md. Aquil of Biharsharif, Dr.Manzoor 
Ahmad of Nawadah, Fida Hussain Ansari of Jahanabad, Wajihuddin Minhaji 
of Gaya, Syed Anisur Rehman of Danapur. Apart from them there were also 
members of the Congress Socialist Party like Abul Hayat Chand Kazmi, 
Razi Azimabadi, Ahad Fatmi, all of them were opponents of the Muslim 
League and its policies. They played a most important role during the 
elections of 1946 and their only objective was to defeat the League and see 
that the Congress nominees, or Congress supported nominees win the 
elections. In this task Abdul Ghafoor of Siwan (future Chief minister of 
Bihar) and Fazlur Rehman of Bettiah who were the members of Forward 
Block, in spite of the fact that the Forward Block was opposed to the 
Congress on ideological grounds, also aided them. We find that among the 
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youth, Zawar Hussain Karbalai of the All-India Students' Federation had 
also campaigned for the Congress candidates during the elections of 1946^'. 
Syed Mahmud, reacting sharply against the League's Lahore Resolution, 
said, 
"The two nation theory and partition scheme does not have any 
historical background. It will benefit not the Hindus nor the 
Muslims but the British alone"''". 
While persuading the people to attend the Conference of nationalist Muslims 
scheduled to be held at Delhi in 27 -29 April 1940, Prof. Abdul Bari, Anisur 
Rehman, S.H.Razi etc. made an appeal that: 
"All the freedom loving patriotic Muslims mu.st attend the meeting to defeat 
reactionary and disruptive forces of Muslim Communalism"^"\ 
The Bihar Provincial Student Conference too convened a meeting at 
Darbhanga to record their resentment and protest against the Muslim 
League's resolution of Lahore. The meeting was held in April 1940 and 
presided over by Md. Faruque whereas Jawahar Lai Nehru came to 
• 64 maugurateit . 
61 Taqi Raheem, op cit p.499 
The Searchlight, April 5,1940. 
49 
Ibid. April 6,1940. 
Ibid. April 9,1940. 
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In Patna "Hindustan Day" was celebrated which strongly denounced the 
Pakistan scheme. Addressing the meeting, Prof. Abdul Bari criticized the 
Muslim League for taking up issues, which have no constructive 
programme. He pertinently remarked: 
"That movement alone can stay which aims at developing the 
latent potentialities of a people to their fullest limit with a view to 
their self realization, that movement alone can stay which tries to 
solve the problems of poverty, illiteracy, disease, works for 
economic emancipation of the masses. None of the movements 
that have been started amongst Muslims had these aims in view. 
The Khilafat agitation, separate electorates. Fourteen points, 
Pakistan scheme all is bound to collapse"^^. 
Abdul Bari further observed, "as all had gone their way and receded into the 
background so also the partition plan of India can not live for long. Where is 
the basis for the plan to stand upon? He questioned and proceeded to say that 
the League "aims at safeguarding the cultural, religious and linguistic 
interests of the Muslims. But where are those interests in danger? The 
Hindus and the Muslims of Bengal speak the same language. Their dress, 
manners, and customs are alike so is in the Punjab". 
At Sonepur, while delivering a speech on Minority Problem in India, 
organized by the Satyagraha Training Camp, Prof. Abdul Bari laid emphasis 
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on making direct approach to the Muslim masses, in order to defeat the 
League's designs. 
He said, 
"I do not expect much from the Nationalist Muslim Conference to 
be held at Delhi and I do not like that it should be carried too far. 
Direct approach to the Muslim masses is only remedy"^^. 
He pointed out that the League was in the hands of the reactionaries and 
advised the Congress workers to select a district for an experiment and carry 
an intensive propaganda amongst the Muslim masses to defeat the 
reactionary designs of the League^^. 
In this regard efforts were made even months before the Lahore Resolution 
of the League, the leadership had tried its best to keep Muslims away from 
the League. In January 1940, the news that Arab Muslims denounced Jinnah 
and his separatist politics, was given a considerable space in the 
Searchlight^^. 
It reported that, 
"High Arab leaders are of one mind in deploring Jinnah's uncalled 
for and baseless demonstrations. Jinnah's sense of proportion as 
well as political timing is disastrously at fault". 
''' Ibid. April 21,1940 
IhicL April 26,1940. 
" llml. 
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The statement of the Arab Muslims that "Cause of Islam will suffer if 
Muslims play into the hands of British" was made the highlight of 
newspaper with sub-heading, "Grand Mufti's nephew supports Congress 
demand - Free India would contribute to liberation of Islam in Arabia. With 
such kind of heading and sub-heading the news item read like this: 
"That the Congress demand for self determination has the warmest 
support of all Palestinian Arabs, that India's freedom would 
powerfully contribute to the cause of Islamic nations of Syria, 
Palestine, Trans Jordan and indeed all the Arab world, that 
Congress stand was not only entirely just but also precisely the 
same as Durs, that Arab leaders would welcome the visit of a 
Congress leaders and that "Pan- Islamism "of which so much is 
heard in India, finds absolutely no echo in the heart of the patriotic 
Arabs, are the views of Musa Hussain, nephew of Grand Mufti, 
and cousin of Jamal Hussain, a member of the higher 
Committee..." 
Such was the categorical denunciation of the Muslim League by the Arab 
leaders and it was widely reported by most of the leading daily newspapers 
of Bihar. What impact it had on the attitude of the Muslims, don't find any 
concrete evidence. But it is evident that the leaders had tried to use the anti 
Ibid. January 13,1940 
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League stance of the Arab leaders to convince Muslims that their views have 
their support to our stand against League's Lahore resolution. 
Dr. Maghfoor Ahmad Ajazi of Muzaffarpur had gone from door to door to 
campaign against League's Lahore Resolution. Although, by 1940, Dr. Ajazi 
had (because of a variety of reasons) got disillusioned from the Congress; 
the organization that he had built up so assiduously in the district of 
Muzaffarpur. He had openly opposed Jinnah's two-nation theory with the 
strongest force at his command. He formed All India Jamhoor Muslim 
League, precisely to contest the League's separatism. He continued with his 
campaign till last. Even in 1947, when due to prolonged and recurrent riots, 
Muslims started planning to migrate from Bihar, he, along with his 
companions like Gharibul Hasan (Head Maulvi, Marwari School, 
Muzaffarpur), Haji Abdus Salam (Mutawalli, Jama Masjid, Company Bagh, 
Muzaffarpur), Dr. Ali Reza Quadri, Haji Ramzan Ali, Md.Yusuf Halwai, 
Mehmood Karim Baksh Book seller etc. traveled from village to village on 
bicycles and persuading them that Pakistan will not have another God to 
save their life, property and honour. Confronting them with such religious 
idioms, he kept on persuading people against League's idea of separate 
nationhood. He used to mobilize people around mosques and addressed with 
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a view to acquaint and make people realize them against the inherent flaws 
in Jinnah's League resolution affecting the Muslims of Bihar^^. 
In this way, the Muslim League's resolution was contested, resisted and 
opposed by many Muslim Organizations and popular and known individual 
Muslim leaders associated with and representing various Muslim 
organizations. In spite of this, in 1944, during Gandhi - Jinnah talks, 
Gandhiji had conceded that the League was the most powerful Muslim 
organization and that in the capacity of being the president of the Muslim 
League, Jinnah was the representative of Indian Muslims^®. 
Evidently, the Momin conference was quite baffled at this kind of status 
being granted to Jinnah by no less a person than Gandhiji. As early as 1939, 
the Momin conference had put forward six points demand before the 
Congress. 
It was contented by the votaries of the Momin conference and many others 
that if the Congress had responded to the six point demands positively then 
"League's poisonous fangs would have been destroyed automatically"^ ^  
Interview with Dr.Ajazi's son Asghar Ajazi in December 2000. See also, 
Maghfur Ajazi Papers. (NMML, New Delhi). I am thankful to Mr. Asghar Ajazi to 
give me a copy of the papers. 
Pyarelal. Mahatma Gandhi: The Last Phase. Ahmedabad.1956, vol. I p.89. 
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The six demands of the Momin Conference were: 
1. One Minister, at least, of the Central (or federal) Governments is taken 
f r o m the Momin Community . 
2. Fif ty percent of the seats in the Central (or Federal) legislatures and in 
each of the provincial legislatures reserved for the Musl ims be allotted to 
and reserved for the members of the Momin Communi ty . 
3. Seats in Local Se l f -Goveming and civic bodies be reserved for the 
members of the Momin Communi ty proportionate to their populat ion in 
the area served by such body. 
4. Appointments in Government and Semi Government services be reserved 
for the Momins in proportion to their population. 
5. Special facilities be provided by Government for impart ing general as 
well as technical education to Momins boys and girls. 
6. State protection and State aid be provided for the handloom textile 
industry owned and carried on by the Momins . 
It was fur ther made clear that, "the Momins will be the first to denounce the 
reservations in the above demands of their object ive of 'Happier and Free 
India ' and 'Truly Democratic Islamic Society ' is duly achieved. 
The reservations are means to an end and not end by themselves"^^. 
Judging the implications of the Six-Point demand, it has been argued that: 
' Ali Anwar, Masawat Ki Jung: Pas-e-Manzar - Bihar ke Pasmanda Musalman 
(Hindi), Delhi, 2 0 0 1 . p - l l l 
''' Jawahar Lai Nehru's Papers. Vol.136, pp-10-14. Letter from Abdul Qaiyum 
Ansari to J.L.Nehru dated 8 December. 1939 and letter from Abdul Qaiyum Ansari 
to Rajendra Prasad dated 30 October. 1939. 
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"If the Congress leaders would have accepted these demands by 
making some amendments so as to include other i/a/iY-backward 
Mus l im biradaries, then the League's dream of making Pakis tan 
would have never succeeded because when the <ia/i?-backward 
Musl ims would have got an option to chose be tween the League 
and its opponents , backward Musl ims, they would have chosen 
the la ter" ' ' . 
Any sectional demand appeared to have no force to s tem the tide on which 
The Musl im League had set its sail. 
Similar kind of observation had been made by Dr. Ram Manoha r Lohia . He 
narrates, 
" 1 got an interesting viewpoint f rom one Mughal Mian of Patna. 
He is a julaha by caste, who never deviated f r o m the path of 
nationalism. In fact, backward castes of Musl ims in general have 
remained aloof from the Muslim League. Except during riots they 
were never excited. Even during riots very few of them were 
excited. 
Occasionally, the Indian National Movement did adopt a pol icy of 
encouraging the backward Musl ims and the Momin , but this 
policy was .so full of tricky manipulat ions that it failed to give 
satisfactory results. If these backward castes would have been 
encouraged by the Indian National Movement to annihilate the 
73 All Anwar, op cit. p. 111. 
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Caste system and if this policy would have been brought properly 
into practice, at least since the Non Co-operation Movement, then 
India would have not been partitioned"''*. 
Such an analysis of detecting the guilty men responsible for the ultimate 
partition of India, apparently, was more polemical than offering any 
historical explanation. 
The Condemnation of the Muslim League by the Momin Conference during 
the election Campaign of 1946 seems more interesting and worth 
mentioning over the developments: 
"Condemnation of the Sharif viewpoint of the League remained a 
major electoral thrust of the Momin Conference in 1946. Thus, a 
leaflet of the Momin Students' Federation in Dehri-On-Sone 
(Abdul Qaiyum Ansari's hometown) deployed a narration of the 
situation in Latifur Rehman Ansari's Zamindari in the village 
Nagmatia (in Gaya) to embarrass the Momin supporters and 
candidates of the League. It carried a mention of Rehman insisting 
on forced labour from his biradari and extorting fowl from his 
tenants and neglecting the fate of the Momins during Yam famine. 
A pamphlet in support of Ramzan Ali, a Momin Conference 
candidate, "Zila Palamau ke Momin Biradari Se Appeal" 
circulated that the Momin Panchayats had decided against voting 
for the League which was being openly funded by Bhaiya Saheb 
whose Zamindari covered much of the district. The Palamu 
74 Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia, Bharat Vihhajan Ke Gunahgar (Hindi) p.58 
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Momin Conference Campaign was directed against the vagueness 
of the Pakistan Scheme and the abolition of the Zamindari 
System. 'Momin Conference Zindabad' an election pamphlet 
during the rounds of Manbhum and the Jharia Coal fields, 
summed up that it was the 'five crore' Momin nation' that the 
League wanted to obliterate. Predominantly an organisation of 
nawabs and Khan bahadurs, the League had only ' a look of 
contempt ' for them. The Momins had 'an immense numerical 
superiority' which was not to be wasted, or else their fate would be 
sealed for ever"^"\ 
The nationalist Muslim organizations in Bihar were so much strong that 
rather than the Congress, the leaders of the Imarat-e-Shariah, Jamiatul 
Ulama and Momin Conference were looking after the entire affair of the 
election campaign of 1946. (This was true at least for the Muslim seats.) The 
most prominent leaders were Maulana Shah Mohiuddin Quadri, {Sajjada 
nashin of khanqah-e-Mujeebia,Fhu\v/Sin Shareef. He was also the Amir of 
Iniarat-e-Shariah.) He was assisted by Maulana Usman Ghani, Quazi 
Ahmad Hussain, Maulana Abdus Samad Rehmani. They were supporting 
Congress quite openly. From the platform of Jamiat ul Ulama, Maulana 
Nooruddin Bihari, Maulana Fakhruddin (of Gaya), Abdul Wahab (of 
Papiya Ghosh, "Partitions Biharis" in Mushirul Hasan (ed) Islam, Communities 
and Nation. Pp. 247-48. Ghosh cites many archival sources including the 
pamphlets that have been mentioned. 
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Darbhanga), worked hard for Congress during the elections. The local units 
of Imarat-e-Shariah were the only organisational machineries upon which 
the Congress Solely depended for its campaign in Muslim reserved 
constituencies. 
Abdul Qaiyum Ansari, through his formidable organization (Momin 
Conference) was assisted by capable leaders like Ahad Mohammad Noor, 
Hafiz Manzoor, Shafiqullah Ansari, sami Nadvi, Rezaur Rehman Ansari, 
Amanat Ali Ansari etc. Interestingly, we find that just on the eve of the 
elections, even the Jamaat-e-Islami had turned against the Muslim League, 
despite the fact that Maulana Maududi, the founder of Jamaat-e-Islami, had 
supported the two-nation theory very vigorously in the beginning. While 
vehemently opposing the League, Maulana Maududi went to the extent that 
he lashed out Jinnah and his personal life and the idea of Pakistan'^. 
We find that all the leading Muslim organizations of Bihar with 
commendable mass base were up against the Muslim League. So much so 
that the Momin Coference, the Imarat-e-Shariah/Jamiat ul Ulama and even 
the Congress also, were quite optimistic about the end result. 
Taqi Raheem op cit. p.494 
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"There was a fair degree of hope about winning seats in the provincial 
elections if extensive propaganda was done"^^. 
As the election came closer by March 1946 the optimism began to 
evaporate. Even then, as late as 2 March 1946, Rajendra Prasad expected the 
Congress and its allies in the nationalist Muslim organizations to win about 
fifty percent of the Muslim seats in Bihar . When the result came out, 
thirty-four seats out of forty seats were bagged by the League. 
The results belied the hopes and came as a big shock to all those who had 
taken stand against the Muslim League. 
How did it happen? 
Several factors were responsible for it. It has been argued that had there been 
a universal adult franchise then it would have been impossible for the 
Muslim League to divide the country. In fact, on the issue of Pakistan, 
common Muslims rooted in their home were not allowed to give their 
opinion. They were deprived of franchise, yet the elections of 1946 were 
made to be a kind of referendum for Pakistan. 
"It would, therefore, be proper to say that the common Muslims 
are not responsible for the Partition. Dalit and backward Muslims 
particularly Moniins (Ansahs), who constituted the overwhelming 
^^  Sucheta Mahajan, Independence and Partition: The Erosion of Colonial Power 
in India. New Delhi 2000 . pp-214-215 
^^  Rajendra Prasad to Sardar Patel. Rajenda Prasad Papers. 7-5/45-6 
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majority of Muslims, were opposed to the Partition. It is said tiiat 
majori ty of Musl ims called arzal and ajlaf did not have vot ing 
rights. Franchise was given to ashrafs, nawabs, jagirdars, mis 
who voted for Musl im League"^^. 
In fact the Musl im League was supported only by a section of Mus l im 
ashruf. 
The fact that out of the total population of India ( including Hindus and 
80 
Muslims) only 13% of India's population had the right of vote . 
The franchise was restricted and based on property qualif icat ion. Only those 
people had right to vote who could pay Rs. 64 per annum as malguzari, Rs. 81 
1.25 as chowkidari tax, matriculate men and literate w o m e n . Elect ions 
always seem unpredictable that even an ardent nationalist like Professor 
Abdul Bari had lost the election in 1946, may be in the changed a tmosphere 
because of his nationalist views 
Among other reasons advanced for the drubbing of nationalist Mus l im C T 
organizat ions was that they had scarce resources to contest the elect ions . 
Momins were a poor community; similar was the posit ion of Jamiat ul 
Ali Anwar, op cit p. 114. 
Ibid. p. 115 
" Ibid. p. 115 
Rajendra Prasad, Autobiof^raphy. Bombay, 1957. 
^^  Rajendra Prasad to Patel. 7 Nov. 1945. Rajendra Prasad Papers. File No. 7-5/45-
46. National Archives of India. New Delhi 
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ulama/Imarat-e-Shariah leaders. Financial constraints did play a role in final 
outcome of the elections. The leaders were aware and had corresponded with 
congress leaders for help and support. 
"The amount of expenditure on Muslim seats, Rs. 2,63,575, 
amounted to three fourths of the total amount spent. The President 
of Chandi Thana District Congress Committee, Abu Nasr Abdul 
Baes, had suggested to Rajendra Prasad that Rs. 10000 be 
allocated for every Muslim seat and all the seats be contested by 
the Congress". 
But this request was turned down. Had it been accepted, politically it would 
have been a better proposition. That would have been better investment, as 
the Congress message would have reached much more deeper into the 
Muslim masses*^ "^ . 
In Laheriasarai, in order to counter the League propaganda, a local Muslim 
resident, S. Haq wrote to Rajendra Prasad making an urgent demand for 
money to "create a patriotic atmosphere" in the province^^. A nationalist 
Muslim of Patna, named Yunus suggested to earmark a fund so that 2000 
Sucheta Mahajan. op cit. P-215. She cites Rajendra Prasad Papers. 9-R/45-6., 
Also see She Kewajima. op cit. P-198. 
S.Haq to Rajendra Prasad, 19 Feb. 1946, R.P.Papers. F.no.9-R/45-6. 
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boys may tour the province. And Yunus made this suggest ion, months 
86 
before the election . 
But all these requests of the Musl im leaders of the Congress to contest the 
1946 elections remained unheeded. 
Yet another reason was that the Congress and the Nationalist Mus l im 
organizat ions could not arrive at a proper co ordination with each other. 
Despi te having formed a nationalist Musl im Board, they could not come out 
with a jo in t manifesto. Hence, the failure to come out with a c o m m o n 
manifes to led to "confused, unco-ordinated, joint campaign with the 
nationalist Mus l ims" in the election*^^. 
Moreover , the nationalist Musl ims in order to wri te of f the League 
propaganda of discriminations against Musl ims demanded some assurances 
f rom the Congress , which it refused. These demands included employment 
quotas, the appointment of a Musl im teacher in primary schools , special 
quazi courts etc. The President of the Musl im Parl iamentary Board , Quazi 
Ahmad Hussa in Saheb had recommended that the Congress should make 
these promises in a joint manifesto. His argument was that wi thout such 
Yunus to Rajendra Prasad. 10 Dec. 1945, ibid 
^^  Rajendra Prasad to Patel 8 March. 1946. R.P.Papers 7-5/45-6. 
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88 assurances he could not succeed in pushing out the League . The Congress, 
unfortunately, refused to concede such a demand. Rajendra Prasad argued 
that only this much could be ensured that the Muslims will have liberty to 
89 
pursue religious education and nothing more . 
The nationalist Muslim organizations of Bihar like Imarat-e-Shariah were 
warning the Congress, right since 1939 about the alienation of the Muslims 
against the Congress. Even then, the Congress was not looking into the 
matter with as much of seriousness as it was warranted. That's why a 
nationalist Muslim of Patna, Yunus, had to say that, "Nobody is to be 
blamed except the Congress for it talks and writes about Muslim mass 
contact but does nothing"^®. 
The letter written by Maulana Abul Mohasin Mohd. Sajjad {Naib Amir-e-
Shariat of Imarat-e-Shahah and President of Jamiat-ul-Ulama-e-Bihar) in 
November 1939 reveals that the Congress was being warned since 1939 to 
look into the matter of Muslim alienation on a priority basis. This letter, 
consisting of several pages, was addressed to the Congress leadership for 
Qa/i Ahmad Hussain of Phulwari Sharif to Rajendra Prasad. 22 Nov. 1945. Ibid. 
5-RP/PSF(l) 1945 cf. Sucheta Mahajan op cit. p.215. 
Rajendra Prasad to Maulana Azad. 19 December, 1945. ibid 
"" Yunus to Rajendra Prasad. 10 Dec. 1945. Ibid 9-R/45-6. Col.l 
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self- introspection and it was not the intention of the writer to make it public 
so that the League may not make a dirty use of it. 
He said, 
"s ince 1920, the present leaders of the League have been opposing 
(the Congress) , but this opposition was never so severe. Most of 
the Musl ims now entertain a genuine and sincere aversion for the 
C o n g r e s s " " . 
He fur ther said, "It is an imperative call of the t ime that the responsible 
leaders of the Congress and the members of the working Commit tee should 
deeply probe into the matter... ' in order to find out the root cause of all the 
present discontent" '^l 
The letter demanded that, 
"what is needed most is that responsible leaders of the Congress 
should be bold enough to plead guilty for such errors which may 
be defini tely proved to exist, and should declare their firm 
determinat ion not to let them recur again; and that no t ime should 
be spent to redress such wrong"^^. 




In the letter he went on to say that the choice of Shri Krishna Sinha (rather 
than Syed Mahmud) as the Premier of Bihar while format ion of ministry in 
1937, Bihar Assembly failing to nominate even a single Mus l im 
representative in Bihar Council and ignoring the able leadership of S.M. 
Omair and launching Musl im mass contact only half heartedly, all had 
contr ibuted to Musl im alienation. There should have been only 'Mass 
Contact ' as there was nothing like Hindu Mass Contact , Christ ian Mass 
contact , Sikh Mass Contact^'^. After accepting the ministry "the Congress 
commit ted innumerable blunders": 
" In Bihar when Rural Development Department was started, fo r 
two long years not a single Musl im was appointed as an o f f i ce 
bearer. The chief organizer, Asst. organizer, and Super intendent 
were all Hindus. 
Even clerks were all of one and the same communi ty . It did a 
great harm to the prestige of the Congress"^^. 
In the letter there are many more grievances recorded against the Congress 
about Urdu and Urdu med ium schools. The letter also said that the leaders of 
the nationalist Mus l im organizations keep informing the Congress work ing 





Moreover , even in 1937, when the Musl im Mass Contact was launched, an 
ef fec t ive pamphlet written by Maulana Azad could not be publ ished and 
distr ibuted due to constraint of funds^^. 
Besides the plea of lack funds, it also failed because the Congress right-
wingers "girded themselves to resist the campaign that threatened their 
political dominance". . . . With Mass Contacts making rapid progress, they 
were now faced with the cheerless prospect of yet another Musl im inf lux" 
into the Congress . The local/District Congress Commit tees remained idle. 
Most of the leaders of the Bengal P C C remained reluctant to pursue the 
Mass Contacts Campaign. In these effor ts they were aided and supported by 
the Hindu Mahasabha also. It was their calculated strategy to starve Mass 
Contact Commit tee of funds , to fill them with their trusted l ieutenants, and 
to ensure that Musl ims were kept out of Provincial and District Conmii t tees . 
Men wi th anti Musl im proclivities w h o had close l inks with the Hindu 
Mahasabha and other overtly communal organizat ions control led mos t of the 
Provincial and District Committees, and also they were involved in many 
communa l violence. And thus, "by letting the Mass Contacts Campaign 
peter out . Congress allowed Jinnah, perhaps involuntari ly, to take advantage 
of deteriorat ing communal relations and rally his communi ty around the 
96 Mushirul Hasan(ed), India's Partition: Process Strategy and Mobilization, OUP, 
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divisive symbol of a separate Muslim homeland, and about which 
K.M.Ashraf had to say later that 'due to such failures on the part of the 
Congress, the Muslim League turned overnight, into a full fledged 
manager'^^. 
From 1937 to 1945, along all these 8 or 9 years, the agenda of Muslim Mass 
Contact Programme remained absent from the Congress priority. Again, on 
the eve of election in 1946 the "Muslim mass contact was brought out from 
the cupboard where it had been stashed away a decade ago and dusted and 
readied for use"'^ **. 
Jayprakash Narayan makes a similar observation in his ''Note on Communal 
Question''. He suggests the Congress to take up the tasks like economic 
betterment of Muslims, their representation in Congress Committees 
ensuring a share for Muslims in licenses, contracts, jobs, support to 
nationalist Muslims etc. where were, according to Mr. J.P.Narayan, all 
desirable, most necessary^^. 
Despite all the above factors that contributed to loss of Congress/Nationalist 
Muslim organizations and victory for the League in 1946, the mere electoral 
Delhi 1993. pp. 149-59. 
A ICC Papers No. 11/1937 also see Mushirul Hasan, "The Muslim Mass Contact 
Campaign: Analysis of a Strategy of Political Mobilization" in Mushirul Hasan 




victory for the League did not make Pakistan a reality . Pakistan was made 
a reality only by the colonial masters and all varieties of communalism, 
which got prodding and encouragement from the colonial state. In Bengal, it 
was Muslim League's "Direct Action" which perpetrated most heinous 
bloodshed against Hindus. 
While In Bihar, it was Hindu reaction of taking revenge of Noakhali that 
slaughtered thousands of Muslims and rendered many more of them 
homeless; forcing them to migrate towards Bengal. It was this forced 
migration, which made the League's design to succeed. 
But in Bihar, much more baffling was the fact that, most of riotous mobs 
were attended and even led by the Congressmen. 
In Patna, the ami Noakhali meeting (25 October 1946) that precipitated the 
outbreak of riots on the following day was organized by Jagat Narayan Lai, 
who was the leading Congressman of the district. Some Congressmen, in 
fact confessed before Gandhi admitting their participation in the riot'®'. 
Wavell also testified the complicity of the Congressmen in the riots. He 
' Sucheta Mahajan. op cit. p.219 
'''' AICC Papers. G-36/1946. 
Sucheta Mahajan. op cit. P-219. 
"" Pyarelal, Mahatma Gandhi: The last Phase, vol. I, Ahmedabad, 1956, pp.624-
27) 
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noted that, in Bihar, the lower strata of the Congress planned the 
outbreaks'®^. 
Jawahar Lai Nehru also had to confess to Sardar Patel that the Congress-run 
administration and many party members had also succumbed to Hindu 
communalism. He reported the involvement of some Congressmen with 
Hindu Mahasabha inclination 
The Muslim League also knew that despite its electoral victory, at least in 
Bihar, it was not going to have a formidable mass base. Since its foundation 
in Bihar, the Bihar Provincial Muslim League (BPML) had toed somewhat 
different line from that of the All India Muslim League, 
^ h i s difference was also reflected in 1940s when the BPML had demanded 
partition of Bihar on religious lines rather than supporting Jinnah's 
Pakistan'^. Hence, League was quite desperate to make its further inroads 
among Muslims. It was only after the October 1946 (when riots started) that 
"the League extracted the utmost political mileage from the riots and turned 
it to cormnunal ends. The exodus of refugees into Bengal was influenced, if 
^^ ^ N. Mansergh, Transfer of Power. Vol. IX, p. 140. New Delhi, 22 November. 
1946; Wavell - Pethik Lawrence) 
'"•^Nehru to Patel. 5 November 1946. Durga Das (ed) Sardar Pat el's 
Correspondence 1945-50. Vol.3, p. 165. Also see CID, SB, 40 (A), 1946, Top 
Secret, (November 1946. G. O. Patna, DIG-CID) 
K.K. Dutta, History of Freedom Movement of Bihar vol. III. Patna 1957. p. 
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not organized, by the League" Free land and houses were promised in 
Bengal and people left their homes even in those areas, which had remained 
relatively unaffected by the riots. About 60,000 refugees left Bihar between 
the third week of November and the end of December 1946'°^. The League 
volunteers were active in distributing relief in Bihar. 
No less a person than Sardar Patel refused to send any team of relief workers 
to Bihar. Patel had arranged funds for N.S. Gill and a batch of 100 men of 
the Indian National Army for their programme of relief work in Noakhali. 
But he disapproved of Gandhi's agreeing to send Gill and his party to Bihar 
to serve the Muslims and establish their credentials. 
He went on to say quite insensitively "there is no trouble in Bihar"'®^. 
Thus, in Bihar, the Congress had got communalized on Hindu lines. The 
viceroy was emphatically of the opinion that the lower strata of the Congress 
were responsible for the killings in U.P and Bihar, "And they were 
undoubtedly organized, and organized very thoroughly, by the supporters of 
the Congress"'°l 
Nehru to Suhrawardy, 1 January 1947. SWJN 2nd. Series Vol.1, p. 104. also see 
Sucheta Mahajan op cit. p.264. 
Rajendra Prasad Papers. 6-B/46, Part 1, S.No.80 
'"^Patel to N.S.Gill. 26 January and 10 Feb. 1947 SPG. Vol.4, p.224 see also 
Sucheta Mahajan op cit. p.264. 
Viceroy to Secretary of State. 22 nov.1946. Mansergh, Transfer of Power Vol. 
IX, pp. 139-40 
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H.B. Chandra , a Congressman f rom Bihar, wrote to Ra jendra Prasad that 
Hindu peasant mobs, by resorting to killings, were only do ing what the 
Congress leaders had asked them to do af ter Noakhali'®^. 
Not only this, Gandhi 's suggestion of appoint ing enquiry commit tee by the 
Government of Bihar was announced to be instituted with much reluctance 
and delay on 13 February 1947. Syed Mahmud wrote to Gandhi that even 
four months af ter the trouble, suspicion and fear persisted, and removing 
them was the main challenge. Mere relief was not enough and even that was 
not entrusted to his charge, despite Maulana Azad's advice to the Chief 
Minister to do so. Syed Mahmud also had to say that even the Congressmen 
had called for avenging Noakhali and they were responsible for the riots. 
The Congressmen who were leading the processions made this sort of call. 
Another contemporary Taqi Rahim also corroborated the content of the letter 
of Syed Mahmud. He wrote that the press, including the Searchlight incited 
the communal riots. Its editor, a Congressman, Murl i Manoha r Prasad, a long 
with K.B.Sahay and Jagat Narayan Lai decided to observe 25 October as 
Naokhali Day and in Patna, a procession shouting s logans like Khoon ka 
hacUa khoon sc Icn^e (blood to be revenged with blood) came out and 
assembled at Gandhi Maidan where under the Presidentship of K.B.Sahay a 
R.P.Papers, 6-B/46, Part 1. S.No.83. 
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public meeting was held. Here, Congressmen themselves del ivered 
extremely inf lammatory speeches"®. 
Responding to Syed Mahmud's letter (dated 16-17 Feb. 1947), Gandhi came 
to Patna on 2 March 1947. Which made the Congress complici ty even more 
clear. The Ministers were opposed to Gandhi 's visit to the a f fec ted vil lages 
on foot . They also opposed Gandhi 's advice that the Bihar government 
should buy Musl im houses in cases where the Mus l ims wanted to move 
f rom them. Gandhi remained annoyed that the Congress Government in 
Bihar had not instituted enquiry committee even after having announced for 
it. This was conveyed by Rajendra Prasad to S.K. Sinha t w i c e ' " . 
The Chief Minister, S. K. Sinha, kept repeating that the League would make 
a political capital if the government appointed an enquiry commit tee . 
Gandhi fur ther advised that Syed Mahmud should be made in charge of the 
relief work, but the Ministers again refused. Thus we find that all these 
factors led the common Musl ims of Bihar to think that regardless of the 
position of the Musl ims vis-a-vis the Musl im League, the c o m m o n Hindus 
including most of the Hindu Congressmen of Bihar thought Mus l ims to be a 
' T a q i Rahim op cit. p.521. (For Syed Mahmud's letter to Gandhi See 
R.P.Papers. 24 C/46-7, S.No.58) 
' ' ' R.P.Papers. 24-C/46-7. Letters dated. 25 March & 19 June 1947 
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separate nation and that the Hindus themselves believed in the two-nat ion 
theory " I 
Once this feel ing seized the hearts and minds of the Musl ims, it became 
almost impossible for the nationalist Musl im organizations to corner the 
Musl im League. In fact, af ter the riots broke out, in Bihar, all such 
organizat ions (most prominent of them being the Imarat-e-Shariah and the 
Momin Conference) got engaged in relief works and in persuading the 
people not to migrate elsewhere. They kept saying that for the Mus l ims of 
Bihar (or fo r that matter of all the aqalliat subahs) Pakistan held nothing. 
Even on 6 October 1947, Naqeeb, the organ of Imarat-e-shariah came with 
an editorial with contents contesting League's two nation theory, reiterated 
its faith in muttahidah qaumiyat (composi te nationalism). The editorial 
asserted that rather than League's brand of nationalism it was composi te 
nat ional ism that "made more political sense" 
Taqi Rahim op cit. p.526 
' Papiya Ghosh, op cit (in lESHR, 34,1,1997. p.l9.) also see Naqeeb, 6 
October1947(editorial). 





An exploration of the response of the Musl ims o f Bihar towards the T w o 
Nation theory from 1940 to 1947 reveals that the Musl im opposi t ion to the 
religious bi-national nationalism of the Musl im League was far more 
pronounced and strong than that in favour of the League. 
The hnarat-e-Shariah remained consistently opposed to the communal 
separatist nationalism of the League. It advocated a kind of state, which 
would remain a non-interventionist in the matters of religion, and made a 
common cause with the Indian National Congress . The Imarat-e-Shariah 
was founded at a time when a large section of Indian Musl im leadership 
(both religious/ traditionally educated; and m o d e m educated ones) were 
disgruntled with the western imperialist designs in the Ot toman Empire as 
well as various issues at home in India. 
This kind of response demonstrated by the Musl ims against the colonialism 
of the west is de fmed by a term called pan-Islamism. This term, here, calls 
for amplif ication, at least in the Indian context. 
24f) 
We may say, pan Islamism was against imperialism; therefore it represented 
the forces of sub nationaHsm'. 
Pertinently, Rizwan Qaiser says that the western intellectuals have not seen 
Muslim resistance against western Imperialism as a manifestation of 
nationalism. Rather it has been dubbed and subsequently propagated by 
them as borne out of religious passion. Whereas similar resistance offered 
by the East European countries against Imperialism has been interpreted as 
manifestation of nationalist sentiments. 
He therefore, strongly asserts that pan Islamism should be viewed as a 
strong cultural resource employed against colonialism to gain independence. 
It was this potential of pan Islamic sentiment that Maulana Abul Kalam 
Azad and Mahatma Gandhi capitalized on to forge Hindu Muslim unity 
against British colonialism to launch the Non cooperation and Khilafat 
Movement^. 
This resurgent anti colonial sentiment could not be accommodated within 
the loyalist Muslim League. Similarly, the Ulema of Bihar displayed even 
stronger commitment to attain Swaraj and religious freedom by establishing 
' Rizwan Qaiser, "Pan Islamism, Hindustan ki Jang-e-Azadi aur Mahatma Gandhi" 
In Jamia (Urdu Journal), June 1996, Delhi. 
Also see Mushirul Hasan, Nationalism and Communal politics in India 1885-1930. Delhi, 1991. p. 121. 
^ See R. K. Trivedi, The Critical Triangle: India, Britain and Turkey 1908-24. Jaipur, 1993. 
Gail Minault, op cit. 
Mushirul Hasan (ed.) Communal and Pan Islamic Trends in Colonial India. Delhi, 1985. 
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the Anjuman-e-Ulama-e-Bihar, which was a forerunner of the Jamiatul 
Ulama-e-Hind and the Imarat-e-Shariah. 
In keeping with the concept of communitarian unity called Muttahidah 
Qaumiyat (Composite Nationalism), they kept fighting both communal 
separatism of the League and colonialism of the British. 
Its leaders supported the view of confining the religion to private sphere and 
banning of contentious religious processions and rituals and also repudiated 
the Two Nation theory of the League, pushed more vigorously after 1940. 
This kind of collaboration with the Indian National Congress, continued 
even after their disillusionment with the Congress, particularly the kind of 
treatment meted out to the Muslims by the Congress Ministry of 1937-39. 
The founder of the Imarat-e-Shariah, Maulana Sajjad, in a longish letter to 
the Congress did declare the Congress to be 'communalist to the core'. But 
their opinion about the League remained unchanged and their resolve to 
fight against the League's separatism or British colonialism remained as 
strong as ever. In contrast quite a few important Congress leaders like Jagat 
Narayan Lai, Murli Manohar Prasad etc. hobnobbed with the Hindu 
Mahasabha and were alleged to have provoked some of the communal riots 
including the riots of 1946. But none of the Imarat-e-Shariah leaders were 
ever alleged to have indulged in such practices. 
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After the Khilafat movement petered out, communal polarizations and 
cleavages between the two communities ftirther sharpened. However, the 
Imarat-e-Shariah in its literature and from its forum continued to espouse 
the idea of Hindu - Muslim unity. It can be said that it was due to the 
ideologies and practices of the Imarat-e-Shariah that the Muslims League 
remained almost non existent till 1937 and even after 1937 it could not 
strike deeper roots as it did in the adjacent provinces of U.P. and Bengal. 
It has been pointed out ^ that the Sufi Khanqahs and the Sajjada Nashins 
(the hereditary religious leaders) exercised their spiritual influence by 
giving religious underpinnings to the rural politics thereby the idea of 
Pakistan came to be looked upon as the establishment of a religious state. 
The network and influence of these spiritual leaders proved to be of great 
help for the League in the 1946 elections. 
Similarly, Ian Talbot^ in his study on Punjab says that despite certain 
limitations of the League (i.e. it being led by the English educated urban 
elites), it was able to mobilize widespread support by relying on the Sufi and 
i 
Kinship networks and thereby, penetrating down to the rural voters which in 
his views, proved decisive in creation of a new Muslim Nation state. 
^ See David Gilmartin, "Religious leadership and the Pakistan Movement in the Punjab". 
In Mushirul Hasan (ed.), India's Partition: Process, Strategy and Mobilization. OUP, Delhi, 1993. 
'' Ian Talbot, "The Growth of the Muslim League in the Punjab 1937-46". 
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The Sufi Khanqahs of Bihar viz. Khanqah-e-Mujibia (Phulwaria Sharif, 
Patna) and Khanqah-e-Rehmania (Munger), however present a contrasting 
picture. They inspired the foundation of Imarat-e-Shariah which fought for 
the Swaraj and was consistently opposed to the League politics. 
The other most formidable and consistent opponent of the League in Bihar 
was the All India Moniin Conference. Migrant Momin Muslims from Bihar 
and U.P founded this organization in Calcutta. However it emerged as an 
important political force in Bihar only. In the adjacent provinces of Bengal 
and U.P., it could neither strike roots nor throw up any effective leadership 
to stand up to the Muslim League. 
In Bihar the Momin Conference was led by Abdul Qaiyum Ansari and under 
his able and competent leadership it put up a formidable resistance against 
British colonialism and communal separatism of the League. Incidentally, 
Abdul Qaiyum Ansari's political career also starts from the Non co-
operation and Khilafat Movement^ 
In Mushirul Hasan (ed.) op cii. 
^ Abdul Qaiyum Ansari entered into the national movement in 1919. Then, he was a student in the Sasaram 
High school. In the wake of the Khilafat Movement, the Ali Brothers visited Sasaram and thus Qaiyum 
Ansari came into their contact, in 1920, he became secretary of Dchri-On-Sone Khilafat Committee and 
participated in the Congress sessions. Afterwards, Abdul Qaiyum Ansari's assertive politics in late 1930s 
and 1940s put a great hurdle before Muslim League in the province by demanding the very same 
concessions and by putting the very same questions that were put by the League before the Congress. 
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The opposition of Momin Muslims to British colonialism also had an 
underlying economic content because weaving, which was their hereditary 
occupation incidentally was the first industry to have been completely 
wiped out by the colonial onslaught. So having been at the receiving end of 
the colonial exploitation, they nursed a grudge against it. 
The Momin Conference's opposition to the League was premised upon class 
analysis. The Conference perceived League as a party of landed aristocracy 
of Muslims whose religious nationalism did not have anything for the lower 
social orders of the Muslims. 
Apart from these two greatly popular organizations, the Muslim leaders 
associated with the Congress were equally popular and were having 
tremendous support base. Almost every district and locality had its own 
popular leaders who kept repudiating the Two Nation Theory. It was due to 
the influence of these leaders that not only the League's separatism 
remained an un-appealing idea but also they ensured the success of the 
Individual Civil Disobedience Movement and the Quit India Movement. Of 
these leaders, besides Syed Mahmud (1889-1971), Abdul Bari (1882-1947), 
Shah Mohammad Umair (1894-1978) and Syed Sulaiman Nadvi (1884-
1953) other very important names are of the Ajazi brothers {i.e. Maghfoor 
Ajazi (1900-1967) and Manzoor Ajazi (1913-1969) of Muzaffarpur. They 
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moved on bicycles knocking one door to another exposing the hollowness 
and dangers inherent in the religious separatist nationalism of the League. 
Maghfoor Ajazi set up All India Jamhoor Muslim League who formidably 
fought against the League's Separatism. The politics of communitarian 
consensus remains an inspiration for the people of Muzaffarpur. 
Shah Mohammad Imam in Gaya played similar role. Husain Mazhar (son of 
Mazharul Haq) and his associates participated in the individual Civil 
Disobedience Movement and they went to the jails. 
During the Quit India Movement Abdul Jaleel played a great role in Tajpur 
(Darbhanga, now Samastipur District) and Fida Hussain in Jehanabad. We 
have a large number of Muslims who sacrificed their lives during the Quit 
India Movement at Bajpatti (Sitamarhi). 
Several students and teachers from the madrasas like Madrasa Shamsul 
Hoda of Patna, Madrasa Ahmadia Salfia of Darbhanga and Madrasa Jamial 
Uloom of Muzaffarpur participated enthusiastically in the Quit India 
Movement and they were the greatest force resisting the League's 
separatism. Interestingly, all these madrasas had come into being in the later 
half of the nineteenth century were heavily influenced by the 'Wahabi' 
movement and its tradition of strong anti colonialism. 
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The leaders associated with the peasant and workers' movements who were 
ideologically aligned to Socialism were another group, which fought British 
colonialism and the League's separatism. Comrade Ali Ashraf, Manzar 
Rizvi, Pirzada Syed Shah Sulaiman, Chaudhry Abul Hasnat of Arrah were 
few such leaders. 
It were these forces who, led by the famous journalist Syed Abdullah of 
Pumea, convened a conference called Azad Muslim Conference in the 
village Sahnola (Bhagalpur) in July 1940, to reject Jinnah's Two Nation 
theory. It is significant to note that the Muslims' contestation against 
Pakistan was not confined to cities only; rather effective mobilizations were 
made in mofussil areas also. 
However this is not to say that the League's separatism did not have any 
takers among the Muslims of Bihar. The League's separatism did find 
significant support in Bihar, particularly after 1937-38, when Jinnah visited 
Patna, addressed a public meeting there, which was the venue of the 26th 
annual session of the Muslim League. Subsequently, on 1st January 1939, 
Jinnah visited Gaya and there also he addressed a public meeting. Patna also 
hosted the session of the AH India Muslim Students' Federation. All these 
developments galvanized a section of Muslims and Muslim League 
Volunteer Corps proliferated across various towns. Syed Abdul Aziz, 
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Mahbub Ahmad Warsi and Jafar Imam were some of the important leaders 
active during this period. 
It is however , s ignif icant to note that till 1937, the League was non-existent . 
Thus the rise of the League after 1937 was spectacular. It is therefore, 
necessary to go into the issues, which probably contributed, to the alienation 
of Musl ims against the Congress paving the way for the League. 
Shortly after the Congress ministry took over in Bihar, several Musl ims 
switched their affi l iat ion from the Congress to the League in Bhagalpur , 
Munger , Arrah and Gaya. 
Shah Mohd . Qasim of Gaya District Congress Commit tee expressed his 
indignation that he had been in the Congress for 20 years but he and his 
fr iends were compel led to leave the Congress because: 
"It was forc ing Hindu Culture and language in disregard of the 
serious object ions made known to the Congress by the Imarat-e-
Shariah and the Jamiat-ul-Ulemar 
Syed Qamruddin , Congress leader of Gaya left the party observ ing that: 
" the Congress had become another name for the Hindu 
Mahasabha which was ready to give Musl ims anything but power 
so much so that not only Syed Mahmud was denied the 
Premiership but when Shah Md. Omair lost the 1937 election, he 
was not nominated by the Congress to the legislative council . 
Even though he was made chairman of the Gaya Municipal i ty, his 
powers were reduced". 
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Immediately af ter that, Molvi Abdul Hameed Reshmi, Secretary of 
Congress Musl im Mass Contact Committee alleged that many of the district 
Congress leaders who were also off ice bearers of the Hindu Mahasabha had 
played a distinctly communal role during the Bhagalpur riot of July 1938, 
over a Rath Yatra procession. An enquiry made by the Congress confirmed 
this allegation.^ 
It needs to be repeated here that each of three N'luslim League reports (viz. 
Pirpur Report , Fazulul Haq ' s and Shareef report) had made similar charges 
against the Congress that indicted the Bihar Congress for having unleashed 
a 'Hindu R a j ' . 
Maulana Qamar of Darbhanga, Maulana M o h a m m a d Abbas , Mahfzul Haq 
V. 
etc. left the Congress to join the Musl im League on these gr ievances only. 
The 'genuine and sincere aversion for the C o n f e s s ' can be understood by 
Maulana Sa j j ad ' s letter also^. This letter revealed that even the anti League 
and Nationalis t Mus l ims also had to reach at an inevitable conclusion that 
the Congress was ' communal is t to the core ' . . 
Even Syed M a h m u d had also to undergo a painful experience. 
' In the course of his tenure as minister of educat ion, Syed 
M a h m u d found the charge that he had been favour ing Musl ims, 
^ AICC papers No. G-22/1938. 
AICC papers No. G-42/I939. 
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' so pa in fu l ' that it was only because of his ' s t rong sense ' of 
loyalty to the Congress that he did not burst up ' (Sic). 
Thus, he wrote to Rajendra Prasad, that on the one hand, the Musl ims 
thought that their claims were being over looked. O n the other hand, he was 
told that ' in Congress circle ' it was thought, he was ex tending favours in 
employment only to Musl ims. He presented the list of Mus l im appointees to 
the provincial Congress committee to prove that in fact he had 'appointed 
7 8 
none . 
And Syed M a h m u d even made known to Gandhij i that the gr ievances of the 
Musl ims were not merely due to the propaganda of the League a lone . ' 
Another mistake commit ted by the Congress leadership was that even as the 
Congress report on the 1938 Bhagalpur riot blamed both the Mus l im League 
and the Hindu Mahasabha and even after the Congress confessed a 
Congress-
Hindu Mahasabha overlap in Bhagalpur. 
In general , the Congress kept blaming and counter ing only the Musl im 
League and not the Hindu Mahasabha. 
Syed Mahmud to Rajendra Prasad dated 18 July 1938. In V.C. P. Chaudhry (ed.), Dr. Rajendra Prasad: 
Correspondence and Select Documents. Vol. II. New Delhi, p. 70. 
Papiya Ghosh, "The Making of the Congress Muslim Stereotype: Bihar 1937-39". 
\nlESHR. 28.4 , 1991 
Ibid. p. 432. 
The Search light, 20 December 1938 and AICC Papers No. G-22/1938 
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This becomes more clear when we see that the Congress ministry did create 
a Muslims' propaganda department (to counter the Muslim League's 
mischievous propaganda politics) but no such effort was directed against the 
Hindu Mahasabha." 
Thus, even a Muslim League leader from Bihar i.e. Abdul Aziz, had to say, 
"at one time the Congress had considerable Muslim support. But 
it had subsequently alienated the Muslims by its acts of omission 
and commission." 
In fact, this alienation started from the Shahabad riots of 1917 itself. 
Afterwards, the Hindu Mahasabha's Shudhi activities had started during 
1920s in Bihar. Jagat Narayan Lai (who was a member of both the Hindu 
Mahasabha and the Congress) was one of the leaders who were in the 
forefront of the Shudhi campaign. 
Darbhanga Gazette, Mittila Mihir, Dharmbir, Kayastha Patrika (Gaya) etc. 
recklessly poured out venoms advocating attaining Swaraj with Hindus 
alone. Whereas, in sharp contrast with this, we don't come across any such 
Urdu newspaper in Bihar indulging in spreading the communal poison. 
However, despite the Hindu Mahasabha's assertion in 1920s and Muslim 
League's rise after 1937, the appeal of the League's separatism remained 
much weaker in Bihar as compared to the strength of the League in the two 
'' Papiya Ghosh, "Articulating Community Rights: the Muslim League and Hindu Mahasabha in Congress 
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adjacent provinces of Bengal and U.P. So much so that the Bihar Provincial 
Muslim League could not project any upper rank leader to the All India 
Muslim League whereas the provincial Congress Committee, since the 
beginning was able to have some Muslim leaders of all India political 
stature like Dr. Syed Mahmud, Prof. Abdul Bari, Shah Mohammad Umair, 
Syed Zahurul Hasan Hashmi, Shah Mohammad Umair, Shah Mohammad 
Zubair, Maulvi Ismail, Dr. Zainul Abidin Nadvi, Qazi Ahmad Husain and 
many others who formed the core of Nationalist Muslims in Bihar. It was 
due to the efforts of these leaders that the Pirpur Report's call for migration 
of Muslims from Bihar to 'escape the dread of Hindu majority' was largely 
unheeded. 
It was the events of 1937-1939 and the riots of 1946 that threw the Muslims 
into the vortex of the pro-Pakistan and anti Pakistan politics. 
There were large-scale killings of Hindus in Calcutta and Noakhali and the 
Suhrawardy led ministry did nothing to stop this orgy of rioting. Against 
these killings the Bihar Congressmen called for a hartal in Patna on 25 
October 1946, which was being observed as Noakhali Day. The communal 
atmosphere got so charged that it set off a series of riots in different places 
of Bihar. The complicity of the Congressmen, particularly its lower strata, in 
Bihar, 1937-39" in South Asia, Vol. 14, 1991. 
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these riots marred the reputation of the Congress as a secular organization in 
the eyes of the Muslims. 
That this was no mere allegation is substantiated by the confessions of 
some Congressmen to Gandhi about their participation in the riot/^ 
In Patna, it was Jagat Narayan Lai, the leading Congressman of the district, 
organized the anti Noakhali meeting that precipitated the outbreak of riots. 
Wavell also testifies to the complicity of the Congressmen in the riots. 
He noted that, in Bihar, the lower strata of the Congress planned the 
outbreaks'^. 
The riots of 1946 provided Muslim League with the opportunity to cash in 
on the injured feelings of Muslims against Congress and carve out a space 
for itself in their hearts and minds. The Muslim League cadres from Bengal 
went around the relief camps in Bihar and spread rumours which 
accentuated the fear psychosis of the Muslims and thereby adding to the 
panic in order to drive them to Dhaka. 
Papiya Ghosh says: 
"The riots of 1946, thus, saw the crystallization of communal 
identities. 
" Pyarelal, Mahatma Gandhi: The Last Phase, vol. 1, Ahmedabad, 1956, pp 624-27 
" N. Mansergh, Transfer of Power. Vol. IX, p. 140. New Delhi, 22 November, 1946; Wavell - Pethik 
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A combination of propaganda and the dimensions of the riot 
metamorphosed community consciousness among Hindus and 
Muslims into political identities." 
Things had come to such a pass that division of Bihar on communal lines 
was contemplated. The proposition was deliberated in a meeting called 
'Division of Bihar Conference' in Gaya on 19 April 1947. The meeting 
which was presided over by Chaudhry Abid Husain, a Muslim League 
MLA, demanded that 'the province of Bihar be forthwith partitioned into 
Hindu and non Hindu autonomous provinces'. The conference met again at 
Kishanganj. Raja Ghazanfar Ali who presided over the meeting, even 
specified the districts to be included in the Muslim majority province to be 
carved out from Bihar. 
It is significant to note that in this rhetoric of division of Bihar, the idea was 
to create a safe haven for the beleaguered community within the bounds of 
the state. A majority of the League leadership in Bihar, including its leading 
politician, Syed Abdul Aziz dissuaded the people from migrating out of 
Bihar and he himself did not migrate. 
The migrations that took place were, a panic reaction to the series of riots 
' Papiya Ghosh, The 1946 Riot and the Exodus... 
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engineered by local Congressmen and irteJTiciently contained by the 
Congress led ministry. The cadres from the Bengal Muslim League who 
came as relief workers further exacerbated the^feeling of panic by resorting 
to rumour mongering, which induced a migratjbn spree among the Muslims 
« 
of Bihar. 
In this whole episode, the complicity oj^'^^ihar Muslim League is 
conspicuously either marginal or absent. 
In fact, an account of the career of the Muslim i . ^ g u e in Bihar says that, 
" during the early days it was free from^ommunal character, if 
not entirely, very greatly. Probably, the leadership of Mazharul 
Haq and other such people were of great help, who kept opposing 
the separate electorate". 
Needless to say, the separate electorate was the key reason for the 
communitarian division. It may also be recalled here that the Hindu Sabha 
of Bihar also followed the same trend in its early days. The Congressmen 
like Dr. Rajendra Prasad, Sri Krishna Sinha, Sachidanand Sinha, Deep 
Narayan Singh, Langat Singh and the 'Maharaja' of Darbhanga founded it'^. 
In the post Khilafat days, the Muslim League became non-existent in Bihar 
to be re\ ived only after the formation of the Congress ministry in 1937. 
Jata Shankar Jha, "An Unpublished Correspondence Relating to the Hindu Sabha in Bihar" JBRS, 1968. 
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However, it was only the riots of 1946, which could exacerbate the situation 
beyond redemption. Even then, as compared to Bengal and UP, the Muslim 
separatism definitely remained much weaker in Bihar. The reason for this 
can be traced" in the 19th century itself, when not only the movement of 
1857 was fought shoulder to shoulder by the two communities, but also the 
educational institutions and political organizations (including the Congress) 
were set up by a remarkable co-operation between the two communities. 
These harmonious/ consensual approaches did significantly marginalize (if 
not eliminated) the communally divisive issues like cow slaughter. Though, 
the organizations like Gaurakshini Sabhas since late 19th century and the 
Hindu Sabha (1st in 1907 and then in 1911 and more pronouncedly in 
1920s) and Shudhi/ Sangathan campaign did continue to vitiate the polity 
and society of Bihar. This is however, a significant thing about Bihar's 
polity and society that such divisive trends were not as much stronger force 
in Bihar unlike those in its neighbouring provinces of UP and Bengal. 
The present study, therefore, suggests that while making any generalization 
about the Partition, the region of Bihar cannot be clubbed with UP. 
Because, not only in the colonial period but also in the post colonial period, 
the political behaviour of the Muslims have been strikingly different in 
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Bihar and UP, notwithstanding the linguistic and other similarities between 
the two provinces. 
To sum up, the present work suggests that confining the investigation to 
Muslim separatism may not tell us the whole story of partition. The general 
belief that partition was a consequence only of the separatist politics of the 
Muslim minorities is something not testified by this study. At least in the 
case of Bihar, some of the causes of the partition also lie beyond the Muslim 
League. 
Broadly speaking, there were four milestones in the history of Hindu-
Muslim rift in twentieth century colonial Bihar, 
(a) Shahabad Riots 1917: 
After these riots (during 1917-23) Bihar witnessed, " a reconstruction of 
the terrain in which Hindu-Muslim antagonism appeared to be 
hardening"'^ 
While the Muslim leaders like Mazharul Haq, Hasan Imam, Sarfarz 
Husain Khan etc, expediently dismissed the details of the mosques 
defiled, women raped etc. so that the animosity may seize to exist but the 
Hindu Mahasabha pitched its shudhi campaign after 1922 quite 
" Ghosh, Papiya, "Community Question and Bihar Politics 1917-23". 
Indian Historical Review (IHR) 1-2, July 1989-January 1990. p 195. 
262 
stridently. Ironically many district level Congressmen remained 
associated with the Hindu Mahasabha besides the leaders of larger 
stature like Rajendra Prasad and Sri Krishna Sinha. 
rb) The Electoral politics of 1923 and 1926. 
In the municipal, District Board, and Council elections of 
1923 and 1926 certain undesirable things happened which 
poisoned the politics of Bihar. 
The defeat of: 
(i) Veteran Congressman, Shafi Daudi in the District 
Board elections of Muzaffarpur, 
(ii) Mazharul Haq in the election to the Bihar Legislative Council 
(iii) Hadi Husain in the District Board elections of Gaya. 
This kind of electoral results combined with militant 
spadework of Hindu Mahasabha, Arya Samaj and the Shudhi 
movements created a wide gulf between Hindus and 
Muslims'^. 
(c) Certain grievances against the Congress Ministry 1937-39 
" Kamta Chaubey, op at pp 181 -82, 229-30. 
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During the Congress ministry,s tiie League made a 
breakthrough by blowing the cases of drscriminations 
against the Muslims out of proportion. 
But, 'mere reconstruction of the League's view is 
I Q 
misleading' . 
Congress' refusal to make an alliance with the MIP, preferring S.K. Sinha to 
S. Mahmud for the premiership'^ dismissing Sultan Ahmad from the post of 
Advocate General, anti Urdu attitudes of the Congress ministry^", 
the series of riots and Congress-Hindu Mahasabha nexus^' 
etc. led to disillusionment of a large number of Muslim « 
leaders of Congress in Bhagalpur, Munger, Arrah, Gaya etc. 
Many of them switched over to the League, 
(d) The riots of 1946 
These riots proved a major turning point when even the 
Congressmen were involved in the planning and execution 
of 
" Papiya Ghosh, "The Making of the Congress- Muslim Stereotype Bihar 1937-39" 
lESHR. vol 28, No 4. 1991 pp 417-34 
Also see Papi>a Ghosh. ""Articulating Community Rights The Muslim League and the Hindu Mahasabha in Congress 
Bihar 1937-39 Souih -Isia. New Series, vol 14, No 2 December, 1991 pp 79-97 
" Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, India wins Freedom, Delhi, 1988 pp 16-17 
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riots^^. This series of riotings was triggered off by the 
observance of Noakhali Day in Patna on 25"' October in 
which the Congressmen were leading the procession. During 
the procession taken out, provocative and divisive slogans 
were raised. The leading dailies like Indian Nation and the 
Searchlight kept publishing inflammatory and provocative 
write-ups, which also added, further fuel to the fire. The 
editor of the Searchlight, Murli Manohar Prasad was 
particularly provocative in his conduct even though he had 
won the provincial elections of 1946 from Tirhut (urban) 
area, unopposed on the Congress ticket. 
The involvements of landed elites were also evident from 1880s (the 
Gaurakshini Sabha led riots) to 1946 riots. 
Notwithstanding the abovementioned factors, in the society and polity of 
Bihar, the Muslim proclix ities were more towards the Congress or towards 
the Socialist forces rather than with the forces like the League. A survey of 
the rise and growth of the Muslim League in Bihar clearly shows that from 
1908 (when the BPML was founded) to 1920, it remained liberal, non-
communal and even opposed to the separate electorate. From 1920 to 1937, 
22 Pyare Lai, op cit, p. 641. Mansergh, op at vol. ix p. 140. 
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the League was non-existent. From 1937-38 onwards , it made a 
breakthirough in divisive politics, yet it could never produce any single 
leader of national eminence. The most important leader of the League in 
Bihar, Syed Abdul Aziz dissuaded Musl ims f rom migrat ing out of Bihar in 
1946 riots. 
Despite the communal izat ion of the lower rungs of the Congress , it was 
largely due to the ideals set by the Congress-led national movement that the 
all-inclusive ideals like religious pluralism and secular democracy remains 
the guiding principles of Independent India. The Congress may be blamed 
for many things but there is no gainsaying the fact that this was the only 
organization, which had not pursued any sectional or sectoral demands. The 
fact therefore remains that India could be partitioned only in the presence of 
British. Were the British not in a hurry to leave India, as evident f rom the 
preponement of the date of independence. Similarly the haste in which the 
Radcl i f fe Commiss ion was given the task of demarcat ion of the boundar ies 
between the two newly created dominions. Bihar Mus l ims were dazed, 
bewildered and broken then and thereafter, inspite of their consistent 
resistance to the very idea of Partition as we have seen above. And those 
Bihar Mus l ims w h o opted for Pakistan at best remained Muha j i r s in the land 
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